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Section 1: Instructions for users  
Please take note of the following:  
The aim of this evaluation indicator document is to provide suggestions to policy-makers and 
practitioners as to how they could measure particular outcomes as outlined in the Australian 
and New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee’s National Countering Violent Extremism 
Evaluation Framework and Guide (Research and Evaluation Working Group CVE Sub-
Committee, 12 May 2018). In Table 6 of that document, numerous example indicators are listed 
under various high-level outcomes. This document focuses on the sub-outcomes listed in Table 
6 (e.g., Outcome 1.1, Outcome 1.2, Outcome 2.3, Outcome 2.4).  
 
We have imposed some parameters in our review of different example indicators. While certain 
example indicators listed in Table 6 are easily defined and quantified (e.g., indicator number 
of intervention programs, under Outcome 3.1), others are more ambiguous in their focus (e.g., 
indicator social cohesion, under Outcome 1.3). Hence, a range of suggested measures can exist 
for particular example indicators, some of which have been debated and reviewed across a 
number of different policy and research fields. We have not reviewed the full body of work 
relating to particular example indicators given the extent of the existing literature and the 
number of suggested measures that already exist. Hence, there will be possible applicable 
measures we have not listed or considered. Other researchers, policy-makers and practitioners 
may have different ideas about or opinions on how certain example indicators should be 
defined and measured. This document is not meant to be a descriptive tool, and there will be 
occasions where suggested ways of measuring a particular example indicator will need to be 
adapted.  
 
There will be differences of opinion on how certain example indicators listed in Table 6 can 
best be measured using either quantitative or qualitative methods. For some indicators, no 
standard metric or agreed to method of evaluation exists; therefore, for some indicators we 
have provided a broad description of how they might be measured rather than stipulating a 
specific metric. We have explained the relevance of each indicator to the field of countering 
violent extremism (CVE). Some indicators overlap, and ways of measuring them will be the 
same. We highlight these overlaps throughout this document. 
 
Readers should be aware that the authors were not involved in discussions about the inclusion 
of example indicators listed in Table 6, why they were chosen and why stakeholders believed 
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they were relevant to CVE programs. We have taken the indicators as agreed and examined 
their applicability and measurement. Some readers may question the relevance or validity of 
indicators listed in Table 6.  
 
Some of the example indicators listed in Table 6 have not been specifically measured or 
operationalised in the CVE field, and caution is needed when translating one method of 
measuring a certain issue (i.e., an outcome) to a different policy or research field. Many of the 
example indicators listed in Table 6 of the National Countering Violent Extremism Evaluation 
Framework and Guide, under ‘Individuals, Environment and Communities’, relate to different 
aspects of what has been termed ‘resilience’. The aim of this document is not to provide a 
comprehensive overview of how resilience can be measured as a CVE outcome.  
 
When it comes to applying any of the suggested methods of measuring the indicators listed in 
Table 6, one must be cautious in assuming there is a causal link between a program and an 
observed reduction or change in certain behaviours or attitudes that a measurement tool or 
dataset may demonstrate. That is, the data may demonstrate a change (e.g., improved critical 
thinking or wellbeing, increased community awareness of violent extremism, positive 
perceptions of Australia, recall of media campaigns, successful rehabilitation); however, this 
measured change or impact may not have been the result of the program itself. Other influential 
factors may also be at play that have not been captured or considered in the chosen method of 
evaluation.  
 
This evaluation indicator document aims to supplement the National Countering Violent 
Extremism Evaluation Framework and Guide (2017). Section 2 reviews each sub-outcome 
listed in Table 6. We provide a definition of the outcome, followed by suggested ways of 
measuring it, as well as drawing on pre-existing measures that exist across a range of research 
and policy fields. This is then followed by a brief summary of the relevance of the example 
indicator to CVE and how it should be understood as applicable to CVE evaluation. Appendix 
A provides an overview of existing CVE guides, tool kits and metrics developed by various 
research institutes and academics. It is important to note that in providing a list of these 
resources, we are not endorsing those documents as examples of good practice in CVE 
evaluation. They are simply provided as a list of additional resources.  
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At the start of each section we have provided an overview of each outcome indicator. We 
strongly recommend that these summary tables are not used in isolation from the contents of 
each section. 
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Section 2 – Measuring outcome indicators  
Outcome 1 – Communities and individuals are resilient to violent extremism 
Outcome 1.1 – Individuals 
Summary Table  
Outcome 1.1 – Individuals 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following eight indicators:  
 Critical thinking skills. 
 Coping skills. 
 Sense of belonging. 
 Self-efficacy. 
 Strong cultural identity combined with openness to other sources of belonging. 
 Wellbeing. 
 Social participation. 
 Strong social skills, problem solving and conflict resolution skills. 
Why measure? 
This outcome relates to building individual resilience and self-confidence and increasing 
protective factors against an individual’s radicalisation to violent extremism. Individuals 
who feel a strong sense of worth and are well connected to society (positive relationships 
with family and friends) are likely to be more resilient against negative anti-social influences 
that may lead them down a pathway of radicalisation. The capacity to solve problems through 
non-conflictual means can be understood as a protective factor against violent extremism. A 
lack of a sense of belonging to mainstream society and connectedness to social institutions 
(e.g., schools) can result in individuals seeking alternative avenues to develop a sense of 
identity. A CVE program may aim to improve self-efficacy (i.e., capacity to cope), increase 
the level of connectedness an individual feels towards his/her local community, or encourage 
positive behaviours and attitudes towards self, the local community and the wider Australian 
community. The ability of individuals to cope effectively and constructively with the 
challenges they face is important to tackling radicalisation. 
Ways of measuring 
CVE programs may aim to increase social participation though a range of activities, thus 
triggering a greater sense of connectedness to mainstream values and norms and extending 
a sense of belonging. Programs may aim to assess a client's changing behaviours/beliefs 
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through their willingness to engage in various activities. Individuals identified as at risk of 
radicalisation could be assessed overtime to evaluate improvements in particular skills or 
problem-solving strategies gained through participation in a CVE intervention. A range of 
tools are proposed to measure these outcomes (e.g., Youth Life Skills Survey; Ways of 
Coping Measure; COPE Scale; Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale; Sense of Belonging 
Scale; Connection to Community Scale; General Self-Efficacy Scale; Multi-group Ethnic 
Identity Measure; Emotional Stability Scale; Quality of Life Survey; Attitude Toward 
Neighbourhood and Civic Obligation Scale; Social Problem-Solving Inventory). Some 
instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted 
accordingly.   
 
Indicator: Critical thinking skills  
Critical thinking can be understood as the ability to think clearly and rationally about what to 
do or what to believe, enabling an individual to actively judge, assess and challenge their 
thoughts and reflect on their attitudes and behaviours (Behar-Horenstein & Niu, 2011; Ennis, 
1985; Lau & Chan, 2017). Critical thinking encourages an individual to ask questions such as: 
‘why should I do or refrain from doing that?’ or ‘why should I believe that, or not believe it?’ 
(Bowell & Kemp, 2005). It encourages them to look for reasons and arguments to support their 
behaviours and beliefs, and to consider the implications of these behaviours and beliefs (Fisher, 
2001). Specific abilities associated with critical thinking include the ability to analyse 
arguments, claims or evidence, make inferences using inductive or deductive reasoning, judge 
and evaluate decisions and reflect on the justification given for one’s own beliefs and values 
(Lau & Chan, 2017). It includes an individual's ability to analyse attempts made by others to 
persuade them by evaluating whether they are providing valid arguments (Bowell & Kemp, 
2005). Questions that reflect critical thinking include:  
1. What precise question or problem am I trying to answer? 
2. From what point of view or perspective am I thinking? 
3. What information am I using to base my decision upon? 
4. Have I sought information from multiple sources or points of view? 
5. Am I consistent in interpreting the information and alternative points of view? 
6. How am I interpreting this information? 
7. Am I drawing inferences that are logical and follow from the evidence? 
(Source: http://www.partcanada.org/critical-thinking--eip).  
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Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Standardised tests of critical thinking include the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal 
(WGCTA) (Watson & Glaser, 1991), one of the most widely used measurement tools to assess 
critical thinking in education and potential employment settings (El Hassan & Madham, 2007), 
and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test (see Ennis & Millman, 2005), which is commonly used 
amongst younger students in an educational setting to assess their critical thinking abilities. 
Many scales of critical thinking must be purchased due to licencing restrictions.  
 
Many of these tests are limited because they are designed to measure an individual’s critical 
thinking ability at a single point in time, not the process itself of using strategies and approaches 
to support the application of critical thinking to everyday problems – an important outcome of 
programs that aim to promote critical thinking. More appropriate measurement tools for use by 
program developers include:   
 
The Youth Life Skills Survey (Mincemoyer et al., 2001; Mincemoyer & Perkins, 2005)  
This survey was developed for use with youth between the ages of eight and 18, and includes 
a subset of questions on critical thinking. The scale contains 20 items assessing elements of 
critical thinking, those being reasoning, enquiry, analysis/information processing, flexibility 
and evaluation. The 20 items are:  
1. I think of possible results before I take action. 
2. I get ideas from other people when having a task to do. 
3. I develop my ideas by gathering information. 
4. When facing a problem, I identify options to solve it. 
5. I can easily express my thoughts on a problem. 
6. I am able to give reasons for my opinions. 
7. It is important for me to get information to support my opinions. 
8. I usually have more than one source of information before making a decision. 
9. I plan where to get information on a topic. 
10. I plan how to get information on a topic. 
11. I put my ideas in order by importance. 
12. I back my decisions by the information I got.    
13. I listen to the ideas of others even if I disagree with them.  
14. I compare ideas when thinking about a topic.  
15. I keep my mind open to different ideas when planning to make a decision.     
16. I am aware that sometimes there are no right or wrong answers to a question.  
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17.  I develop a checklist to help me think about an issue.  
18.  I can easily tell what I did was right or wrong.  
19.  I am able to tell the best way of handling a problem.  
20.  I make sure the information I use is correct.  
(Response options: 1= never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always.)  
 
Critical thinking skills and relevance to the CVE context 
When applied to the CVE context, developing critical thinking skills can help individuals 
question the validity of arguments put forward by extremist groups to attract them to their cause 
and that are used to justify their actions. This could include the capacity of young Muslims to 
assess the reliability and validity of the religious explanations groups like ISIS use to justify 
targeting civilians, or statements made by such groups to argue that Muslims in Western 
countries are obliged to undertake violent jihad. The acquisition of critical thinking skills (e.g., 
referring to other Islamic sources, schools of thought or scholars) is important to reduce the 
influence of these groups and their ability to encourage young Muslims to commit acts of 
terrorism via their extremist propositions. The same applies to far right extremism, where 
similar binary perspectives are used to vilify immigrants and ethnic groups (Hamm & Spaaij, 
2017). Seeking out alternative explanations and questioning the foundation of such propaganda 
is essential to weakening the influence of extremist groups. Strategies to develop critical 
thinking are included in CVE programs and include psychological elements designed to 
directly challenge the thoughts, beliefs and attitudes of individuals at risk of radicalisation, or 
those who have committed extremist acts. For example, the Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) 
(see Dean, 2014, 2016; NOMS, 2013; Jones, 2015) and the Developing Dialogue Toolkit (see 
Jones, 2015), both of which are part of interventions delivered by the UK’s Prison and 
Probation Service to convicted terrorists, have modules on critical thinking. These are not 
publicly available.  
 
The measures outlined above to assess critical thinking are generic, and there is no validated, 
publicly available critical thinking scale as it relates to violent extremism. One issue to keep in 
mind when assessing levels of critical thinking among people who have committed or who are 
at risk of committing violent extremism, is the content of the types of messages or propositions 
with which they engage (i.e., the evidentiary base or rationalisations underpinning them). 
Hence, measuring any change in critical thinking would need to examine the general attributes 
of critical thinking, but also its application to the type of violent extremism (e.g., Islamists or 
far right/left) towards which an individual has gravitated.  
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Indicator: Coping skills  
Coping skills encompass behavioural and psychological strategies that people adopt to master, 
tolerate, reduce or minimise stressful events or tasks (Cooper, Katona & Livingston, 2008; 
Taylor, 1998). They can include problem-solving strategies involving efforts to alleviate or 
solve demanding tasks, and emotion-focused coping strategies which aim to regulate an 
emotional response to stressful or potentially stressful events (Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1980; Taylor, 1998). Coping skills can be both constructive/adaptive and 
destructive/maladaptive. Constructive/adaptive coping skills can include activities that 
encourage positive behaviour and thinking regarding how to solve particular problems or 
challenges a person may face in their lives. One example is the application of strategies that 
involve goal setting. Destructive/maladaptive coping skills may include negative behaviours 
or reactions such as social withdrawal or aggression. Being able to cope constructively with 
particularly stressful or challenging situations is synonymous with resilience (Windle et al., 
2011).  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Direct measures of coping skills 
Two measurement tools have been used to directly measure coping skills. These include: 
 
Ways of Coping Measure (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980) 
Ways of Coping (Revised) (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). 
The Ways of Coping measure aims to assess a range of thoughts and actions people use to deal 
with the internal and/or external demands of specific stressful encounters. The revised and 
shorter version measures eight dimensions through 67 items. The eight dimensions and 
example items include: 
1. Confrontive coping e.g., ‘I stood my ground and fought for what I wanted’. 
2. Distancing e.g., ‘I went on as if nothing had happened’. 
3. Self-controlling e.g., ‘I tried not to act too hastily or follow my first hunch’. 
4. Seeking social support e.g., ‘I asked a relative or friend I respected for advice’. 
5. Accepting responsibility e.g., ‘I realised I brought the problem on myself’. 
6. Escape–Avoidance e.g., ‘I avoided being with people in general’. 
7. Planful problem solving e.g., ‘I knew what had to be done, so I doubled my efforts to make 
things work’. 
8. Positive reappraisal e.g., ‘I changed or grew as a person in a good way’.  
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(Response options: 0 – does not apply and/or not used, 1 – used somewhat, 2 – used quite a 
bit, 3 – used a great deal.) 
 
COPE (see Carver et al., 1989) 
Brief COPE (see Carver, 1997) 
The original COPE measurement tool measures 14 dimensions across 53 items on how an 
individual may respond when they are confronted with difficult or stressful events in their life. 
The shortened version, Brief COPE, was developed to be a more workable instrument 
depending on the context. Some example items include: 
1. Active coping e.g., ‘I've been taking action to try to make the situation better’. 
2. Substance use e.g., ‘I've been using alcohol or other drugs to make myself feel better’. 
3. Use of emotional support e.g., ‘I've been getting emotional support from others’. 
4. Use of instrumental support e.g., ‘I’ve been getting help and advice from other people’. 
5. Behavioural disengagement e.g., ‘I've been giving up trying to deal with it’.  
6. Venting e.g., ‘I've been expressing my negative feelings’. 
7. Positive reframing e.g., ‘I've been looking for something good in what is happening’. 
8. Planning e.g., ‘I've been thinking hard about what steps to take’. 
9. Humour e.g., ‘I've been making jokes about it’. 
10. Acceptance e.g., ‘I've been learning to live with it’. 
11. Religion e.g., ‘I've been praying or meditating’. 
(Response options: 1 – I haven't been doing this at all, 2 – I've been doing this a little bit, 3 – 
I've been doing this a medium amount, 4 – I've been doing this a lot.)  
 
Coping skills measured as resilience 
Coping skills are considered synonymous with resilience, and numerous resilience scales have 
been developed and presented in the literature (see Windle et al., 2011). These can act as proxy 
measures of coping skills. Examples include: 
 
The Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) (see Connor & Davidson, 2003) 
The original CD-RISC comprised 25 items, each rated on a 5-point scale of 0 – not true at all, 
1 – rarely true, 2 – sometimes true, 3 – often true, and 4 – true nearly all of the time, with higher 
scores reflecting greater resilience. A shortened version, including 10 of the original items that 
have also been validated and tested, could be a more workable measurement tool in some 
contexts (Campbell-Sills & Stein, 2007). This refined version includes the following 10 items:   
1. Able to adapt to change. 
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2. Can deal with whatever comes. 
3. Tries to see the humorous side of things. 
4. Coping with stress can strengthen me. 
5. Tend to bounce back after illness or hardship. 
6. Can achieve goals despite obstacles. 
7. Can stay focused under pressure. 
8. Not easily discouraged by failure. 
9. Think of self as a strong person. 
10. Can handle unpleasant feelings. 
 
Resiliency, Attitudes and Skills Profile (RASP) (see Hurtes & Allen, 2001) 
This is a measurement tool specifically developed for measuring resiliency in youth for 
recreation and other social services. It could also be used for CVE programs and interventions, 
particularly those aimed at youth at risk. RASP measures seven dimensions of resiliency across 
34 items, with each item measured on a six-point response scale from 1 – strongly disagree to 
6 – strongly agree. Some example items include:  
1. Insights e.g., ‘I learn from my mistakes’; ‘I know when I am good at something’. 
2. Independence e.g., ‘I say ‘no’ to things I don’t want to do’. 
3. Creativity e.g., ‘When I am faced with a tough situation, I came up with new ways to handle 
it’. 
4. Humour e.g., ‘I look for the “lighter side” of tough situations’. 
5. Initiative e.g., ‘I can change my surroundings’; ‘I try to figure out things I do not 
understand’. 
6. Relationships e.g., ‘I avoid people who could get me into trouble’. 
7. Values orientation e.g., ‘It’s ok if I don’t see things the way other people do’; ‘I avoid 
situations where I could get into trouble’. 
     
Coping skills and relevance to the CVE context 
The ability of individuals to cope effectively and constructively with stressors and challenges 
they face in their lives is important to tackling radicalisation because, for some individuals, 
violent extremism could be an outcome of destructive or maladaptive coping skills. This has 
been found in some cases of lone wolf terrorists (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017). Hence, constructive 
coping skills can act as a protective factor against violent extremism. Further, lacking the 
ability to cope with everyday stressors and challenges may leave an individual feeling isolated 
and therefore open to negative and anti-social influences, which may lead them down a 
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pathway of radicalisation. It could leave them vulnerable to extremist groups who can 
provide a sense of belonging (whether in the virtual world or through group interactions). 
Providing individuals with constructive or adaptive coping skills can potentially help them 
avoid extremist ideologies or groups that aim to exploit feelings of disenchantment, depression 
and isolation (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). Measures of coping skills, such as those described 
above, could be used on individuals identified as at risk of radicalisation with changes 
measured over time to see how their coping skills improve through a particular intervention.  
 
Indicator: Sense of belonging 
Sense of belonging is similar to the indicator social participation. Both relate to the level of 
connectedness an individual feels towards his/her local community and/or the wider Australian 
community. Sense of belonging differs to social participation as it specifically relates to the 
degree to which an individual identifies with or relates to their local community and/or the 
wider Australian community. In other words, does the individual consider themselves as 
belonging to and being accepted by a specific group or the mainstream Australian population? 
A sense of belonging has been found to influence an individual’s health and wellbeing and is 
closely related to social and psychological functioning. It is an important element for mental 
health and social wellbeing, and may help build individual resilience (Hagerty et al., 2001). A 
sense of belonging can have two defining attributes: (1) the experience of being valued, needed, 
or important with respect to other people, groups or environments, and (2) the experience of 
fitting in or being congruent with other people, groups or environments through shared or 
complementary characteristics (Hagerty et al., 2001). The concept has been applied across a 
variety of policy and research domains, including education, youth mental health and 
wellbeing.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
The literature recommends that a sense of belonging be measured at the program level (i.e., 
measuring an individual’s sense of belonging within a particular program), or at the community 
level (measuring an individual’s sense of belonging to the wider community).  
 
Program level 
A sense of belonging at a program level represents the level of belonging/safety/attachment an 
individual feels to a particular program in which they are participating. The two following 
Sense of Belonging Scales (10-item and 5-item) are ways of measuring this at the program 
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level, and have been used to evaluate youth-focused prevention programs, such as Big 
Brothers/Big Sisters in the USA (Arthur, 1997).  
 
Sense of Belonging Scale  
(10-Item Belonging Scale) 
1. I don’t have many friends at the program.  
2. I feel comfortable at the program.  
3. The leaders at the program make me feel 
wanted and accepted.  
4. I feel like I am an important member of the 
program. 
5. I wish I were not a part of the program. 
6. I am disliked by kids at the program.  
7. I am a part of the program.  
8. I am committed to the program.  
9. I am supported at the program.  
10. I am accepted at the program. 
(Arthur, 1997) 
Sense of Belonging Scale  
(5-Item Belonging Scale) 
1. I feel comfortable at the program.  
2. I am a part of the program.  
3. I am committed to the program.  
4. I am supported at the program.  
5. I am accepted at the program. 
(Anderson-Butcher & Conroy, 2002)  
 
 
 
Community level 
The Connection to Community Scale and the Social Trust Scale, developed by Price et al., 
(2011), aim to measure connection to the broader community and the degree to which 
individuals believe they can trust community members (e.g., police). These tools measure 
attitudes, not behaviours. 
 
Connection to Community Scale 
1. I have a strong attachment to my community. 
2. I often discuss and think about how larger 
political and social issues affect my 
community. 
3. I am aware of what can be done to meet the 
important needs in my community. 
4. I have the ability to make a difference in my 
community. 
Social Trust Scale  
1. Most people can be trusted. 
2. I trust people in my neighbourhood. 
3. I trust the local police. 
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5. I try to find the time to make a positive 
difference in my community. 
(Adapted from: The Technical Appendix of Price et al., 2011.) 
 
These tools could be administered as a pre-test (before the person participates in a program) 
and as a post-test (following program participation). Each item is scored on a scale of 1 to 5 
where 5 – strongly agree, 4 – agree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 2 – disagree, 1 – strongly 
disagree. Higher scores indicate that individuals feel a stronger connection to their 
communities.  
 
Sense of belonging and relevance to the CVE context 
A lack of a sense of belonging can result in individuals being attracted to violent extremist 
groups. Extremists can provide important peer and friendship networks that an individual may 
be missing in their lives. Within the literature on pathways into radicalisation, a sense of 
belonging is given prominence (Khosorokhavar, 2017; Moghaddam, 2005). A lack of 
belonging to mainstream society and connectedness to social institutions (e.g., schools) can 
result in individuals seeking alternative avenues through which they may find a sense of 
belonging and an identity. It is within this context that individuals may begin to gravitate 
towards radicalisation and violent extremism. When developing questions to measure a sense 
of belonging, consideration needs to be given to the source of belonging (e.g., the wider 
Australian community). Questions from the Connection to Community Scale and the Social 
Trust Scale may need to be adapted to reflect the source of sense of the belonging because 
reference to a term like ‘community’ can have different meanings. For example, the question 
regarding the individual’s attachment to community could refer to one’s racial, ethnic or 
religious group, each of which could represent a different type of community. Belonging at the 
program level is also relevant to CVE programs because it relates to the degree to which an 
individual finds the content of a program relevant and/or identifies with other program 
participants or leaders/mentors delivering an intervention. Measuring an individual’s sense of 
belonging at the program level could be used to identify those individuals most likely to attend 
or drop-out of a program. Participation rates and patterns of attendance could then be used to 
target certain individuals with particular activities. 
 
Indicator: Self-efficacy – A belief in their ability to cope and a sense of control over their life  
In the literature, self-efficacy is defined as a person’s belief in their ability to succeed in a given 
situation, and the degree of control they believe they have over a given situation (Bandura, 
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1997). Low self-efficacy can impact on a person's belief in their own capabilities and thus 
may have a negative impact upon an individual’s behaviour, such as their self-confidence and 
ability to solve problems. This can result in individuals attributing negative intentions to others, 
and to believe they are unable to succeed in life and to set realistic goals. Self-efficacy has 
mainly been examined within the educational setting (Schunk, 1990). When students perceive 
they have made satisfactory progress towards achieving their goal, they feel capable of 
improving their skills and are able to achieve and set realistic future goals.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
The General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE)  
The GSE was created to assess a general sense of perceived self-efficacy, with the aim of 
predicting coping with daily hassles as well as the capacity to adapt after experiencing stressful 
life events. The scale is designed for the general adult population, including adolescents. It is 
self-administered, and takes on average four minutes to administer. Responses are made on a 
four-point scale, and responses to all 10 items are summed up to yield the final composite score 
with a range from 10 to 40.  
 
Scale of Perceived Social Self-Efficacy (PSSE) 
Social self-efficacy is defined as an individual’s confidence in her/his ability to engage in the 
social interactional tasks necessary to initiate and maintain interpersonal relationships (Smith 
& Betz, 2000). Smith and Betz (2000) measured social self-efficacy using an instrument called 
the Scale of Perceived Social Self-Efficacy, which measured six domains. 
 
The General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE)  
(10-Item Scale) 
1. I can always manage to solve difficult 
problems if I try hard enough.  
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means 
and ways to get what I want.  
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and 
accomplish my goals.  
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently 
with unexpected events.  
Scale of Perceived Social Efficacy 
(PSSE) (6-Item Scale) 
1. Making friends.  
2. Pursuing romantic relationships.  
3. Social assertiveness.  
4. Performance in public situations.  
5. Groups or parties. 
6. Giving or receiving help. 
(Smith & Betz, 2000) 
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5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to 
handle unforeseen situations.  
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the 
necessary effort. 
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties 
because I can rely on my coping abilities. 
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can 
usually find several solutions. 
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a 
solution. 
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.  
Reponse options: 1 – not at all true, 2 – hardly 
true, 3 – moderately true, 4 – exactly true. 
(Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) 
 
Self-efficacy and relevance to the CVE context 
Low self-efficacy among individuals can be understood as a risk factor towards radicalisation 
and violent extremism. That is, an individual who perceives they lack a sense of control over 
their life may be attracted to violent extremist groups, due to the certainty they provide in 
relation to solving particular grievances an individual may have towards others. A CVE 
program may aim to improve self-efficacy (i.e., an individual’s capacity to cope) and to 
enhance their beliefs in their own capabilities to identify solutions that do not involve extremist 
behaviour, thus making them less vulnerable to radicalisation.  
 
Indicator: Strong cultural identity combined with openness to other sources of belonging 
This indicator relates to having a strong cultural identity and a sense of pride in one’s culture, 
while maintaining an openness and respect for other members from different cultures, religions 
and ethnic or social backgrounds. This indicator can also be understood as comprising tolerance 
for other social groups. A strong cultural identity may take the form of participation in cultural 
celebrations and traditions and may involve membership of ethnic or religious groups or 
kinship networks.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
One possible measure of a strong cultural identity and openness to other sources of belonging 
is the Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). MEIM is a widely used survey to measure 
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ethnic identification. It was developed for use with adolescents and young adults and has 
previously been used in research with Australian adolescents from diverse ethno-cultural 
groups (Dandy et al., 2008). It provides a measure of engagement with members of one’s own 
group and participation in cultural traditions. It canvasses opinions across the following four 
areas: positive ethnic attitudes and sense of belonging, identity and achievement, behaviours 
or practices, and other-group orientation. 
The Multi-group Ethnicity Identity Measure (MEIM) 
In terms of ethnic group, I consider myself to be___________________ (please write in).  
1. I have spent time trying to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, 
traditions and customs. 
2. I am active in organisations or social groups that include mostly members of my own 
ethnic group. 
3. I have a clear sense of my ethnic background and what it means for me. 
4. I like meeting and getting to know people from ethnic groups other than my own. 
5. I think about how my life will be affected by my ethnic group membership. 
6. I am happy that I am a member of the group I belong to.  
7. I sometimes feel it would be better if different ethnic groups didn’t try to mix together. 
8. I am not very clear about the role of my ethnicity in my life. 
9. I often spend time with people from other ethnic groups other than my own. 
10. I really have not spent much time trying to learn more about the culture and history of 
my ethnic group. 
11. I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group. 
12. I understand pretty well what my own ethnic group membership means to me, in terms 
of how to relate to my own group and other groups.  
13. In order to learn more about my own ethnic group, I have often talked to other people 
about my own ethnic group.  
14. I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishments. 
15. I don’t try to become friends with people from other ethnic groups. 
16. I participate in other cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music or 
customs. 
17. I am involved in activities with people from other ethnic groups. 
18. I feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group. 
19. I enjoy being around people from ethnic groups other than my own. 
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Strong cultural identity and relevance to the CVE context 
A strong cultural identity, a sense of pride in one’s culture and an openness and respect for 
other people should be understood as protective factors against violent extremism. Greater 
identification with one’s religious and ethnic group can create a greater sense of belonging and 
make one more discerning when targeted by extremist groups that appeal to religious ideology 
or group loyalty to attract and recruit fellow Muslims, for example (Cherney & Murphy, 2017). 
Likewise, a lack of openness and acceptance of others is a key attribute of extremists, who 
often condemn other religious or ethnic groups, singling them out for persecution (Koehler, 
2017). Measuring cultural identity, pride and openness is relevant to other indicators such as 
social cohesion, positive perception of Australia, sense of belonging and wellbeing. Attributes 
of cultural identity, pride and openness should mainly be focused on individual perceptions.  
 
Indicator: Wellbeing 
Within the literature, the term ‘wellbeing’ can refer to an individual’s health, or social or 
psychological wellbeing (i.e., life happiness). Wellbeing has much in common with other CVE 
indicators such as social skills, social participation, coping skills, sense of belonging and self-
efficacy. Wellbeing can be reflected in positive relationships with family and friends, self-
acceptance, the realisation of goals and life satisfaction. A measure of wellbeing at an 
individual level may give an indication of how happy a person is or how healthy they are. At a 
community level, it can reflect the degree of (perceived) social inequality. Wellbeing can be 
measured at a (national) population level and can be used as a barometer to measure how 
satisfied people are with their lives. It requires the use of subjective social indicators (e.g., 
asking how people feel about their lives). There is no single definition or single way of 
measuring wellbeing. The following section provides several options that cover a range of 
definitions and categories of wellbeing. 
 
20. I feel good about my cultural or ethnic background. 
Write in the number that gives the best answer to each question: 
21. My ethnicity is: (insert list of Australian-relevant options). 
22. My father’s ethnicity is (use categories/options above). 
23. My mother’s ethnicity is (use categories/options above). 
(Measured using a 4-point Likert scale: 4 – strongly agree, 3 – somewhat agree, 2 – 
somewhat disagree, 1 – strongly disagree.) 
(Phinney, 1992; Dandy et al., 2008) 
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Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
When looking at the indicator wellbeing, it is important to decide what dimension of wellbeing 
is to be measured (e.g., satisfaction with health, happiness, financial circumstances, peer and 
family networks). The following three tools are recommended for consideration as they include 
a range of definitions and measurements of wellbeing, and may need to be adapted for a 
program's cohort: 
 
The Emotional Stability Scale 
This scale is designed to measure emotional stability, the ability to deal with stress and to cope 
under stressful circumstances. It can give an indication of how resilient an individual is during 
stressful periods.  
 
Emotional Stability Scale  
How often have you had the following thoughts or emotions? 
1. Feeling blue (sad).  
2. Feeling others are to blame for most of your problems.  
3. Thoughts of ending your life. 
4. Urges to injure or harm someone else. 
5. Difficulty making decisions. 
6. Nervousness or shakiness inside. 
7. Not feeling liked or respected by others. 
(Evans & Skager, 1992) 
Seven items 
measured using a 5-
point Likert scale 
(from ‘1 – not at all’ 
to ‘5 – very much’) 
 
Quality of Life (QOL) Survey 
A QOL Survey attempts to measure quality of life, comparing one population with another, 
and is useful for measuring the impact of public policy initiatives (Hagerty et al., 2001). 
Scholars point to the need for a range of indicators in a QOL Survey (e.g., Cummins, 1997). 
These can include life and job satisfaction, personal happiness, physical health status and 
satisfaction with personal income. 
 
A QOL Survey must have relevance and meaning for the cohort with which it is being used. 
For example, if the QOL Survey is being used with young Muslim males at risk of being 
radicalised, then it must include questions and topics that are of relevance to that target group, 
but not necessarily applicable to the general population.  
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A QOL Survey designed for a specific target population within a specific social context would 
not necessarily capture (nor be appropriate for) other populations in different socio-political 
contexts. Hagerty et al. (2001) recommend the design of a QOL Survey across the following 
seven domains with each question domain weighted according to its importance/relevance to 
that population. 
 
Quality of Life (QOL) Survey  
Recommended Question Domains 
 
Question Domain Weighting 
1. Relationships with family and friends. 100 
2. Emotional wellbeing. 98 
3. Material wellbeing. 77 
4. Health. 67 
5. Work and productive activity. 61 
6. Feeling part of one’s local community. 29 
7. Personal safety. 27 
(Hagerty et al., 2001; Cummins et al., 1994; Cummins, 
1996, 1997) 
 
 
The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index 
The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index was designed as a barometer of Australians’ satisfaction 
with their lives (Cummins et al., 2003). The index comprises two sub-scales of Personal 
Wellbeing and National Wellbeing and includes questions covering how satisfied an individual 
is with their own life and life events, their satisfaction with life in Australia and their financial 
wellbeing.  
 
The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index 
1. Thinking about your own life and personal circumstances, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole? (Global Life Satisfaction)  
2. How satisfied are you with life in Australia? (Global National Wellbeing)  
3. How satisfied are you with… 
Global Life Satisfaction: 
 Standard of living. 
 Health. 
How satisfied are you with… 
Global National Wellbeing: 
 Economy in Australia. 
 Environment in Australia. 
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 Achieving in life. 
 Relationships. 
 Personal safety. 
 Community connectedness. 
 Future security. 
 Social conditions in Australia. 
 Government in Australia. 
 Business in Australia. 
 National Security in Australia. 
 
Life events examples  
1. Has anything happened to you recently causing you to feel happier or sadder than 
normal?  
2. On a scale from zero (very weak) to 10 (very strong), how strong do you feel this 
influence? 
Financial wellbeing examples 
1. How would you describe your personal financial situation? (The response options 
were: ‘very good’, ‘somewhat good’, ‘somewhat bad’ and ‘very bad’) 
2. Thinking about your financial situation five years ago, are you better or worse off? 
(The response options were: ‘better’, ‘the same’ and ‘worse’) 
(Cummins et al., 2003) 
 
Wellbeing and relevance to the CVE context 
Individual, social or psychological wellbeing can be understood as protective factors against 
violent extremism. Individuals who exhibit low levels of wellbeing may be more vulnerable to 
radicalisation, with it acting as a push factor. For example, an individual that has poor 
emotional wellbeing (e.g., not feeling respected or liked by others) may be attracted to violent 
extremist groups because they fulfil this emotional deficit by providing social acceptance. CVE 
programs may aim to improve different forms of wellbeing. For instance, a CVE program may 
aim to improve emotional wellbeing through a series of interventions such as psychological 
support or diversion/peer group activities (e.g., youth camps, or involvement in a Police 
Citizens Youth Club). In this context, questions relating to emotional stability would be 
relevant. Interventions may aim to improve an individual’s quality of life by providing health, 
educational or economic support. Here, questions from the Australian Unity Wellbeing index 
can be adapted. For example, one could ask a client prior to and following program 
participation how satisfied they are with their standard of living, individual health, 
achievements in life, personal relationships, personal safety, sense of community 
connectedness and future security, weighting each question on the basis of their priority within 
a program's outcome measures. Additionally, an intervention may provide vocational and 
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employment opportunities to an individual, creating greater financial independence. 
Financial independence can help create a greater stake in mainstream society. Questions 
relating to financial wellbeing can therefore be relevant. 
 
Indicator: Social participation 
The indicator social participation is similar to the indicator sense of belonging. Both relate to 
the level of connectedness an individual feels towards his/her local community and/or the wider 
Australian community. This indicator differs in that it relates to the degree to which an 
individual participates in or engages with one’s community or the wider Australian community 
as a whole. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Attitude Toward Neighbourhood and Civic Obligation Scale 
Developed by Price et al. (2011), this scale is a measure of social participation. It measures a 
range of civic activities, such as serving on a jury, the obligation to report crimes, participating 
in local organisations and keeping the local area safe and clean. It is a measure of the degree 
to which an individual accepts and adopts broader community norms around civic 
participation. This tool can be administered as a pre-test (before the person participates in a 
program) and as a post-test (follow up after participating in a program). Each item is scored on 
a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 – very likely, 4 – somewhat likely, 3 – not sure how likely, 2 – not 
too likely, 1 – not likely at all. Higher scores indicate that individuals attribute more importance 
to neighbourhood and civic involvement. 
 
Attitude Toward Neighbourhood and Civic Obligation Scale 
How likely are you to do the following activities? Mark the box for each item that best 
indicates how likely you are to do what the item says: 
Serving on a jury, if called… 
Reporting a crime that you may have witnessed… 
Participating in neighbourhood organisations (school, religious, community, recreational)… 
Voting in elections… 
Helping to keep the neighbourhood safe… 
Helping to keep the neighbourhood clean and beautiful… 
Helping those who are less fortunate… 
(Adapted from: The Technical Appendix of Price et al., 2011.) 
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Social participation and relevance to the CVE context 
Social withdrawal can be understood as a risk factor for violent extremism, which can result in 
individuals rejecting mainstream values and civic participation. As noted by researchers, 
violent extremists often divide the world into in-groups and out-groups, with violent Islamist 
groups condemning Muslims that participate in mainstream Western activities or associating 
with non-Muslims, thus promoting social isolation from broader society to a specific group of 
Muslims (Moghaddam, 2005). CVE programs may aim to increase social participation though 
a range of activities, thus triggering a greater sense of connectedness to mainstream values and 
norms, and extending a sense of belonging. The outcome can be that individuals at risk of 
radicalisation will be less likely to see others (e.g., Westerners or non-Muslims, or immigrant 
groups, in the case of right wing extremism) as the enemy. CVE programs may aim to assess 
a client's changing sense of social participation through their willingness to engage in various 
neighbourhood and civic activities. 
 
Indicator: Strong social skills, problem solving and conflict resolution skills 
Strong social skills, problem-solving and conflict resolution skills comprise a range of 
interpersonal attributes linked to individual resilience to violent extremist influences. The 
broader literature identifies the ability to solve problems and manage conflict in a constructive 
and socially acceptable manner as a key skill required for young adults to gain and maintain 
employment and healthy relationships. Problem solving and conflict resolution are similar to 
the indicators of critical thinking and self-efficacy.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
The Social Problem-Solving Inventory – Revised (SPSI-R) 
The SPSI-R can be used to determine an individual's general problem-solving strengths. It has 
been administered to individuals aged 13 years and over, with longer and shorter versions of 
the inventory having been developed.1 The instrument can be used in various environments 
and with different people to explore social problem-solving abilities. 
 
 
                                                 
1Available for purchase at: https://www.pearsonclinical.com.au/products/view/375 
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Example from the Social Problem-Solving Inventory – Revised: Short Form  
(SPSI-R:SF) 
1. I feel afraid when I have an important problem to solve.  
2. When making decisions, I do not think carefully about my many options.  
3. I get nervous and unsure of myself when I have to make an important decision. 
4. When my first efforts to solve a problem fail, I give up quickly because finding a solution 
is too difficult.  
5. Sometimes even difficult problems can have a way of moving my life forward in positive 
ways.  
6. If I avoid problems, they will generally go away on their own.  
7. When I cannot solve a problem, I get very frustrated.  
8. If I am faced with a difficult problem, I probably will not be able to solve it on my own 
no matter how hard I try.  
9. Whenever I have a problem, I believe that it can be solved. 
10. I try to do anything I can in order to avoid problems in my life.  
11. Difficult problems make me very upset.  
12. When I have a decision to make, I take the time to try to predict the positive and negative 
consequences of each possible option before I act.  
13. When problems occur in my life, I like to deal with them as soon as possible.  
14. When I am trying to solve a problem I go with the first good idea that comes to mind.  
15. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I believe that I will be able to solve it on my 
own if I try hard enough.  
16. When I have a problem to solve, one of the first things I do is get as many facts about 
the problem as possible.  
17. When a problem happens in my life, I put off trying to solve it for as long as possible.  
18. I spend more time avoiding my problems than solving them. 
19. Before I try to solve a problem, I set a specific goal so that I know exactly what I want 
to accomplish.  
20. When I have a decision to make, I do not take the time to consider the pros and cons of 
each option.  
21. After carrying out a solution to a problem, I try to evaluate as carefully as possible how 
much the situation has changed for the better.  
22. I put off solving problems until it is too late to do anything about them.  
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Strong social skills, problem-solving and conflict resolution skills, and their relevance to 
the CVE context 
The capacity to solve problems through non-conflictual means can be understood as a 
protective factor against violent extremism. The inability to identify options for managing an 
individual’s grievances can lead them to adopt solutions promoted by violent extremists or to 
gravitate towards violent extremist groups. Resisting such influences requires an individual to 
be able to weigh up the consequences of their decisions and actions, and identify non-violent 
alternative solutions to the problems they perceive in their lives, or the lack of identity and 
belonging they may feel. Hence, the capacity of CVE programs to promote problem-solving 
and conflict resolution can be an important program outcome, with different items in the Social 
Problem-Solving Inventory aiming to measure aspects of these indictors.   
 
 
Outcome 1.2 – Environment 
Summary Table 
Outcome 1.2 – Environment 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following six indicators:  
 Civic participation. 
 Opportunities for education, training and employment. 
 Engagement between communities and government. 
 Sense of marginalisation. 
 Experience of discrimination. 
 Supportive social networks within the immediate community. 
23. When I am trying to solve a problem, I think of as many options as possible until I cannot 
come up with any more.  
24. When making decisions, I go with my ‘gut feeling’ without thinking too much about the 
consequences of each option.  
25. I am too impulsive when it comes to making decisions.  
(Measured using a 5-point Likert scale where 1 – definitely true, 2 – true, 3 – tends to be 
true, 4 – tends not to be true, 5 – not true.) 
(D'zurilla & Nezu, 1990; Sorsdahl et al., 2017) 
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Why measure? 
This outcome is concerned with the level of engagement, feelings of connectedness and 
commitment towards mainstream society and degree of social support an individual 
experiences. This outcome can also refer to a ‘lack of access’ to resources/opportunities that 
would allow people to participate fully in mainstream society. Subjectively, it can relate to 
whether people perceive themselves to experience this lack of access. Discrimination against 
minority groups may be associated with an increased risk of violence, extremism and 
terrorism. Marginalised individuals may be more likely to join violent groups. Social 
networks and connection to society can act as an important resource when individuals feel 
socially marginalised or isolated. When these networks are strong, they can act as a resource 
for those at risk of violent extremism by providing support in times of need. A lack of 
education, training and employment may exacerbate other risk factors for violent extremism.  
Ways of measuring 
A mix of quantitative and qualitative data could be used. For example, secondary or 
administrative data could be used to measure opportunities for education, training and 
employment (e.g., number of school/training programs, number of enrolments, 
unemployment rates and job vacancies). Qualitative data could measure opportunities for 
education, training and employment, and could be collected through interviews and focus 
groups with program participants. Data on community engagement could examine (1) types 
and levels of community engagement with government, (2) perceptions of and attitudes 
towards community engagement, (3) barriers to community engagement, (4) satisfaction 
with community engagement, and (5) perceived outcomes of community engagement. 
Levels of engagement can be quantified by tallying the number of government outreach 
activities that occur. The quality of the engagement and whether people think this makes a 
difference to their lives should be assessed.  
 
Indicator: Civic participation 
Assessments of levels of civic participation within particular communities have typically been 
based on aggregating from individual level activities. Civic participation can capture similar 
activities as the outcome indicators of social participation, engagement between communities 
and government and social cohesion. Opportunities for civic participation can encompass a 
range of activities. Civil participation is also referred to as civic engagement in the literature, 
and can refer to involvement in individual and/or group activities undertaken to improve or 
benefit a community, governance or democratic processes. This can include activities such as 
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voting, being a member of a civic organisation (e.g., a political party, trade union, 
environmental group or animal welfare group), being a member of a sporting club, volunteering 
or participating in rallies or demonstrations. Notably, in recent years, there has been an increase 
in online forms of civic participation (e.g., participating in online petitions, sharing and 
discussing political and societal content online), particularly among adolescents and young 
adults. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Some examples of measuring forms of civic participation include:  
 
Online and Offline Civic Engagement among Adolescents and Young Adults 
Jugert et al. (2013) adapted items from Lyons (2008) to create scales for online and offline 
civic engagement activities among adolescents and young adults. Each measures participation 
in civic activities in the last 12 months and intention to participate in these activities in the 
future, using a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., in the past 12-months have you participated in: ‘never’ 
to ‘very often’; in the future are you likely to participate in: ‘not at all likely’ to ‘very likely’). 
Example items include: 
 
Online Civic Engagement Scale 
 Discuss societal or political content on the net (caution: this could capture engagement of 
on-line extremist content).  
 Participate in an online-based petition, protest, or boycott. 
 Visit a website of a political or civic organisation. 
 
Offline Civic Engagement Scale 
 Volunteer work. 
 Taking part in a concert or fundraising event with a political or social cause. 
 Distributing leaflets with political content. 
 
Civic participation within the Active and Engaged Citizenship (AEC) measure 
The Active and Engaged Citizenship (AEC) measure (Zaff et al., 2010) was developed for use 
with adolescents to assess four components of civic engagement: civic duty, civic skills, 
neighbourhood social connection and civic participation. The measure of civic participation 
includes eight questions and uses 5- and 6-point Likert scales (5-point scale: from ‘never’ to 
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‘very often’; 6-point scales: (1) from ‘never’ to ‘every day’ and (2) from ‘never’ to ‘five or 
more times’). Example items include: 
 How often do you help out at your church, synagogue, or other place of worship? 
 How often do you volunteer your time (at a hospital, day care centre, food bank, youth 
program, community service agency)? 
 During the last 12 months, how many times have you been a leader in a group or 
organisation? 
 
South Australian Community Health Unity Civic Participation Scale 
The South Australian Community Health Unit developed an 11-item scale of civic participation 
(Hodgkin, 2011). In contrast to the two examples described above, which are targeted at 
adolescents and young adults, this measure has been used among a range of age groups (18 to 
60+ years). The scale measures frequency of participation in a range of individual and group 
activities. Example items include asking how often in the last twelve months someone has: 
 Signed a petition. 
 Contacted a local councillor. 
 Been involved in a campaign or action to improve social or environmental conditions. 
 Been involved with a political party, trade union, or political campaign. 
 
Civic participation and relevance to the CVE context  
Civic participation can encourage feelings of connectedness and commitment towards 
mainstream society (Putman, 2001). Opportunities for civic participation can help individuals 
develop social and support networks that can act as important resources when they feel socially 
marginalised or isolated. Such experiences can make people vulnerable to becoming 
radicalised to violent extremism (Koehler, 2017). Individuals with higher levels of civic 
participation may also feel that they have more say in their community regarding issues that 
are important to them. CVE programs may aim to increase civic participation through a variety 
of initiatives, building a greater sense of involvement and connection through opportunities 
that allow individuals to raise and address issues of concern to them, e.g., through mainstream 
political processes. Measuring levels of civic participation can occur at the community or 
individual level. At the community level, this may involve quantifying the number and type of 
civic activities that exist in a certain area and the level of membership amongst a program's 
target group. CVE programs aimed at the individual level may aim to increase a person's 
willingness to engage in civic activities and assess if levels of participation change over time.  
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Indicator: Opportunities for education, training and employment 
This indicator can encompass both objective and subjective dimensions. Objectively, it can 
relate to the availability of and access to educational institutions, training programs and jobs, 
as well as people's educational status and qualifications. Subjectively, it can relate to whether 
people believe work, training and educational opportunities are available to them and hence 
pursue these opportunities. If understood in this way then the indicator wellbeing is also 
relevant. There are no uniform or agreed measures relating to opportunities for education, 
training and employment.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios/potential existing measures 
Secondary and administrative data 
Secondary and administrative data could be used to objectively measure opportunities for 
education, training and employment. This could include gathering information regarding: 
 
Opportunities for education 
 Number of preschools within communities and surrounding areas to assess availability of 
preschool programs. 
 Number of children within a community enrolled in and attending preschools to assess 
proportion of children within a community engaged in preschool programs. 
 Number of schools (public and private) within communities and surrounding areas to assess 
availability of primary and secondary education. 
 Number of students who complete senior years of high school to assess retention in 
secondary schooling. 
 Number of tertiary educational institutions (e.g., universities, TAFEs) within communities 
and surrounding areas to assess availability and access to tertiary education. 
Opportunities for training 
 Number of trade apprenticeships available within communities and surrounding areas. 
 Number of TAFEs and similar institutions within communities and surrounding areas. 
Opportunities for employment 
 Unemployment rates within communities and surrounding areas (including unemployment 
rates broken down by age group) to assess the rate of unemployment within particular 
communities. 
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 Job vacancies within communities and surrounding areas (such as data collected by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics or job sites) to assess opportunities for employment (both 
in regard to skill level/experience required and accessibility, i.e., distance to employment). 
 Relevance of educational qualifications to current job opportunities to assess rates of 
underemployment within communities.  
 
Perceived opportunities for employment  
A variety of research has examined perceived opportunities for finding alternative employment 
among individuals who are already employed (see Steel & Griffeth, 1989). Peters et al. (1981) 
used a 3-item scale to measure expectations of finding alternative employment: 
 It is possible for me to find a better job than the one I have now. 
 Acceptable jobs can always be found. 
 There is no doubt in my mind that I can find a job that is at least as good as the one I now 
have. 
Each item was measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’).  
 
Perceived educational and career barriers 
McWhirter (1997) developed a 24-item scale to measure perceived educational and career 
barriers for high school students in the USA. The scale consists of items relating to future job 
discrimination, barriers preventing college attendance, barriers respondents may encounter if 
they attend college, and general perceptions regarding future barriers. Each item was measured 
using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). Example items 
include: 
 
Future job discrimination: 
 In my future job, I will probably experience discrimination because of my ethnic/racial 
background. 
Perceived barriers to attending college: 
 If I didn’t go to college, it would be because of money problems. 
 If I didn’t go to college, it would be because of not being smart enough. 
Perceived barriers anticipated in college: 
 If I do go to college, I will probably experience not fitting in with others. 
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General perceptions of barriers: 
 In general, I think that there are many barriers that will make it difficult for me to 
achieve my career goals. 
 In general, I think that I will be able to overcome any barriers that stand in the way of 
achieving my career goals. 
 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data could also be used to measure opportunities for education, training and 
employment. This data could be collected through interviews and focus groups with program 
participants focusing on their perceptions of options for education, training and employment, 
including perceived barriers to such opportunities. Qualitative data could be collected from key 
agency informants (e.g., staff at educational institutions, job centres, service providers) to 
examine their perceptions of opportunities for education, training and employment within the 
community, whether program target groups are affording themselves such opportunities, and 
if not, why this may be occurring. 
 
Opportunities for education, training and employment and relevance to the CVE context  
The link between violent extremism and socio-economic status is weak, in that people who are 
employed and well educated still radicalise to violent extremism (Gambetta & Hertog, 2016; 
Porter & Kebbell, 2011); however, a lack of perceived opportunities for education, training and 
employment can certainly create a sense of marginalisation among some groups, particularly 
if they feel they are denied such opportunities despite having relevant skills and qualifications. 
In such situations, individuals may be attracted to violent extremist groups (Gambetta & 
Hertog, 2016). Another way to think about the relevance of this indicator is that opportunities 
for education, training and employment relate to the indicators wellbeing and social 
participation, in that they can have an impact on a person's quality of life (wellbeing) and the 
degree to which people have the resources to actively participate in their neighbourhood or 
community (social participation). The lack of opportunities for education, training and 
employment may exacerbate other risk factors for violent extremism (see indicators wellbeing 
and social participation), making people more vulnerable to extremist propaganda because 
they feel they have little stake in society (e.g., a job). Depending on the aims of a CVE 
intervention, evaluation plans may want to assess both the objective and subjective dimensions 
of opportunities for education, training and employment, and understand if a program 
influences both dimensions.  
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Indicator: Engagement between communities and government 
There are a variety of definitions of community engagement. Community engagement can refer 
to the processes by which governments and its entities connect with people during the process 
of policy development and implementation, particularly when they are putting in place 
initiatives that affect people's neighbourhoods or communities. Engagement between 
communities and governments may also encompass the degree to which people access 
government services (e.g., Centrelink, Medicare, government-run health services, police), and 
participate in government-organised initiatives (e.g., facilitated workshops, forums, 
community cabinets, consultations). Levels of engagement between communities and 
governments can be quantified by tallying the number of government outreach activities in 
place. An important consideration is the quality of the engagement and whether people think it 
makes a difference to their lives. Importantly, it should be noted that superficial engagement 
without any real opportunity for people to have a say or influence an outcome could be judged 
as disingenuous, because it shows governments are not sincere about seeking community input 
and acting on any concerns or suggestions made (Cherney & Hartley, 2017). Therefore, any 
assessment of engagement between communities and governments would need to incorporate 
subjective measures to judge the quality of that engagement, as well as objective dimensions 
quantifying the number and types of outreach activities and services engaged (Goodman et al., 
2017).  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Secondary and administrative data 
Secondary and administrative data from governments could be used to measure engagement 
between communities and those governments. This could include gathering information 
regarding: 
 Number of community forums and meetings within the last 12 months. 
 Number of collaborative community–government initiatives being run within a 
community. 
 Number of participants/attendees engaging with government initiatives/services within a 
community.  
 
Quantitative Community Engagement Measure 
Goodman et al. (2017) developed a quantitative measure of community engagement in the 
academic research context. The benefit of the Goodman et al. (2017) instrument is that it 
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attempts to quantify the perceived quality of engagement (see 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jcop.21828/full). It incorporates a range of 
questions that ask participants to rate how often an entity adopted a range of engagement 
practices based on a quantity (never, rarely, sometimes, most of the time, always) and quality 
rating (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent). (In the Goodman et al. (2017) study the entity 
was a research team.) The same questions are asked across both quantity and quality ratings. 
The questions could be easily adopted in reference to a state government department, service 
provider or program staff. Example items include asking how often participants think an 
agency/group/organisation does each of the following: 
 Focus on issues important to my community.  
 Show appreciation for community time and effort. 
 Let community members know what is going on with the project. 
 Empower community members with knowledge gained from a joint activity. 
 Use the ideas and input of the community members. 
 Seek community input and help at multiple stages of the process. 
 Help community members gain important skills from involvement. 
 Work with existing community networks. 
 Foster collaborations within which community members are real partners. 
 Enable all people involved to voice their views. 
 Treat community members’ ideas with openness and respect. 
 Include community members in plans for sharing findings. 
 Make commitments to communities that are long-term. 
 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data could be used as a subjective measure of community engagement. Data could 
be collected through key informant interviews or focus groups with individuals, leaders or 
representatives within a community. These interviews and focus groups could examine: 
 Types and levels of community engagement with government. 
 Perceptions of and attitudes towards community engagement. 
 Barriers to community engagement. 
 Satisfaction with community engagement. 
 Perceived outcomes of community engagement. 
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Engagement between communities and governments and relevance to the CVE context 
Engagement between communities and governments may lead to a number of potential benefits 
for citizens, including a sense of feeling heard and represented, and allowing community input 
into the development of appropriate initiatives and policies. Individuals who feel that they are 
heard, recognised and represented in their community are less likely to feel marginalised 
(Forrest & Kearns, 2001). This helps generate an environment in which community members 
feel a government has their interests at heart. Hence, engagement between communities and 
governments is related to the indicator trust in government (Fisk & Cherney, 2017). Effective 
engagement can lead to community members being more willing to cooperate with authorities 
in tackling terrorism and participating in CVE initiatives (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). A lack 
of cooperation and participation can be linked to the lack of quality engagement (e.g., input) 
around the aims of CVE programs and benefits to target groups, although framing community 
engagement around CVE may be unhelpful (Cherney, 2016). While quantifying if CVE 
programs have improved the levels of engagement between communities and governments and 
facilitated access to relevant services, the outcomes and quality of such engagements also needs 
to be considered. It may be unrealistic to assume that such engagements are able to satisfy the 
demands of all constituencies. Further, the nature of engagements may vary depending on the 
different community groups being consulted (e.g., non-English speaking background, 
immigrant) and what the aims of any particular CVE program might be. Likewise, assessments 
of engagement would need to consider whether the groups being engaged with are 
representative of the community and represent those most in need.  
 
Indicator: Sense of marginalisation 
Sense of marginalisation is closely aligned to other example indicators such as social cohesion, 
social participation, sense of belonging and wellbeing (Forrest & Kearns 2001). It often refers 
to a lack of access to resources and opportunities that would allow people to participate fully 
in mainstream society (Cruwys et al., 2013). Cruwys and colleagues (2013) identified five 
domains of disadvantage commonly linked with marginalisation: (1) social stigmatisation, (2) 
early-life disadvantage (often as a result of intergenerational transfer), (3) financial hardship, 
(4) poor health, and (5) social isolation. Marginalisation has been predominantly studied within 
health fields (e.g., psychology, public health), where the focus has largely been on indicators 
of ‘marginalisation’ (e.g., receipt of welfare payments, extended periods of unemployment) 
rather than on a ‘sense of marginalisation’ (i.e., self-reported subjective rating of 
marginalisation or perceived marginalisation). 
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Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
A number of studies have examined a sense or feelings of marginalisation or perceived 
marginalisation. Example questions and scales from some of these studies are outlined below: 
 
Ethnic marginalisation 
Ventura Miller, Barnes and Hartley (2011) used a 4-item scale to measure feelings of 
marginalisation among a sample of Hispanic adolescents in the American Southwest: 
Has this happened to you in the past year (yes/no)? 
 Seeing friends treated badly because they are [ethnicity]? 
 Being embarrassed that your parents have problems not speaking English well? 
 Being treated unfairly because you or a family member do not speak English well? 
 Being treated unfairly at school because you are [ethnicity]? 
 
Intragroup Marginalization Inventory (IMI) 
Castillo, Conoley, Brossart and Quiros (2007) developed the Intragroup Marginalization 
Inventory (IMI) to measure perceived marginalisation from a range of sources (termed ‘intra-
group marginalization’). This refers to the marginalisation or social exclusion of an individual 
from their family, friendship and cultural group, resulting in an individual adopting behaviours 
or attitudes in opposition to these groups, or that reflect the rejection of mainstream norms. The 
IMI consists of three different subscales, measuring marginalisation from family (12 items), 
friends (17 items) and ethnic group (13 items). Example items from each subscale are included 
below: 
 
Family: 
 My family has a hard time accepting my new values. 
 Family members criticise me because I don’t speak my ethnic group’s language well. 
Friends: 
 Friends of my ethnic group tease me because I don’t know how to speak my ethnic group’s 
language. 
 Friends of my ethnic group tell me that I am not really a member of my ethnic group 
because I don’t act like my ethnic group. 
Ethnic group: 
 People of my ethnic group tell me that I need to act more like them. 
 People of my ethnic group say that I have changed. 
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 People of my ethnic group laugh at me when I try to speak my ethnic group’s language. 
 
Perceived marginalisation 
Issmer and Wager (2015) measured perceived marginalisation among German adolescents of 
a low-educational background using a 4-item scale: 
 People like me are worth less than others in [country] society. 
 With my background, I will have problems when looking for work. 
 For people like me, leading a normal life is made difficult. 
 In our society, people like me are not offered any chances. 
These items are measured using a 4-point Likert scale (from ‘do not agree at all’ to ‘fully 
agree’). 
 
Sense of marginalisation and relevance to the CVE context  
There is some evidence to indicate that marginalised individuals may be more likely to join 
violent groups (e.g., gangs and extremist groups) (Ferenczi et al., 2016; Issmer & Wagner, 
2015; Ventura Miller et al., 2011); however, marginalisation does not only relate to material or 
economic marginalisation, but can be subjective in orientation. Communities that feel highly 
marginalised (termed ‘relative deprivation’) can feel they are not given the same opportunities 
as others and therefore may be attracted to violent extremist groups because they see them as 
providing answers to the perceived injustices they feel (e.g., see perceived marginalisation 
scale, above). In this context, people can be influenced by extremist groups to displace their 
aggression onto an ‘enemy’ (e.g., the West, non-Muslims, immigrant groups) (Koehler, 2017; 
Moghaddam, 2005). CVE programs may aim to influence objective (e.g., school participation, 
employment) and subjective (e.g., acceptance by friends, family, ethnic or religious group, 
broader society) marginalisation. 
 
Indicator: Experience of discrimination 
Discrimination is commonly defined as less favourable treatment of an individual or group on 
the basis of particular characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, race, religious beliefs, gender, sexual 
orientation) that results in adverse or negative consequences (National Research Council, 
2004). Discrimination may be direct or indirect (Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.). 
There are a number of existing questions and scales that measure experiences of discrimination. 
It must be emphasised that studies have measured discrimination at the individual level with 
results aggregated to achieve population level estimates. Measures of discrimination have 
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predominantly been developed and used in health fields (e.g., psychology, public health, 
epidemiology). A handful of studies examining violent extremism have also developed 
measures of experiences of discrimination. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Some example measures of discrimination include:  
 
Everyday Discrimination Scale 
The Everyday Discrimination Scale (EDS) is one of the most widely used measures of 
discrimination in epidemiology and public health research. The EDS was designed to measure 
chronic, routine and relatively minor experiences of unfair treatment or discrimination. The 
scale comprises of nine items using a 6-point Likert scale (1 – never, 2 – less than once a year, 
3 – a few times a year, 4 – a few times a month, 5 – at least once a week, 6 – almost every day). 
There exists a full scale (Williams, Yu, Jackson & Anderson, 1997) and a revised shorter scale 
(Stucky et al., 2011).  
 
Example items from the EDS include: 
 You are treated with less respect than others. 
 People act as if they are afraid of you. 
 You are called names and insulted. 
 
General Ethnic Discrimination Scale 
The General Ethnic Discrimination Scale (GEDS) was designed to measure perceived ethnic 
discrimination across a wide range of ethnic groups (Landrine et al., 2006). The GEDS 
comprises 18 items measured using a 6-point Likert scale (see Landrine et al. (2006) for full 
scale). These items measure both the frequency (last 12 months and lifetime) and subjective or 
perceived ethnic discrimination across a variety of contexts (e.g., discrimination from a 
stranger, discrimination from a public health professional, discrimination that led to a fight or 
argument). In contrast to the EDS, the GEDS focuses specifically on discrimination attributed 
by the respondent to their race or ethnic group. The GEDS has predominantly been used in 
health research in the US and with a number of ethnic groups. Example questions from the 
GEDS include: 
 How often have you been treated unfairly by your employers, bosses and supervisors 
because of your race/ethnic group? 
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o How often in the past year? (Response options: never, once in a while, 
sometimes, a lot, most of the time, almost all of the time.) 
o How often in your entire life? (Response options: never, once in a while, sometimes, 
a lot, most of the time, almost all of the time.) 
 How often have you been accused or suspected of doing something wrong (such as stealing, 
cheating, not doing your share of the work or breaking the law) because of your race/ethnic 
group? 
o How often in the past year? (Response options: same as above) 
o How often in your entire life? (Response options: same as above) 
o How stressful was this for you? (Response options: same as above) 
 How often have you been really angry about something racist that was done to you? 
o How often in the past year? (Response options: same as above) 
o How often in your entire life? (Response options: same as above) 
o How stressful was this for you? (Response options: same as above) 
 
Perceived personal discrimination and perceived group discrimination 
Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje (2009) developed scales for perceived personal 
discrimination and perceived group discrimination in a Dutch survey of attitudes towards 
extremism. Each scale is comprised of four items measured using a 5-point Likert scale.   
 
Items from the perceived personal discrimination scale include:   
 It makes me angry when I think of how I am treated in comparison to others. 
 I think I am worse off than others in [country]. 
 I have the feeling of being discriminated. 
 If I compare myself with others in [country] then I feel unfairly treated. 
 
Items from perceived group discrimination scale include:  
 I think the group to which I belong is worse off than other people in [country]. 
 It makes me angry when I think of how my group is treated in comparison to other groups 
in [country]. 
 I have the feeling that the group to which I belong is discriminated. 
 If I compare the group to which I belong with other groups in [country], I think we are 
treated unfairly. 
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Experience of discrimination and relevance to the CVE context 
Research suggests that discrimination against minority groups may be associated with an 
increased risk of violence, extremism and terrorism (Piazza, 2012). Discrimination can increase 
a person's perception that they are not seen as a valued member of society as it helps to reinforce 
beliefs that they do not belong, or are not afforded the same opportunities as others. Violent 
extremism may be seen as a solution to this discrimination, with extremist groups using 
messages about discrimination to promote their propaganda (e.g., that Muslims are not free to 
practice their religious beliefs). Measures such as those discussed above could be utilised or 
adapted for use in CVE evaluations to measure experiences of discrimination and assess if 
programs help reduce discrimination, or generate greater resilience among certain groups when 
they experience discriminatory behaviours. Based on program outcomes, it should be 
considered whether discrimination is measured at a personal or group level and whether the 
measure should examine discrimination broadly or explicitly in relation to particular 
characteristics (e.g., one’s ethnicity or religion).  
 
Indicator: Supportive social networks within the immediate community 
Social support is commonly defined as the existence or availability of support accessed through 
social ties to other individuals, groups and communities (Lin et al., 1979). It has close links to 
other outcome indicators such as social cohesion and social participation. The term ‘social 
support’ has a number of meanings in the literature and has mainly been measured at the 
neighbourhood level. Social support appears to have two key elements: (1) an individual’s 
belief that there is an adequate number of social supports available to them in times of need, 
and (2) how satisfied that individual is with the type of support available (Sarason et al., 1983). 
Trust is also a dimension of social support networks, in that a person must believe that the 
various social networks available have their interests at heart. If this is absent then a person is 
unlikely to defer to those networks. Research indicates that perceived social support is a 
protective factor against stress among individuals who have experienced traumatic events, 
disasters and terrorist attacks (Besser & Neria, 2012; Sarason et al., 1983). This indicator 
specifically relates to the existence of supportive social networks within the immediate 
community. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Neighbourhood Social Ties 
Carpiano and Hystad (2011) use two items to measure the number and intensity of 
neighbourhood social ties: 
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 Would you say that you know most, many, a few or none of the people in your 
neighbourhood? 
 About how many people in your neighbourhood do you know well enough to ask for a 
favour (none, 1-5, 6-10, or over 10)? 
 
Australian Community Capacity Study – Frequency of neighbouring 
The Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS) (Murphy et al., 2012) uses a 3-item scale 
to measure incidents of reciprocal exchange among neighbours: 
How often do you and people in your community: 
 Do favours for each other? 
 Visit in each other’s homes or on the street? 
 Ask each other advice about personal things, such as child rearing or job openings? 
Items are measured using a 4-point Likert scale ( from‘never’ to ‘often’).  
 
Australian Community Capacity Study – Social cohesion and trust 
The ACCS (Murphy et al., 2012) also uses a 4-item scale to measure a respondent’s perception 
that their community is socially cohesive and that people in their community can be trusted: 
 People in this community are willing to help their neighbours. 
 This is a close-knit community. 
 People in this community can be trusted. 
 People in this community do not share the same values.  
Each item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’).  
 
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) 
The MSPSS was designed by Zimet et al. (1988) for use in health research. The scale consists 
of 12 items measuring social support from family, friends and significant others using a 7-point 
Likert scale (from ‘very strongly disagree’ to ‘very strongly agree’). Example items are listed 
below: 
 There is a special person who is around when I am in need. 
 I get the emotional help and support I need from my family. 
 I have friends with whom I can share my joys and sorrows. 
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Unlike the measures described above, this scale does not specifically refer to social support 
within the immediate community; however, the wording of the scale could be adapted (e.g., 
‘There are people in my community who can assist me in a time of need’). 
 
Supportive social networks and relevance to the CVE context  
Violent extremist groups operate via family, friendship and community networks (Day & 
Kleinmann, 2017). Family and community support for non-violence can act as a protective 
factor against violent extremism (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). It is in this context that 
supportive social networks against violent extremism can help build feelings of belonging and 
trust among community members. When these networks are strong, they can act as a resource 
for those at risk of violent extremism by providing support in times of need. Evaluating 
supportive social networks that are the target of a CVE program will overlap with other 
indicators such as social participation, wellbeing and social cohesion. The suggested measures 
set out above do capture elements of these indicators. CVE programs can potentially aim to 
leverage existing social support networks and also build new social networks. The measures 
outlined here aim to assess the level of existing social support networks within a community, 
rather than on specific programmatic outcomes, such as whether an initiative helped to build 
supportive social networks. Measures could be taken prior to and following an intervention to 
examine if existing support networks improved over time. Caution would need to be followed 
when inferring a causal link between the two.  
 
Outcome 1.3 – Communities 
Summary Table  
Outcome 1.3 – Communities 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following nine indicators:  
 Awareness and understanding of violent extremism. 
 Trust in government. 
 Perceived community safety. 
 Social cohesion. 
 Perception of community harmony. 
 Inter-communal tensions. 
 Positive perception of Australia. 
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 Identify as Australian. 
 Community capacity and willingness to respond to crisis.  
Why measure? 
This outcome is concerned with building resilience and capacity within a community around 
issues relevant to CVE. Measuring perceptions of extremism and radicalisation can highlight 
the extent to which they are visible issues, and provides a focus for program developers. The 
assumption is that cohesive communities are resilient against violent extremist influences, 
whereby people within these communities feel a greater sense of belonging and acceptance. 
Low levels of trust in government can see people becoming disengaged. The existence of 
inter-communal tensions can potentially lead to the emergence of violent extremist groups 
and help facilitate membership. If people have a positive perception of the country in which 
they reside they are more likely to feel a sense of belonging and inclusion. CVE programs 
can work both directly and indirectly to develop a more positive perception of Australia 
amongst community members. Greater identification with the values and beliefs of the 
mainstream culture can affect a sense of belonging and integration and ensure a person does 
not develop an ‘us and them’ mentality, which is a key characteristic of extremist groups. 
Ways of measuring 
CVE programs may be aimed at an individual or at certain population groups and 
neighbourhoods to build social cohesion or community capacity. An individual’s 
participation/level of engagement in a CVE program can be measured qualitatively through 
interviews or focus groups with program participants to gauge their views about various 
aspects of the program. Data could be collected to examine community awareness of violent 
extremism and inter-communal tensions and its causes; this would encompass both objective 
and subjective dimensions. Various tools to measure these indicators are suggested (e.g., 
Community Safety Scale, Scanlon-Monash Index of Social Cohesion, Australian 
Community Capacity Study, AMES Australia: Citizens’ Trust in Government Organisations, 
Survey of Migrants Perceptions of Australia – Past, Present and Future; Community 
Assessment of Resilience Toolkit). Some instruments have not been applied in the CVE 
context and may need to be adapted accordingly.  
 
Indicator: Awareness and understanding of violent extremism 
This indicator can encompass a range of issues. It can span community understanding of the 
scale and prevalence of violent extremism compared to other forms of criminality, the causes 
of violent extremism including the role of ideological motivations, awareness of the risk factors 
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for radicalisation and the vulnerability of certain groups to extremist influences, support for 
CVE-related programs and the roles of different agencies and individuals in the prevention of 
radicalisation. This indicator overlaps with Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator community 
awareness of violent extremism and related issues, Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support, 
indicator community awareness of violent extremism and indicator community awareness of 
government initiatives to counter violent extremism.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures  
Quantitative data 
Currently, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure of community 
awareness of violent extremism.  
 
Evaluation of the Extreme Dialogue project 
One initiative that specifically aims to assess understanding and awareness of violent 
extremism is the Extreme Dialogue project, a preventative educational program aimed at 
building resilience to radicalisation among young people (Extreme Dialogue, 2017). The 
educational resources available through the project have been designed to develop young 
people’s psychological and social understanding of violent extremism by increasing their 
knowledge of violent extremism and its roots, including associated ideologies (European 
Forum for Urban Security, 2016). Participants were asked to rate a number of items from 1 -
10 where 1 – not at all/strongly disagree, 5 – average/neither good nor bad, 10 – 
completely/strongly agree. Questions were asked pre- and post-implementation and included:   
 I understand what violent extremism is. 
 I am aware of what radicalisation is. 
For such questions to be meaningful, it would be necessary to have further follow-up questions 
relating to the grounds or evidence people use to make these assessments and whether they 
have a good or poor understanding of violent extremism.  
 
Qualitative data 
Some existing studies have aimed to gauge community awareness and understanding of violent 
extremism. For example, Tahiri and Grossman (2013) conducted a study in Australia 
examining community perceptions of radicalisation and extremism. This involved semi-
structured interviews, focus groups and written submissions comprising a sample of 542 
respondents spanning government stakeholders, community leaders and members from a 
variety of religious and ethnic groups. Questions asked respondents what they understood the 
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terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’ to mean. The precise wording of the questions 
contained in the interview schedule is not listed in the 2013 report.   
 
Qualitative data could also be collected to examine community awareness of violent extremism 
and its causes. The latter is particularly important, for if awareness and understanding are based 
on stereotypes or misperceptions then perceptions of the threat of violent extremism may be 
misguided. Further, poor awareness means people do not know how they might contribute to 
stopping violent extremism. Hence, improving knowledge and understanding can help ensure 
community members reduce the incidence of individuals within the community becoming 
involved in violent extremism. Qualitative data collection may focus on exploring: 
 Community members’ perceptions of their levels of violent extremism and what groups are 
most at risk. 
 What people regard as the causes of violent extremism.  
 Understanding the sources of information influencing people’s opinions. 
 How perceptions of the threat of violent extremism influence how people behave (e.g., 
reporting people at risk), or how they help to collaborate in CVE efforts.  
 
Awareness and understanding of violent extremism and relevance to the CVE context 
CVE programs targeted at the general population can aim to increase awareness and 
understanding of violent extremism (e.g., media campaigns) (see Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies, 
indicator recall of media campaigns). Increasing people’s awareness and understanding can 
help to equip communities with the skills to both detect radicalisation and work together to 
prevent violent extremism by understanding what factors place particular individuals at risk 
(see also Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator community awareness of violent extremism 
and related issues, Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support, indicator community awareness of 
government initiatives to counter violent extremism). Greater knowledge about violent 
extremism can act as a protective factor against radicalisation. Likewise, a realistic 
understanding of the prevalence of violent extremism and the threat it poses can also be relevant 
to ensuring people are not overly fearful or single out certain groups as posing a threat. 
Recognising a lack of understanding about violent extremism within particular at-risk 
communities or populations can also provide evidence of where further targeted interventions 
should be focused. Assessing understanding would also need to capture a range of dimensions 
relating to risk factors for radicalisation, the vulnerability of certain groups, stereotypes 
informing particular beliefs and knowledge of CVE programs (see also Outcome 2.2 – 
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Community-led support, indicator community awareness of government initiatives to 
counter violent extremism). Evaluating any changes in awareness would require a baseline 
measure of knowledge about violent extremism so a meaningful assessment could be made on 
whether it improves over time.  
 
Indicator: Trust in government 
Trust in government has been conceptualised across a range of fields as comprising beliefs in 
the legitimacy of prevailing political institutions and processes (e.g., Beetham, 2013). It can 
comprise appraisals that the government and key institutions will make decisions based on the 
principles of fairness, transparency and distributive justice (Blind, 2006). Low levels of trust 
in government can lead individuals to disengage from society and withdraw their support for 
key institutions. It can create resistance to institutional authorities and is linked to behavioural 
outcomes such as non-compliance, a lack of cooperation and disengagement with authorities 
(Fisk & Cherney, 2017).  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
There is considerable debate over how best to measure trust in government, with many 
measures proposed within the literature. Examples include:   
US National Election Study 
This measure comprises the following items: 
 How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what 
is right? (Scale of ‘just about always’, ‘most of the time’, ‘some of the time’. ‘Never’ is not 
a response option but is recorded if the participant voluntarily offers it.) 
 Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out or 
themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all people? (Response options: ‘few big 
interests’, ‘benefits of all’.) 
 Do you think that the people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste 
some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? (Response options: ‘a lot’, ‘some’, ‘not very 
much’). 
 Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not 
very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? (Response options: ‘quite 
a few’, ‘not many’, ‘hardly any’.)  
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The European Social Survey  
This measure asks participants to rate seven institutions on a scale of trust using the following 
question:  
 Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust the following 
institutions (where 0 – no trust at all, 10 – complete trust): ‘[country’s] parliament, the 
legal system, the police, political parties, the European Parliament, the United Nations?   
 
Building a New Life in Australia:  Longitudinal Study of Humanitarian Migrants (Australian 
Institute of Family Studies) 
This study samples individuals or families who were granted their permanent visa through 
Australia’s ‘offshore’ and ‘onshore’ humanitarian programs. Participants are asked to rate their 
level of trust in different community groups and organisations. Trust in government is worded 
in the following way:  
 How much do you trust the following groups of people? (a) government (b) people in 
the wider Australian community. (Response options: ‘a lot’, ‘some’, ‘a little’, ‘not at 
all’.) 
 
Australian Election Study  
This study aims to provide a long-term perspective on political attitudes and behaviours of 
the Australian electorate. The study has been conducted since 1987. Trust in government 
measures include:   
 ‘In general, do you feel that the people in government are too often interested in looking 
after themselves, or do you feel that they can be trusted to do the right thing nearly all the 
time?’  
 ‘In general, do you feel that people in government are only interested in looking after 
themselves or do you feel they can be trusted to do the right thing?’  
(Scale: ‘usually look after themselves’, ‘sometimes look after themselves’, ‘sometimes can 
be trusted to do the right thing’, ‘usually can be trusted to do the right thing’) (Bean, 2001; 
AES, 2017).   
 
Citizens’ Trust in Government Organisations (2015)  
This measure presents nine items measuring three dimensions of political trust, these being 
perceived competence, benevolence and integrity. The nine items are presented on a 5-point 
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Likert scale of 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – neutral, 4 – agree, 5 – strongly agree. 
The items are as follows:  
 When it concerns [policy area]… 
o [the government organisation] is capable.  
o [the government organisation] is expert.  
o [the government organisation] carries out its duty very well.  
o If citizens need help [the government organisation] will do its best to help them.  
o [the government organisation] acts in the interest of citizens. 
o [the government organisation] is genuinely interested in the wellbeing of citizens.  
o [the government organisation] approaches citizens in a sincere way.  
o [the government organisation] is sincere.  
o [the government organisation] is honest.  
 
Trust in government and relevance to the CVE context 
Research indicates that low levels of trust in institutional authorities can create conditions 
conducive to the emergence of extremist groups and can lead communities to provide both 
passive and active support for terrorism (Cherney & Murphy, 2017; Littler, 2017). Low trust 
in government is identified as a characteristic of violent extremist groups who tend to reject 
the legitimacy of mainstream political institutions and believe that governments conspire 
against them (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2016). At the community level, trust in government 
leads people to see authorities as legitimate and ensures people cooperate with them. Thus, 
building trust in government can be a CVE program outcome and can have a bearing on the 
degree to which groups see government responses to violent extremism as legitimate. Trust in 
government can be measured at the program level when focused on assessing an individual's 
participation in a CVE program and their changing levels of trust towards various institutional 
authorities. The indicator can also be measured at the community level by assessing changes 
in trust perceptions amongst communities that can provide the conditions under which the 
ideology and grievances of violent extremists can gain traction.  
 
Indicator: Perceived community safety 
Perceived community safety may be understood as encompassing individual or community 
perceptions of the physical and social incivilities within an area. Physical incivilities cover the 
physical environment such as abandoned buildings, refuse and graffiti and a lack of parkland 
and communal facilities. Social incivilities include the threat of violence a person perceives in 
their environment from others and encompasses visible criminal activity, gangs and disorderly 
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conduct within public spaces (Anderson & Kidd, 2014; Worrall, 2006).  Perceptions of 
community safety may be influenced by a range of factors, including levels of violence, 
physical signs of crime, ethnic diversity, gender, socioeconomic status, residential stability and 
confidence in the police.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures  
Many measures of perceived community safety exist within the literature, with various 
approaches to measurement taken. One example is the Community Safety Scale (CSS), which 
measures the perceived characteristics of a person's environment that can contribute to feelings 
of insecurity (Shoffner & Vacc, 2002). The scale consists of 15 items using a 5-point Likert-
type response option (from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’). Some example items 
include:  
 There are places in my neighbourhood community where people do not feel safe. 
 People in my neighbourhood community try to stop vandalism when they see it happening. 
 People help each other in my neighbourhood community. 
 Drug dealing is a problem in my neighbourhood community. 
 A lot of things get stolen in my neighbourhood community. 
 People take pride in the appearance of my neighbourhood community. 
 Gangs are a problem in my neighbourhood community. 
 Fighting is a way some problems are solved in my neighbourhood community. 
 My neighbourhood community is well lighted for afternoon and evening activities. 
 There are empty and uncared-for homes and apartments in my neighbourhood community. 
 People in my neighbourhood community use drugs. 
 It would not be hard to get drugs in my neighbourhood community. 
 It would not be hard to get a job in my neighbourhood community. 
 
Perceived community safety and relevance to the CVE context 
Measuring perceived community safety in the context of CVE program evaluation can serve 
the purpose of gauging the extent of general criminality in a community, which can act as a 
potential risk factor for radicalisation and extremism (Pressman & Flockton, 2012).  Elements 
associated with general criminality such as unemployment, vandalism, drug use or poor 
housing can potentially create the social conditions for radicalisation and extremism (Day & 
Kleinmann, 2017). Measuring perceptions of whether extremism and radicalisation are a 
problem for a community can highlight the extent to which it is perceived as a visible issue, 
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and provides a focus for program developers when designing and implementing CVE 
programs aimed at the broader population. Example questions could be designed drawing on 
several of the items of the CSS. For example, questions could directly measure a community’s 
perception of the extent of the problem of extremism or radicalisation. These could include:  
 Extremism/radicalisation is a problem in my neighbourhood community. 
 People in my neighbourhood community show signs of extremism/radicalisation. 
 People in this neighbourhood community work together to try to stop 
extremism/radicalisation.  
Other questions could be designed to measure the perceived threat of general criminality in a 
community. 
 
Indicator: Social cohesion 
The concept of social cohesion is multi-dimensional and there are variations in how it is 
understood across different policy and research fields (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). It is closely 
aligned to other example indicators such as sense of belonging, civic participation, 
marginalisation, community harmony, trust in government, social participation, positive 
perception of Australia and inter-communal tensions. Different measures of social cohesion 
tend to capture these indicators as well. Social cohesion can be understood as the bonds and 
relationships people have with their family, friends and the wider community. Day-to-day 
interactions between people in a community build trust and reciprocity, and contribute to 
cohesion (Berger-Schmitt & Noll, 2000; Forrest & Kearns, 2001). Where social cohesion is 
evident, it is said that there are more likely to be shared values, high levels of trust, perceptions 
of being part of a common enterprise and facing shared challenges, social inclusion, 
demographic stability and less inequalities in wealth and income (Duhaime et al., 2004; Forrest 
& Kearns, 2001; Maxwell, 1996).   
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Social cohesion has been measured in a range of ways:  
 
The Scanlon-Monash Index of Social Cohesion 
The Scanlon Foundation has developed a social cohesion index based on five domains of 
Belonging, Social Justice and Equity, Participation, Acceptance and Rejection, and Legitimacy 
and Worth (Scanlon-Monash, see http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/). Associated measures 
include the following:  
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 Belonging: Indication of pride in the Australian way of life and culture; sense of 
belonging; importance of maintaining the Australian way of life and culture.   
 Worth: Satisfaction with one's present financial situation and indication of happiness over 
the last year.   
 Social Justice and Equity: Views on the adequacy of financial support for people on low 
incomes; the gap between high and low incomes; Australia as a land of economic 
opportunity; trust in the Australian government.  
 Participation (political): Voted in an election; signed a petition; contacted a Member of 
Parliament; participated in a boycott; attended a protest.  
 Acceptance, Rejection and Legitimacy: The scale measures rejection, indicated by a 
negative view of immigration from different countries; reported experience of 
discrimination in the last 12 months; disagreement with government support of ethnic 
minorities; feeling that life is getting worse. 
 
Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS) 
This is a longitudinal study conducted across Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney and examines 
a range of issues relating to crime and community safety (see 
https://accs.project.uq.edu.au/content/front-page). Social cohesion is measured on the belief 
that one’s community is socially cohesive and that people in the community can be trusted 
(Mazerolle et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2012). The following four items measuring social 
cohesion are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree: 
 People in this community are willing to help their neighbours. 
 This is a close-knit community. 
 People in this community can be trusted. 
 People in this community do not share the same values.   
 
Social cohesion and relevance to the CVE context 
Social cohesion is typically regarded as essential to CVE (Husband & Alam, 2011); however, 
it is an amorphous concept and can be hard to quantify (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). The 
assumption is that cohesive communities are resilient against violent extremist influences, with 
people feeling a greater sense of belonging and acceptance (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). This means 
they are less likely to be attracted to the sense of grievance and injustice that violent extremists 
propagate to attract and recruit people to their cause. The relevance of social cohesion mirrors 
those of other example indicators, such as sense of belonging and trust in government, as they 
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contribute to building an environment that makes individuals less vulnerable to radicalising 
to violent extremism. CVE programs may aim to build social cohesion within certain 
population groups or neighbourhoods as opposed to assisting specific individuals identified as 
at risk of radicalising to violent extremism.  
 
Indicator: Perception of community harmony 
Perception of community harmony is a multi-dimensional indicator. It can be understood as 
the extent to which individuals perceive a level of accordance within their local neighbourhood. 
Alternatively, community harmony can be said to exist where there is peaceful order and 
respect for diversity among citizens (Bell & Mo, 2014). Community harmony is closely aligned 
with the indicator social cohesion. It can be closely linked to elements such as neighbouring or 
the psychological sense of community, both of which are elements of social cohesion. It is also 
related to the indicators inter-communal tensions, civic participation and supportive social 
networks within the immediate community (Grossman et al., 2016).      
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
While direct measures of community harmony are rare, indirect measurements of community 
harmony could be drawn from broader social cohesion measures. Some examples of social 
cohesion measurements have been provided in this document. Buckner (1988) developed the 
Neighbourhood Cohesion Instrument, based on three interconnected factors: attraction-to-
locale, neighbouring and sense of community. Example items include:  
 I visit with my neighbours in their homes. 
 If I needed advice about something, I could go to someone in my neighbourhood. 
 I borrow things and exchange favours with my neighbours. 
 I rarely have neighbours over to my house to visit. 
 I regularly stop and talk with people in my neighbourhood. 
 The friendships and associations I have with other people in my neighbourhood mean a lot 
to me. 
 I think I agree with most people in my neighbourhood about what is important in life. 
 I feel loyal to the people in my neighbourhood. 
 I would be willing to work together with others on something to improve my 
neighbourhood. 
 I like to think of myself as similar to the people who live in this neighbourhood. 
 A feeling of fellowship runs deep between me and other people in this neighbourhood. 
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 Living in this neighbourhood gives me a sense of community. 
Items were presented on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 – strongly agree, 2 – agree, 3 – neither 
agree nor disagree, 4 – disagree, 5 – strongly disagree. 
 
Australian Community Capacity Study 
This study also provides measures relating to community harmony. A component of the study 
asks about the frequency of neighbouring, aiming to capture the incidence of reciprocal 
exchange among neighbours (Mazerolle et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2012). This closely aligns 
with a measure of community harmony. Example items can be found under the indicators 
social cohesion and supportive social networks.  
 
If perceptions of community harmony are understood to constitute respect for diversity, various 
measures have been used to assess this element. For example, this includes the International 
Study of Attitudes to Immigration and Settlement (Berry, Bourhis & Kalin, 1999; adapted to 
Australia by Pe-Pua, 2001; Dandy & Pe-Pua, 2010). This survey includes items that assess a 
range of attitudes toward different elements of immigration and ethnic groups. Of most 
relevance are the questions relating to multiculturalism and diversity (referred to as 
Multicultural Ideology and Social Equality Beliefs). The Multicultural Ideology scale consists 
of 10 items designed to assess attitudes toward cultural diversity. An example item includes: 
‘Australians should recognise that cultural and racial diversity is a fundamental characteristic 
of Australian society’. The Social Equality scale consists of 11 items designed to measure 
social equality beliefs (i.e., tolerance and social dominance). An example item includes: ‘It is 
good to have people from different ethnic groups living in the same country’. All items are 
assessed on a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’) (see Dandy & 
Pe-Pua, 2010).   
 
Perception of community harmony and relevance to the CVE context 
Like the indicator social cohesion, community harmony, or a lack thereof, is regarded as 
providing the social conditions for violent extremism (Grossman et al., 2016). For example, if 
certain groups feel other community members regard them with suspicion due to their ethnicity 
or religious beliefs, this can create a sense of siege and make them feel under threat (Cherney 
& Murphy, 2016). Likewise, individuals who have animosity towards ethnic or religious 
groups can similarly feel under threat. These conditions are disruptive to community harmony 
because they perpetuate a sense of victimhood, allow conspiracy theories to flourish, can create 
defensiveness and suspicion towards authorities and perpetuate conflict between groups. This 
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provides fertile ground for violent extremism to emerge (Blackwood, Hopkins & Reicher, 
2013; Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Noor et al., 2012); however, it has been noted that while 
promoting social/community harmony might be a laudable goal, it can be unrealistic in a highly 
diverse country like Australia. Perhaps a more realistic goal is for CVE programs to build the 
capacity of groups to respond to the challenge of community conflict and differences in a 
respectful way (Grossman et al., 2016). While CVE programs may aim to improve perceptions 
of community harmony, thus potentially measuring it through the indicators outlined above, 
how people actually act towards others can be just as important. This may require more 
qualitative measurements that understand how perceptions of community harmony are linked 
to particular behaviours (e.g., if people interact with other racial or ethnic groups). CVE 
programs may want to capture both in their assessments of community harmony.  
 
Indicator: Inter-communal tensions 
Inter-communal tensions comprise subjective and objective dimensions, and are evidenced by 
conflict, animosity and suspicion between groups of individuals who differ in racial, ethnic or 
national origin, culture or religion. They can arise from perceptions that other groups present a 
threat to the perceived safety and security of others, which can be exacerbated by the racial, 
ethnic or religious distinctions people make between groups and a sense people feel of not 
living in harmony with those others (Bar-Tal, 2007; Grossman et al., 2016; Institute of 
Community Cohesion, 2010). Low levels of trust between community members can be an 
outcome of inter-communal tensions, with such tensions acting as a precursor to disorder, 
criminality and inter-communal violence. The impact of the existence of inter-communal 
tensions is division, segregation and discrimination (Bar-Tal, 2007). Inter-communal tensions 
can be considered alongside the example indicator perceptions of community harmony; that is, 
inter-communal tensions will erode community harmony. It is also applicable to the example 
indicator social cohesion, with inter-communal tensions undermining social cohesion. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Oldham Council’s You and Your Community Survey, 2013 (Oldham Metropolitan Borough 
Council, 2014) 
The Oldham Council’s You and Your Community Survey comprises a longitudinal study of 
residents of Oldham in Greater Manchester in the UK to assess community cohesion, 
engagement and residents’ satisfaction with services. Particular survey items aimed to capture 
inter-communal tensions and include such examples as:  
1.   In your neighbourhood, how much tension would you say there is between people…? 
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a. from different age groups? 
b. from different social backgrounds? 
c. from different ethnic groups? 
(Response options: a great deal, a fair amount, a little, none at all, don’t know.) 
2.  To what extent do you agree or disagree that your neighbourhood is a place where people…?  
a. of different ages get on well together? 
b. from different social backgrounds get on well together? 
c. from different ethnic groups get on well together? 
(Response options: definitely agree, tend to agree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to 
disagree, definitely disagree, don’t know, too few people in the local area, all the same 
background. See 
https://www.oldham.gov.uk/downloads/file/4013/you_and_your_community_survey.)   
 
Scanlon Foundation Mapping Social Cohesion national survey 
The 2015 and 2016 iteration of Scanlon (see http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/) included 
questions about people's local neighbourhoods, one of which is relevant to understanding 
perceptions of inter-communal tensions: ‘My local area is a place where people from different 
national or ethnic backgrounds get on well together’. This is assessed on a 5-point Likert scale 
(from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). 
 
Institute for Community Cohesion (2010) ‘Tension-monitoring’ 
A proposed way of measuring inter-communal tensions has been developed by the Institute for 
Community Cohesion (2010) in the UK. This guidance provides details on what is termed 
‘tension monitoring’ (see Institute of Community Cohesion 2010). The guidance examines 
communal tensions across a range of dimensions and outlines how it should be assessed on a 
scale of ‘imminent’ to ‘normal’. These tension-monitoring measures draw on a range of 
qualitative or quantitative data to evaluate subjective aspects of inter-communal tensions (e.g., 
voiced levels of alarm, fear and anxiety, perceived levels of tensions), as well as secondary or 
administrative data for objective measures (e.g., media scanning, police reports on hate crimes, 
incidents of racial abuse). The monitoring of community tensions requires the sourcing of 
existing data from police, government bodies, community service providers and community 
organisations. Qualitative approaches, such as focus groups with community members, are also 
proposed as a way to assess perceptions, drivers and dynamics of inter-communal tensions and 
determine solutions to these tensions.  
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Inter-communal tensions and relevance to the CVE context 
The existence of inter-communal tensions can potentially lead to the emergence of violent 
extremist groups and help facilitate their membership (Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Grossman et al., 
2016). Similar to the indicators social cohesion and community harmony, these tensions 
provide the social conditions for extremist narratives to take hold, with violent extremists 
exploiting and feeding off their existence. It is relevant to the ability of people to respond to a 
crisis with it undermining the ability of community members to act collectively (Norris et al., 
2008; Kaniasty & Norris, 2004). Similar to the indicators social harmony and social cohesion, 
inter-communal tensions encompass both objective and subjective dimensions. CVE 
evaluation may want to assess both these features by collecting data from target groups who 
are the subject of an intervention to gauge how they perceive any tensions, as well as data on 
incidents that indicate a rise in inter-communal tensions (e.g., hate crimes, racial abuse) within 
particular areas. 
 
Indicator: Positive perception of Australia 
A positive perception of Australia can cover a range of areas, including socio-economic 
conditions such as employment prospects, living standards, income levels, perceptions of the 
quality of government social services such as education, health or housing, community safety, 
crime levels, recreational opportunities and ethnic and cultural diversity. Positive perception 
of Australia can relate to the indicators perceptions of community harmony, sense of belonging, 
civic participation, inter-communal tensions and opportunities for education, training and 
employment. Understanding people’s perceptions of Australia can provide insights into the 
level of self-determination they may feel when engaging in the Australian community, which 
can be linked to the indicator self-efficacy. This is particularly true for communities where there 
is a higher population of migrant, refugee or asylum seekers. If pre-settlement expectations of 
Australia as a place to live do not match reality, more negative perceptions of Australia may 
develop which may lead to disappointment and disillusionment, and ultimately disengagement 
from the Australian way of life.   
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
AMES Australia: Survey of Migrants’ Perceptions of Australia – Past, Present and Future 
AMES (Adult Migrant English Service – see https://www.ames.net.au/) is one of Australia’s 
largest migration settlement agencies covering services for refugees and migrants, such as on-
arrival settlement support, English language and literacy training, vocational training and 
employment services. The AMES survey was conducted in 2014 amongst a sample of students 
 61 
in English language classes provided by AMES in Victoria. Example questions to assess 
positive perceptions of Australia include:  
 Australia is safe and secure. 
 Australian people are welcoming, warm and friendly. 
 Finding a good job in Australia that pays well is difficult. 
 My standard of living will be/is better in Australia. 
 My family will have/has a better life. 
 Australia is a democratic country that allows freedom of speech. 
 Australia has a good health care system. 
 People treat each other equally and fairly. 
(Response options: agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, don’t know.)   
 
The AMES survey was mainly focused on assessing pre- and post-migration perceptions of 
Australia. The issues canvassed by the measures outlined above can also be relevant to non-
immigrant populations, who may feel, for example, that they have few opportunities in 
Australia and see ethnic and religious groups as having (negatively) changed the Australian 
way of life. Thus, measures as outlined in the indicator perceptions of community harmony can 
also be relevant to this indicator.  
 
Australia @ 2015 Scanlon Foundation Survey 
This is a large-scale study of the Australian population that aims to further understand the 
perceptions of Australia of both recent immigrant arrivals and people born in the country. 
Included in the study are survey questions relating to positive and negative perceptions of a 
respondent’s life in Australia, such as:  
1. How satisfied are you with life in Australia? (Response options: very satisfied, satisfied, 
neither, dissatisfied, strongly dissatisfied, don’t know.)  
2. What do you most like/least like about Australia? 
 ‘Most liked’ attributes were: weather/climate, lifestyle/Australian way of life, beauty 
of the country/of the land, freedom and democracy, people are kind and friendly, clean 
environment, the standard of living, education system/opportunity for children, friends 
and family are close by, cultural diversity and multiculturalism. 
 ‘Least liked’ attributes were: weather/climate, cost of living/housing, high 
unemployment, hard to find a job in profession, taxes are too high, 
racism/discrimination, inadequate public transport, family and friends are not here, no 
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opportunity to have a say on issues of importance, there is corruption, there are too 
many immigrants, Australians are not friendly. 
 
Positive perception of Australia and relevance to the CVE context 
If people have a positive perception of the country in which they reside they are more likely to 
feel a sense of belonging and inclusion (Grossman et al., 2016). Extremist groups seek to recruit 
individuals to their cause by exploiting a perceived common ‘bond’ of hatred and rejection of 
the positive elements of the dominant mainstream culture. They portray the prevailing social 
and economic order as privileging certain groups and discriminating against others (McCauley 
& Moskalenko, 2016, 2017). If people have a positive perception of the country in which they 
live they will potentially be less vulnerable to such messaging or influences. In this regard, an 
individual is less likely to see him or herself as an outsider or feel that he or she is denied 
similar opportunities as others (known as relative deprivation, Moghaddam, 2005). CVE 
programs can both directly and indirectly work to develop a more positive perception of 
Australia amongst community members, directly through specific initiatives such as 
intercultural dialogue or exposure to the positive attributes of living in a multicultural society 
(Grossman et al., 2016), or indirectly as the result of services and/or support (e.g., education 
and employment assistance) that may be provided as part of an intervention. Positive 
perceptions of Australia can be measured quantitatively through the different measures listed 
above by targeting certain communities or neighbourhoods. It can also be measured 
qualitatively through interviews with program participants to gauge their views about Australia 
(e.g., those attributes listed in Scanlon) and identify if this changes over time when involved in 
an intervention. Again, assuming causation would need to be done with caution. 
 
Indicator: Identify as Australian 
The concept of ‘identity’ can be understood as recognising shared characteristics with another 
person or group. It is closely aligned with the indicator sense of belonging, because to identify 
as part of a group is to feel a sense of belonging, to experience security and to share values 
(i.e., a sense of ‘we’ as opposed to ‘they’). In this instance, to identify as Australian means to 
feel part of an Australian community and support its values and ideals. What these values and 
ideals constitute is not the subject of widespread agreement.   
 
 
 
 63 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Australian Community Capacity Study (ACCS) 
As mentioned for the indicator social cohesion, the ACCS is a longitudinal study conducted 
across Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney that examines a range of issues relating to crime and 
community safety (see https://accs.project.uq.edu.au/content/front-page). A component of the 
ACCS includes an ethnic minority sample to measure feelings of identity with the wider 
Australian community. This was assessed via four items measured on a scale of 1 – strongly 
disagree to 5 – strongly agree. The four items are:  
 I see myself first and mainly as a member of the Australian community. 
 It is important for me to be seen by others to be a member of the Australian community. 
 I am proud to be an Australian. 
 What Australia stands for is important to me.   
 
Australia @ 2015 Scanlon Foundation Survey 
This is a large-scale study of the Australian population aimed at understanding perceptions of 
recent immigrants and those born in Australia. An Australian Identity Scale within the study 
comprises nine questions: 
1.  To what extent do you have a sense of belonging in Australia? (Response options: great 
extent, moderate extent, only slightly, not at all.)  
2. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. How 
strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see 
yourself? 
 I see myself as an Australian. 
 I see myself as part of my local community in Australia. 
 I feel as if I belong to Australia. 
 When I discuss Australia I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’. 
 I identify with Australians. 
 I feel I am committed to Australia. 
 I feel a bond with Australians. 
 I see myself as Australian. 
(Response options:  strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly 
disagree.)  
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Identify as Australian and relevance to the CVE context 
A sense of identity features in discussions of the causes of terrorism and radicalisation. For 
instance, it has been argued that Muslims in the West can experience identity conflict, whereby 
they are caught between their own religious and cultural identity and their sense of 
identification with the country in which they reside (e.g., young Australian Muslims) (Cherney 
& Murphy, 2017). Studies have found that when Muslims living in the West feel disconnected 
from broader society they are more likely to develop extremist beliefs and empathise with the 
grievances propagated by terrorists (e.g., Doosje, Loseman & van den Bos, 2013). Greater 
identification with the values and beliefs of the mainstream culture can affect a sense of 
belonging and integration and ensure a person does not develop an ‘us and them’ mentality, 
which is a key characteristic of extremist groups (Cherney & Murphy, 2017; Koehler, 2017). 
Thus, identifying as an Australian is important because a person will be less likely to see the 
dominant culture as the enemy. This does not mean the other identities a person may have (e.g., 
as a Muslim) must become subordinate to the dominant cultural identity. Rather, they should 
be equally valued along mainstream social identities. Furthermore, the indicator of identifying 
as Australian closely mirrors the indicator of sense of belonging; accordingly, the relevance to 
the CVE context is similar. CVE programs aimed at the community and individual level could 
measure the extent to which individuals within a community identify as Australian, and work 
to implement activities and strategies aimed at enhancing this component of self-identification 
while acknowledging existing ethnic, racial or religious identities that an individual may have. 
 
Indicator: Community capacity and willingness to respond to crisis 
This indicator covers a range of components. Firstly, community capacity to respond to a crisis 
is influenced by a community having the networks, resources and skills to react when 
experiencing some type of crisis. This can include physical capacity, such as local 
infrastructure, such as utilities (water, electricity, gas), food services, health services (e.g., 
hospitals), transportation, communication and banking operating at the required level during a 
crisis to ensure individuals and groups survive and recover (McAslan, 2011). This also includes 
the operational capacities of local emergency and health services, volunteers and warning 
systems, communication systems and transportation infrastructure. Capacity to respond to a 
crisis includes having the required operational practices in place and ensuing that risk 
assessments have been carried out. This can be referred to as procedural capacity. 
Responsiveness to a crisis includes elements of community cohesion and civic participation 
that relate to supporting individuals during a crisis, with these influenced by values and beliefs 
shared amongst community members. Hence, capacity to respond to a crisis relates to the 
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ability of residents to act collectively and come together for a common purpose (e.g., 
supporting those in need) (Norris et al., 2008). This can be referred to as social capacity. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Given the complexity of this indicator, a number of possible measures could provide insight 
into a community’s capacity and willingness to respond to a crisis. The way this indicator is 
defined and what a CVE program aims to achieve will determine how this indicator will be 
assessed. Program developers and policy-makers may need to use existing measures outlined 
in this document, including those listed under Outcome 1.1 – Individuals and Outcome 1.2 – 
Environment. Data on capacity to respond to a crisis may also be held by other agencies. 
 
Community Assessment of Resilience Toolkit (CART) 
CART is a community intervention for assessing and building community resilience to 
disasters (Pfefferbaum et al., 2013a). The toolkit aims to assess four domains of community 
responses to disasters – connection and caring, resources, transformative potential and disaster 
management – which mirror the components of physical, procedural and social capacities to 
respond to a crisis, as discussed above. CART involves an assessment process whereby 
stakeholders are brought together to address community issues through assessment, feedback, 
planning and actions (Pfefferbaum et al., 2013b). The toolkit includes a survey questionnaire, 
a focus group script and other assessment and analytical instruments that can be used to assess 
a community’s capacity and willingness to respond to a crisis. This includes key informant 
interviews with relevant agencies, focus groups with community groups to identify knowledge 
about local capacity and the willingness of people to work together, mapping the existence of 
neighbourhood infrastructure to identify gaps and the development of maps to identify the 
partnerships and connections across individuals, groups and organisations within a community 
(for more details see: https://www.oumedicine.com/docs/ad-psychiatry-workfiles/cart_online-
final_042012.pdf). 
 
The interview and focus group schedule canvasses the following topics: community resilience, 
connection and caring, resources, transformative potential, disaster management, terrorism 
preparedness and public engagement (see Pfefferbaum et al., 2011). Some examples of the 
focus group/interview questions relating to terrorism preparedness include: 
 What is your community doing to establish terrorism response capability? 
 Who will be served? Will individuals or groups be neglected? If so, why? 
 Are improvements necessary? If so, what are they? 
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 Would these changes address the needs of under-served individuals or groups? 
 If not, how could under-served individuals or groups be better served? 
 What would be required to make the recommended improvements? 
 What is your community doing to establish terrorism recovery capability? 
 Who will be served? Will individuals or groups be neglected? If so, why? 
 How might recovery capacity be improved? 
 Would these changes address the needs of under-served individuals or groups? 
 If not, how could under-served individuals or groups be better served? 
 What would be required to make the recommended improvements? 
 
The CART survey questionnaire has been adapted depending on the community context 
(Pfefferbaum et al., 2015). The foundational questionnaire includes the following 21 items:   
 People in my community feel like they belong to the community. 
 People in my community are committed to the wellbeing of the community. 
 People in my community have hope about the future.  
 People in my community help each other.  
 My community treats people fairly no matter what their background is. 
 My community supports programs for children and families.  
 My community has resources it needs to take care of community problems (resources 
include, for example, money, information, technology, tools, raw materials, and services). 
 My community has effective leaders.  
 People in my community are able to get the services they need.  
 People in my community know where to go to get things done. 
 My community works with organisations and agencies outside the community to get things 
done. 
 People in my community communicate with leaders who can help improve the community. 
 People in my community work together to improve the community. 
 My community looks at its successes and failures so it can learn from the past. 
 My community develops skills and finds resources to solve its problems and reach its goals. 
 My community has priorities and sets goals for the future.  
 My community tries to prevent disasters.  
 My community actively prepares for future disasters.  
 My community can provide emergency services during a disaster. 
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 My community has services and programs to help people after a disaster. 
(Response options range from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree, with a midpoint of 3 
–  neither disagree nor agree.) 
 
Community capacity and willingness to respond to crisis and relevance to the CVE context 
The relevance of community capacity and willingness to respond to a crisis relates to 
understanding how resilient and responsive a community will be when there are incidents of 
violent extremism. In such situations, resources will need to be redirected to ensure an 
appropriate response occurs. Further, it encompasses elements of the indicators of coping skills, 
social cohesion, social and civic participation, identify as Australian and supportive social 
networks within the immediate community. These will influence the level of collective 
mobilisation amongst neighbours, their ability to ‘pull together’ and whether they scapegoat 
others as to blame for extremist acts (Norris et al., 2008; Kaniasty & Norris, 2004). If 
community groups scapegoat others, this will have an impact on their capacity to act 
collectively in the interests of all community members. CVE programs may aim to build 
physical, procedural and social capacities to respond to a crisis. Evaluating this indicator may 
need to be focused at these three levels. 
 
Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies  
Summary Table  
Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document.  
This outcome includes the following four indicators:  
 Recall of CVE-related media campaigns. 
 Exposure to extremist messaging. 
 Media discussion of inter-communal relations. 
 Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes. 
Why measure? 
Programs may aim to address the ideologies that underpin the propaganda, anti-Western 
rhetoric and messaging and narratives that violent extremist groups use to justify their 
actions. They may also aim to address broader social issues such as poor inter-communal 
relations, or negative racial or other stereotypes, both of which may be pre-conditions for 
radicalisation. Extremist messaging can come from a number of sources, including social 
media.  
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Ways of measuring 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches could be utilised to assess these indicators. For 
example, data on the recall of CVE-related media campaigns could encompass the 
recollection and recognition of key messages and the impact on knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviours. Qualitative data could be gathered through focus groups or interviews with at-
risk individuals exploring exposure to extremist messaging. Data from community members 
could assess the nature and impact of media presentations of racial and other stereotypes.   
 
Indicator: Recall of CVE-related media campaigns 
Recall of CVE-related media campaigns could encompass the recollection and recognition of 
key messages and other elements from a media campaign, where the campaign was seen and 
what impact the campaign had on knowledge, attitudes and behaviours in respect to CVE-
related issues (Sixsmith et al., 2014). Evaluations of media campaigns in the public health area 
have been carried out extensively and can provide guidance on evaluating CVE-related media 
campaigns. CVE-related media campaigns could include providing counter-narratives to 
extremist propaganda, or radio and television campaigns to promote social cohesion, or 
improve the reporting of suspicious activities by the public to the police (Living Safe Together, 
n.d).  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Recall of ‘Foolsspeed’ Campaign (Stead et al., 2002) 
‘Foolsspeed’ was a five-year road safety initiative in Scotland designed to tackle speeding. The 
evaluation of the campaign included a three-year longitudinal survey of drivers in the target 
age group, including a baseline survey prior to the campaign being launched, and then three 
follow-up surveys following the launch. Each wave of the survey assessed attitudes, norms, 
intentions and behaviours over the period of the campaign, with the follow-up survey including 
specific questions on the campaign to assess unprompted and prompted awareness, attitudes to 
and recall of key messages. Those related to the recall of the campaign included the following 
suite of questions: 
 Measure of spontaneous awareness (the extent to which a campaign is front of mind 
amongst the target population): 
o Respondents were asked to recall and describe, unprompted, ‘any advertising or 
publicity which they had seen recently on road safety’.  This measure also gathers 
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mentions of where the campaign was seen, i.e., on television, posters/billboards, 
in newspapers/magazines. 
 Measure of prompted awareness: 
o Respondents were asked whether they had heard of the five speeding-related 
campaigns and slogans, and were shown a visual of each of the campaigns. Again, 
this measure included asking respondents about the medium through which they 
saw the campaign.  
 Unprompted reactions to campaign advertisements: 
o Respondents were asked to describe what ‘thoughts and feelings’ occurred to them 
on seeing the advertisement (open-ended question).  
o Respondents were asked to describe in their own words ‘what the advertisement is 
trying to say’ (open-ended question). 
 Prompted response to campaign advertisements: 
o For some components of the campaign, respondents were asked to rate the 
advertisement in terms of a series of characteristics on a scale of 1-9. The 
characteristics included: difficult/easy to understand, talks down/does not talk down 
to you, like/dislike of ad, made me/did not make me think of how a passenger would 
view my driving, made me/did not make me think about my own driving, is not/is 
for people like me. 
o Prompted level of agreement or disagreement (on a scale of strongly agree, agree, 
neither, disagree, strongly disagree) with seven statements relating to the potential 
message of each of the particular advertisements. Examples of the statements 
included: 
 This ad is trying to say that some ways of driving are foolish. 
 This ad is trying to tell drivers to be more considerate. 
 This ad is trying to make people drive more slowly. 
While these are a ‘typical’ suite of questions asked in media campaign evaluations, any 
evaluation of a media campaign needs to be designed with consideration of the campaign target 
behaviour and audience, the main campaign message, the approach used to convey the 
message, the campaign duration and intensity, the different types of media used and any 
activities or enforcement accompanying the campaign (Wundersitz & Hutchinson, 2011).  The 
design of any data collection technique to measure this indicator would need to take these 
factors into account. For example, assessing the recollection of a social media campaign that 
targets particular at-risk groups (e.g., young people) would be different to a mass media 
campaign used to educate the wider community. 
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Recall of CVE-related media campaigns and relevance to the CVE context 
Public health and crime prevention research does show that media campaigns can be effective 
(Sutton, Cherney & White, 2013). Given the expense of media campaigns, it is important to 
understand their effectiveness and if there are any unintended side effects (e.g., people become 
more curious about the problem being addressed) (Cho & Salmon, 2007). Recall of particular 
media campaigns is important to assess because it helps identify if a campaign’s message 
resonates with its target group. If it does not, then people are less likely to take notice of it.  
 
Recollection of a campaign will not provide insight into its effectiveness. Recall could be 
related to other aspects of the advertisement that may have been judged as funny, ridiculous, 
over-the-top and/or offensive. Recall does not necessarily mean the message is seen as 
legitimate or persuasive. Within the CVE field, recall of a media campaign could be related to 
the perceived legitimacy of the source of the message compared to the content of the message 
itself (Cherney, 2016). Hence, measuring recall of CVE media campaigns needs to take into 
account a number of issues so as to determine whether a particular campaign was effective. 
 
Indicator: Exposure to extremist messaging 
Extremist groups aim to recruit and attract vulnerable individuals to their cause through the 
spread of extremist ideological propaganda, anti-Western rhetoric and messaging, and 
narratives that justify violence. Extremist messaging can come from a number of sources. The 
other indicators listed in Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies make specific reference to the media and 
its relationship to violent extremism. The indicator exposure to extremist messaging is 
understood as related to exposure via social media or extremist/terrorist websites. Accessing 
the level of exposure can be a challenge, given that individuals subject to an intervention could 
be reluctant to talk about their social media viewing habits, and that messaging can occur across 
a range of platforms, with extremist groups easily able to establish new forums once original 
forums and platforms are shut down or disrupted. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
A number of approaches using both objective and subjective data as well as qualitative and 
quantitative approaches could be utilised to assess this outcome.  
 
 
 
 71 
Social media analysis 
Social media analysis can potentially be useful for identifying individuals, groups, subcultures, 
networks, online communities and specific types of content and language that encourage and 
inspire violence on behalf of a cause (Abdo, 2014; Waldman & Verga, 2016). Qualitative 
analysis of website and social media content can look for indications of political, economic, 
social or cultural factors which have been identified as risk factors for violent extremism. These 
may include collective narratives of grievance, de-legitimisations of the state and radicalising 
ideologies that glamorise or offer rewards for violence (Abdo, 2014; Waldman & Verga, 2016). 
Determining the number of followers of known extremists on social media, or the number of 
visits to particular websites known to promote terrorist or extremist propaganda is another way 
that this indicator could be measured. More sophisticated analytical tools and techniques, such 
as the ‘big data analytics’ of Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT), could also be used to 
assess levels of exposure to extremist messaging and if patterns of exposure change over time 
(Bartlett & Reynolds, 2015; Waldman & Verga, 2016; O’Halloran et al., 2016). (The details of 
various SOCMINT techniques are available at https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/State_of_the_Arts_2015.pdf.)  
 
Social media analysis would need to be developed in conjunction with other stakeholders, such 
as intelligence agencies, who will have knowledge of known extremists and their social media 
reach, along with details of known websites where extremist propaganda is promoted.  
 
Social Network Analysis 
Exposure to extremist messaging could also be evaluated through Social Network Analysis 
(SNA), which can help to identify and understand online (or offline) social networks that 
promote and encourage violent extremist elements. SNA aims to measure, map, model, and/or 
describe the nature, intensity and frequency of social networks. SNA can be conducted on data 
sets of online activities including readership or participation in blogs, news stories, discussion 
boards or social media sites. Data on site content, links or usage can be used to reveal the 
number of people in an online social network and how and what information flows among 
them. It can thereby help to explain how messaging spreads amongst online networks and how 
this may change over time (see Abdo, 2014; Bartlett & Reynolds, 2015; Waldman & Verga, 
2016). SNA requires a high degree of technical skill and knowledge of relevant SNA tools to 
implement successfully.  
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Qualitative 
Interviews or focus groups with at-risk individuals could provide an assessment of the 
existence and nature of any exposure to extremist messaging; however, as previously 
mentioned, people may be reluctant to openly discuss their social media habits. Nonetheless, 
this approach could be useful for any counter-narrative campaign that tries to influence 
exposure to extremist content by challenging either emotively or factually the arguments and 
rationalisations underpinning extremist messaging. If this is effective, people will be less likely 
to actively view extremist content because they do not see it as legitimate, thus limiting their 
exposure. Asking target groups about how their social media habits have changed following an 
intervention could therefore be useful.  
 
Exposure to extremist messaging and relevance to the CVE context 
Social media is used by extremist groups to publicise their activities and views to supporters 
and attract new recruits (Waldman & Verga, 2016). Social media allows for the development 
of personal connections that give potential recruits who might be experiencing social alienation 
a ‘sense of communal belonging’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Waldman & Verga, 2016). 
Extremist messaging and propaganda via social media channels can offer narratives that justify 
violent extremism and also create social forums in which such narratives are reinforced (Ducol 
et al., 2016). While social media is a central means by which vulnerable individuals may be 
exposed and influenced by violent extremist messaging, such exposure can also come from 
other sources, including within the community via existing peer or social networks. Exposure 
to extremist messaging via a variety of sources, social media in particular, increases the risk of 
an individual radicalising to violent extremism (Waldman & Verga, 2016; Ducol et al., 2016). 
Thus, the identification of the extent, nature and frequency of exposure to extremist messaging 
via social media and other sources is relevant to the CVE context, particularly in informing the 
development of CVE interventions aimed at neutralising the influence of such messaging. 
 
Indicator: Media discussion of inter-communal relations 
The term ‘inter-communal relations’ overlaps with indicator inter-communal tensions. It can 
refer to the level of conflict, animosity and suspicion between groups of individuals who differ 
in racial, ethnic or national origin, culture or religion. Evidence of the quality of inter-
communal relations can include expressions of the degree of social participation and 
interactions between members of different racial, ethnic and religious groups (for example, see 
also indicator social participation and indicator perception of community harmony). Poor inter-
communal relations can be evidenced by hate crimes, incidents of racial abuse and expressions 
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of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment. Discussions in the media could include 
coverage and opinions (including the nature, medium and frequency of this coverage and 
opinions) in media outlets, including television, newspapers, magazines and radio, as well as 
social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or various political or 
community blogs. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
The primary source of data for assessing media discussions of inter-communal relations can be 
through media monitoring. A range of media monitoring companies exist, such as Isentia, 
Streem, Media Monitors and the Meltwater Group, which offer subscription-based services 
that allow users to monitor the output of print, online, broadcast and social media. Other free 
media monitoring tools exist such as Google Alerts. The CSIRO also offers a suite of software 
tools to track information on social media. (For further details see 
https://www.csiro.au/en/Research/D61/Areas/Data-for-decisions/Social-media.) 
 
Media Monitoring Project: A Baseline Description of How the Australian Media Report and 
Portray Suicide and Mental Health and Illness (Pirkis et al., 2001).  
This project is an example of how media discussion on issues of public concern can be assessed. 
The Pirkis et al. (2001) report included a series of studies that aimed to assess the extent and 
nature of the reporting and portrayal of suicide, mental health and illness. It included a 
quantitative component examining the amount of reporting of these subjects in the media, as 
well as a qualitative study that analysed the content of the material reported and how it was 
framed (e.g., positively, negatively, stereotypically). Both the quantitative and qualitative study 
used data gathered from the media retrieval service Media Monitors. Media Monitors retrieved 
content relating to suicide, mental health and illness from all national daily newspapers and 
Victorian suburban and regional papers, as well news and current affairs items. These source 
materials were then coded and analysed. (For further details of these studies see: 
http://www.mindframe-
media.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/5168/Pirkis,Blood,Francis,etal.-The-media-
monitoring-project_baseline.pdf). 
 
Media discussion of inter-communal relations and relevance to the CVE context 
Monitoring media discussion of inter-communal relations can offer a proxy measure on the 
level of social harmony in a community and whether groups are accepting of one another. A 
lack of acceptance for diversity and for different religious or cultural practices is a key 
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characteristic of violent extremist groups (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2016; Simi et al., 
2017). Poor inter-communal relations are likely to fuel levels of community fear and anxiety. 
Such anxiety can create further division and provide a fertile environment for violent extremist 
narratives to take hold. It must be noted that any fluctuations in the intensity of media 
discussion on the quality of inter-communal relations could arise for a number of reasons, such 
as the saliency of other issues being discussed in the public and political domains. CVE 
programs that aim to influence the content of media discussions would need to take this into 
account and also choose a mix of data collection methods and various media sources through 
which to gauge the quality of inter-communal relations.  
 
Indicator: Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes 
Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes recognises the complex relationship between 
the media and public perceptions (Brooks & Hebert, 2006). There are some similarities to the 
indicator media discussion of inter-communal relations. Media presentations of racial and other 
stereotypes are shaped by pre-existing public misperceptions about ethnic groups and religions 
that are held by members of the public. Media presentations themselves can reinforce and 
perpetuate these existing negative biases and attitudes, which are connected to the construction 
of such stereotypes (Gilens, 1996; Maher, 2009). Stereotypes can be understood as 
representations of a group and its members and are closely linked to discrimination and 
prejudice (Augoustinos & Walker, 1998). The media presentation of racial and other 
stereotypes could include coverage and opinions (including the nature, medium and frequency 
of this coverage and opinions) of racial and other stereotypes in news outlets such as television, 
newspapers, magazines and radio, and could include news coverage, commentary, debate, 
editorials, columns, articles, readers’ letters, cartoons and headlines, as well as reports of events 
(Runnymeade Trust, 1997).  It could also include the presentation of stereotypes such as those 
based on race, ethnicity and gender in film, television and music, as well as on social media. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
In measuring the media presentation of racial and other stereotypes, it is necessary to identify 
what constitutes a ‘stereotype’. To date, there does not appear to be any standardised measure 
that sets out criteria to assess whether something is a stereotypical representation of a specific 
group. One way to set these parameters is to conduct a review of current literature that covers 
stereotypical representations of specific groups and create a classification of those 
representations. This classification or categorisation could then be used to check media 
coverage to identify whether those stereotypes appear in particular stories.     
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Once the parameters are set to determine whether something is considered a stereotypical 
representation of a particular race or group, an assessment of the extent of these media 
presentations can be carried out. A way to assess media presentations of racial and other 
stereotypes is through media monitoring. Details of the various approaches to media 
monitoring, including the types of products and services that exist and how they can be used, 
is discussed under the previous indicators of exposure to extremist messaging and media 
discussions of inter-communal relations. 
 
Qualitative data could also be collected via interviews or focus groups with community 
members to assess the nature and impact of the media presentation of racial and other 
stereotypes. Interviews and focus groups could be used to understand the sorts of stereotypical 
representations that are obvious to community members, perceptions towards the 
pervasiveness of stereotypical media presentations and their impact on behaviour or attitudes. 
 
Media presentation of racial and other stereotypes and relevance to the CVE context 
If the media portray particular groups in a stereotypical way this can reinforce prejudices 
towards such groups. A negative or inflammatory media presentation of racial and other 
stereotypes can have a significant impact on community perceptions by increasing levels of 
community fear, anxiety and alarm, and exaggerating the threat posed by particular groups. It 
is consistently argued that media portrayals of Muslims reinforce the view that Islam is a 
religion of violence and that Muslims present a national security threat (Ewart, Cherney & 
Murphy, 2017). These portrayals can strengthen ideological convictions among the broader 
community that Muslims should be despised, which for some can justify their harassment and 
exclusion.  
 
Outcome 1.5 – Recruitment  
Summary Table  
Outcome 1.5 – Recruitment 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following two indicators:  
 Intentions of joining a violent extremist group. 
 Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups.  
Why measure? 
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The intentions of an individual to join a violent extremist group can include a range of 
cognitive and behavioural indicators. Understanding intentions of joining a violent extremist 
group can provide insight into the tipping point towards radicalisation. Estimated 
membership includes the approximate numbers of individuals who, through indications or 
intelligence, appear to be members of an extremist organisation or group. Having an 
understanding of the estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups will help 
to give an indication of their appeal and subsequent group membership.   
Ways of measuring 
A variety of quantitative and qualitative measures can be used to assess these indicators. For 
example, tools have been proposed that measure risk-taking behaviours that might assist in 
the identification of individuals vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism (e.g., 
Identifying Vulnerable People Guidance by Egan et al., 2016), intent to join a violent 
extremist group (e.g., Self-Sacrifice Scale by Bélanger, 2014) or passive support for 
terrorism (e.g., Cherney & Murphy 2017). Some instruments have not been applied in the 
CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly. Qualitative interviews or a 
quantitative survey of at-risk individuals could assess their level of support and sympathy 
for or intent to join an extremist group; however, such approaches are inherently 
problematic. Data on extremist group membership could be gathered from police-related 
intelligence. Secondary data sources such as internet searches of previously identified 
extremist organisations and groups could also be used to gather membership information.   
 
Indicator: Intentions of joining a violent extremist group 
The intentions of an individual to join a violent extremist group can potentially include a range 
of cognitive and behavioural indicators. These can include stated intentions of becoming an 
actively engaged member of a known extremist group. These can also be signified by passive 
support for terrorism, including sympathising with the ideological justifications used by 
extremist groups or expressing sympathy for acts of terrorism (Paul, 2010). Such intentions 
could be shown through objective measures such as psychological or mental health indictors, 
general criminality or associating with known extremists. Hence, intentions can incorporate 
subjective and objective measures.   
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Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) Guidance (Egan et al., 2016)  
IVP Guidance provides a checklist of key risk-taking behaviours that might assist in the 
identification of individuals vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremism, or contributing 
to such activity. The 16 IVP checklist items are:  
1. Cultural and religious isolation. 
2. Isolation from family. 
3. Risk-taking behaviour. 
4. Sudden change in religious practice. 
5. Violent rhetoric. 
6. Negative peer influences. 
7. Isolated from peer group. 
8. Hate rhetoric. 
9. Political activism. 
10. Basic paramilitary training. 
11. Travel/residence abroad. 
12. Death rhetoric (increased salience of). 
13. Extremist group membership (increased salience of).  
14. Contact with known recruiters and extremists (increased salience of).  
15. Advanced paramilitary training (increased salience of).  
16. Overseas combat (increased salience of).   
Known extremists (identified from Google searches and using other open-source intelligence) 
were classified with persons being rated for each of the 16 criteria as 0 – no record/not known, 
1 – low evidence, 2 – medium evidence, 3 – good evidence.  
 
Self-Sacrifice Scale (Bélanger, 2014) 
This scale could be used as indirect measure of intent to join a violent extremist group or 
commit an act of violent extremism. The scale includes 10 items measured using a 7-point 
Likert scale (from ‘not agree at all’ to ‘strongly agree’). These 10 items were:  
1. It is senseless to sacrifice one's life for a cause (reverse coded). 
2. I would defend a cause to which I am truly committed even if my loved ones rejected 
me. 
3. I would be prepared to endure intense suffering if it meant defending an important 
cause. 
4. I would not risk my life for a highly important cause (reverse coded). 
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5. There is a limit to what one can sacrifice for an important cause (reverse coded). 
6. My life is more important than any cause (reverse coded).  
7. I would be ready to give my life for a cause that is extremely dear to me. 
8. I would be willing to give away all my belongings to support an important cause.  
9. I would not be ready to give my life away for an important cause (reverse coded).  
10. I would be ready to give up all my personal wealth for a highly important cause. 
 
Passive support for terrorism 
A study by Cherney and Murphy (2017) used survey data collected from 800 Muslims living 
in Australia to assess factors that lead to passive support for terrorism. Passive support for 
terrorism was measured through the statement: ‘Terrorists sometimes have valid grievances’ 
(measured on a Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Factors examined 
included beliefs in jihad (e.g., jihad justifies the use of violence as a means to an end, measured 
on a Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). This is an indirect measure (i.e., 
proxy) of support for terrorist groups with a sense of grievance an important way by which 
extremist groups attract members.  
 
An additional approach could be to interview at-risk individuals (either qualitatively through 
face-to-face in-depth interviews or quantitatively through a survey) on their level of support 
and sympathy for, or intent to join, an extremist group. There are inherent problems with this 
approach due to social desirability biases and the willingness of people to openly admit they 
have such sympathies or intentions. Thus, proxy measures, or indirect measurements of an 
individual’s intent to join an extremist group, such as those mentioned above, may be the best 
approach.   
 
Intentions of joining a violent extremist group and relevance to the CVE context 
Understanding intentions of joining a violent extremist group can provide insight into the 
tipping point towards radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017). It can also provide 
evidence as to where CVE policy-makers and program designers need to direct their resources 
to deter individuals from being recruited. It must be emphasised that there is a difference 
between a stated intention to join and whether a person actually follows through with this plan. 
Take for example proxy methods that assess an intention to join, such as a measure of passive 
support for terrorist grievances or self-reported intentions to self-sacrifice for a cause. These 
can be more effective methods of gauging attitudes towards extremism, with people more 
honest in their answers compared to being asked if they support specific groups like ISIS 
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(Cherney & Murphy, 2017); however, sympathy may not mean someone is then motivated 
to commit an act of terrorism. Gauging intentions does raise the risk of false positives; that is, 
a measure of intention is so general that it leads to the incorrect assessment that someone 
possesses a risk of radicalising to violent extremism when in actual fact they do not (Sarma, 
2017). Hence, assessments of intentions to join will need to use a variety of measures to 
accurately assess how these motivations change and if they represent as issue of ongoing 
concern for program staff. 
 
Indicator: Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups 
Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups include approximate numbers of 
individuals who, through indications or intelligence, appear to be members of an extremist 
organisation or group. What constitutes an extremist organisation or group would need to be 
defined to ensure this count was accurate; that is, they are defined by pursuing political, 
ideological or religious goals through the unlawful use of violence.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Identifications of extremist organisations and groups and their subsequent membership 
numbers could come from police-related intelligence. Police or other agencies at the local, state 
and national levels gather details on extremist organisations and groups and their estimated 
membership (e.g., through social media monitoring), including details of a group’s 
composition, levels of online support and if people have multiple forms of membership. Such 
measures could also come from secondary data sources such as Internet searches for extremist 
organisations and groups that have been identified in academic literature, the media and other 
sources. Particular non-governmental organisations may also track membership of extremist 
groups. For example, in the USA, the Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) monitors hate 
groups and other extremist organisations, including membership numbers. The list of hate 
groups is compiled using group publications and websites, citizen and law enforcement reports, 
field sources and news reports (Southern Poverty Law Centre, see 
https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map). Koehler (2017) used secondary data from authorities in 
Germany to assess the impact of de-radicalisation in that country. This included data collected 
on the number of right-wing extremists in Germany, websites and posts on social media and 
right-wing extremist concerts, periodicals and demonstrations. Social media scanning of 
known extremist organisations and groups, and individuals who follow the beliefs of such 
groups, could also provide a proxy measure of membership, and whether membership is 
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increasing or decreasing. Techniques for social media scanning have been provided in the 
indicators exposure to extremist messaging and media discussion of inter-communal relations. 
 
Estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups and relevance to the CVE 
context 
Having an understanding of the estimated membership of extremist organisations and groups 
will help to give an indication of the appeal and subsequent group membership; however, 
accurate data may be difficult to identify, collect and access. Further, high membership does 
not necessarily translate to the group being very active, although it can indicate a level of tacit 
support for the grievances or goals it promotes. In order to assess if a CVE program has an 
impact on membership, a baseline measure of the size of the group would need to be collected 
and then membership monitored over time; however, establishing causation between a program 
and declining membership may be difficult to demonstrate and would need to tap into decisions 
about whether to join a group. Koehler (2017) illustrated a declining number of right-wing 
extremist groups in Germany since 2000 when de-radicalisation programs became active in 
Germany; however, he cautions against assuming there is a direct relationship between this 
decline and the number of programs in operation.  
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Outcome 2 – Individuals at risk of becoming violent extremists divert and do not 
engage in violence 
Outcome 2.1 – Identification 
Summary Table  
Outcome 2.1 – Identification 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following two indicators:  
 Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues. 
 Willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns. 
Why measure? 
To ensure individuals at risk of radicalising to violent extremism are diverted and do not 
engage in violence, it is necessary for the community to be equipped to have both the 
capacity and motivation to identify and report individuals at risk. To be able to do this, the 
community needs to be aware of violent extremism and related issues, and be willing to 
report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns.  
Ways of measuring 
These indicators could be measured through a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. For example, tools for measuring awareness of risk factors for radicalisation 
have been proposed (e.g., Egan et al., 2016). Williams et al. (2016) proposes a way of 
measuring levels of concern if a friend engaged in specific activities, which can act as a 
proxy for levels of awareness. There are proposed ways of measuring willingness to report 
suspicious terrorist related behaviour (e.g., Murphy, Cherney & Barkworth, 2015). The Peer-
Assistance Barometer (Williams et al., 2016) has items which can be applicable to measuring 
willingness in the community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns. Some 
instruments have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted 
accordingly. Qualitative data could be gathered through focus groups or interviews exploring 
knowledge regarding causes of violent extremism, awareness of risk factors and most 
vulnerable groups. Such data can also be collected to examine willingness to report 
suspicious behaviour as well as thresholds and barriers for sharing information with 
authorities. 
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Indicator: Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues 
This indicator can encompass a range of different topics. Given Outcome 2.1 refers to 
identification, it is understood here as relating specifically to identifying individuals and groups 
at risk of radicalising to violent extremism. This may relate to community awareness of the 
causes of violent extremism, risk factors for radicalisation and the vulnerability of certain 
groups to extremist influences. This indicator does share some similarities with Outcome 2.2 
– Community-led support, indicator awareness and understanding of violent extremism and 
Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE, indicator understanding of VE issues and 
strategies to address VE.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Quantitative data 
Awareness of risk factors for radicalisation 
To date, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure designed to assess 
community awareness of risk factors for radicalisation; however, survey questions could be 
developed that draw on existing related measures. Egan et al. (2016) developed a 16-item 
screening tool to be used by frontline workers (e.g., school teachers, healthcare professionals, 
police) as a checklist of key behaviours for identifying individuals potentially at risk of 
becoming involved with violent extremism. Example items include: 
 Cultural and religious isolation. 
 Political activism. 
 Sudden change in religious practice. 
Williams et al. (2016) developed an adapted grievance, activism and radicalism scale, which 
uses eight items to measure how concerned the respondent would be if their best friend engaged 
in a number of activities. Measures of concern can be understood as a proxy for levels of 
awareness because concern requires a certain level of attentiveness towards the expression of 
certain behaviours and their consequences. Example activities include: 
 Joining an organisation that fights for their group’s political and legal rights. 
 Participating in a public protest against oppression of their group if they thought the 
protest might turn violent. 
 Attacking police or security forces if they saw them beating members of their groups. 
Items from these scales could be adapted to develop a measure assessing community awareness 
of risk factors for radicalisation. For example, respondents could be asked to rate how 
concerned they would be if someone they knew was displaying a set of listed behaviours.  
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Qualitative data 
Qualitative data could be collected to measure community awareness of violent extremism 
and related issues. Data could be collected through interviews or focus groups. Interviews 
and/or focus groups could explore: 
 Knowledge regarding causes of violent extremism. 
 Awareness of risk factors for radicalisation. 
 Knowledge regarding groups most vulnerable to extremist influences. 
Hypothetical scenarios may be useful for exploring community awareness of violent extremism 
and related issues. Descriptions of individuals at risk of becoming engaged in violent 
extremism could be used as a stimulus to explore community members’ awareness of risk 
factors for violent extremism. This strategy has been used to examine the community reporting 
of violent extremism to authorities (see Grossman, 2015; Thomas et al., 2017). 
 
Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues and relevance to the CVE 
context 
Increasing community awareness of violent extremism and related issues is important in 
strengthening the capacity of community members to identify individuals who may be at risk 
of radicalisation. Further, it can be used to equip communities to be able to work together to 
prevent violent extremism. Measuring awareness of violent extremism and related issues may 
also be useful in identifying communities that have a low understanding of this problem and 
could benefit from CVE interventions or efforts to help build their knowledge on violent 
extremism and how it can be tackled. It must be acknowledged that an increased awareness of 
violent extremism and related issues may not necessarily translate into a willingness to take 
action against violent extremism, report individuals of concern to authorities or assist those at 
risk. Evaluations of community awareness would need to take into account factors influencing 
awareness and how a program could address these issues to improve knowledge deficits.  
 
Indicator: Willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns 
This indicator can encompass the reporting of behaviour and concerns to family and friends, 
community leaders, religious leaders, police or other government departments and authorities.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Willingness to report terrorism-related information 
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Murphy, Cherney and Barkworth (2015) developed a scale to measure willingness to report 
terrorism-related information to police. The scale consists of seven items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’): 
 If you saw or heard about the following, how likely would you be to report it to police? 
o A person saying he or she had joined a group you consider politically radical. 
o A person overheard discussing their decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist 
attack. 
o A person visiting internet chat rooms or websites in which there is material posted 
that supports al-Qaeda. 
o A person reading religious literature you believe to be extremist. 
o A person giving money to organisations that people say are associated with 
terrorists. 
o A person talking about travelling overseas to fight for Muslims. 
o A person distributing material expressing support for al-Qaeda. 
 
Peer-Assistance Barometer 
Williams et al. (2016) developed an 8-item measure designed to assess an individual’s 
willingness to engage with and assist a peer who might be experiencing a personal crisis. 
Example items from this measure that can be applicable to measuring willingness in the 
community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns include: 
 Thinking now about your friends, imagine if one of them started to say or do things that 
made you think they were thinking about committing violence against someone else. 
What (if anything) do you think you would say or do in response to that friend? 
o I would talk to another friend or family member about what to do. 
o I would talk to someone I trust, outside of my friends and family (e.g., a religious 
official, or a counsellor) about what to do. 
o I would contact the police. 
 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data can also be used to examine willingness within communities to report 
suspicious behaviour and voice concerns, as well as thresholds and barriers for sharing 
information with authorities. Grossman (2015) and Thomas et al. (2017) conducted qualitative 
studies in Australia and the UK examining thresholds in community reporting of suspected 
violent extremist activity. These studies involved interviews with community members and 
government stakeholders, with questions covering: 
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 Potential motivations for Muslim community members and leaders to share concerns 
regarding individuals in their community they believe may be involved in violent extremist 
activity. 
 Factors that may encourage individuals to disclose their concerns. 
 Barrier to willingness to report suspicious activities/behaviour. 
 Expectations regarding support individuals may need or want throughout the reporting 
process and after they make a report. 
 Expectations regarding the outcomes of the reporting process. 
 Concerns and fears relating to reporting and the potential impact (personal, family, and 
community) of reporting. 
 Strategies for increasing community awareness of and knowledge regarding reporting 
suspicious behaviour to authorities (e.g., police). 
Both of these studies developed a number of hypothetical scenarios regarding individuals 
planning involvement in violent extremism. These scenarios were presented to interview 
participants to stimulate discussion about reporting behaviour without requiring participants to 
disclose information regarding people they knew. 
 
Willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice concerns and relevance 
to the CVE context 
It is unanimously recognised that tackling violent extremism requires cooperation from 
community members (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). This cooperation is essential given friends, 
family and community members are often the first people to suspect or know about an 
individual developing interest or becoming involved in violent extremism (Thomas et al., 
2017). Studies on reporting behaviour indicate that a range of factors influence the willingness 
of people to report extremist-related activities or people suspected as at risk of radicalisation 
(see Cherney & Murphy, 2016; Thomas et al., 2017). This can relate to perceptions of police 
treatment or fear of the repercussions for reporting, particularly if it involves a loved one. 
Hence, willingness to report is not just about quantifying the levels of reporting that occur, but 
also factors that motivate and prevent people from reporting suspicious behaviour and to whom 
they are more likely to report that behaviour. Assessing whether CVE programs improve 
reporting behaviours needs to take account of these various issues to capture a comprehensive 
understanding of willingness to report and voice concerns about violent extremism.  
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Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support 
Summary Table  
Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following four indicators:  
 Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues. 
 Willingness to challenge radical extremist views. 
 Willingness to support diversity within the community. 
 Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism.  
Why measure? 
An awareness and knowledge of violent extremism and CVE-related programs is relevant to 
ensure community members know how they can best assist in tackling violent extremism. A 
willingness to challenge radical extremist views is important, which is linked to a willingness 
to support diversity within a community. Measuring levels of awareness can be useful in 
identifying where resources should be directed. Willingness to challenge radical extremist 
views and support diversity can provide relevant information to program designers.   
Ways of measuring 
Quantitative and qualitative methods can be used to measure these indicators. For example, 
survey questions could be designed to measure willingness to challenge radical extremist 
views in various contexts (see Zick, Kupper & Hoverman, 2011). There are tools that provide 
proxy measures of willingness to support diversity within the community. Some instruments 
have not been applied in the CVE context and may need to be adapted accordingly. Measures 
of community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism could 
include the number of referrals/enquiries that come from community sources (e.g., total 
number of calls made to CVE telephone counselling services or helplines) or surveying 
community members on their knowledge of such initiatives and their attitudes towards CVE 
programs. Qualitative data could be gathered through focus groups or interviews exploring 
elements related to each indicator.  
 
Indicator: Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues 
This indicator overlaps with indicators listed in Outcome 1.3 – Awareness and understanding 
of violent extremism, Outcome 2.1 – Community awareness of violent extremism and related 
issues, Outcome 2.2 – Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent 
extremism and Outcome 4.1 – Understanding of violent extremism issues and strategies to 
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address violent extremism. Readers should also consult the indicators under these outcomes 
as some of the proposed issues and methods related to their assessment are applicable to this 
indicator. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Currently, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure of community 
awareness of violent extremism. Ways of assessing this indicator are canvassed in other 
sections; this indicator is specifically listed under community-led support and suggestions have 
been made with this specific task in mind.  
 
Qualitative data could be collected to examine community awareness and its impact on 
people’s willingness and capacity to support CVE initiatives. Interviews and focus groups 
could explore: 
 Community members’ perceptions of their level of awareness and understanding of violent 
extremism.  
 Community members’ attitudes and beliefs regarding their potential role in supporting 
CVE. 
 Community members’ perceptions on how CVE should be tackled.  
Hypothetical scenarios may be useful for exploring community awareness of violent extremism 
and related issues (see Outcome 2.1 – Community awareness of violent extremism and related 
issues).   
 
Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues and relevance to the CVE 
context 
See also Outcome 1.3 – Awareness and understanding of violent extremism, Outcome 2.1 – 
Community awareness of violent extremism and related issues and Outcome 2.2 – Community 
awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism. Some community members 
will be best placed to help people at risk of radicalising to violent extremism. These can include 
family members, friends, acquaintances, community leaders and mentors, teachers, civil 
society groups and community-based service providers. In order for them to know how they 
can best assist, they need to have an awareness of violent extremism. This includes awareness 
of its prevalence, causes and risk factors, how it can and is being tackled and the various 
responsibilities of different agencies. Measuring community awareness would require not only 
quantifying levels of understanding, but also how this influences the willingness of relevant 
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communities to help and refer people to CVE initiatives. Any attempt to improve knowledge 
about violent extremism would require an assessment on whether it has improved over time.  
 
Indicator: Willingness to challenge radical extremist views 
Willingness to challenge radical extremist views would include an assessment of both attitudes 
and behaviours. This could include overall attitudes towards the views propagated by violent 
extremists. (See also the discussion on tacit support in Outcome 1.5 – Recruitment, indicator 
intentions of joining a violent extremist group.) More specifically, it can include self-reported 
readiness to challenge extremist views when they are encountered, a willingness to speak up 
when someone expresses radical extremist views online or in public, and can include 
behavioural indicators such as whether a person participates in rallies and protests against 
extremism or engages with community groups (including religious groups) to help 
communicate an anti-extremist message. This indicator also overlaps with the indicator 
willingness to support diversity within the community.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Quantitative data 
Currently, there does not appear to be any published measure of willingness to challenge 
radical extremist views. Survey questions could be developed to measure this indicator in a 
range of different contexts (e.g., willingness to challenge radical views expressed by a family 
member or expressed in a private or public setting by an acquaintance or member of the public). 
It could include questions about a willingness to challenge views online. Such questions could 
include:  
 How likely would you be to challenge the views of a family member who stated that 
immigrants living here threaten our way of life and our values? (This question is adapted 
from Zick, Kupper & Hovermann, 2011. The term ‘family member’ could be substituted 
with ‘acquaintance’ or ‘member of the public’. The question could be reworded to: ‘How 
likely would you be to challenge the views of someone online who stated that immigrants 
living here threaten our way of life and our values?’) 
 How likely would you be to challenge the views of a member of the public who stated 
Muslims are all terrorists? (Authors’ own wording.) 
 How likely would you be to challenge the views of someone that said the term ‘jihad’ 
justifies the use of violence against non-Muslims? (Authors’ own wording.) 
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 How likely would you be to challenge the views of someone online that posted a message 
in support of a group that promoted hatred against Muslims and immigrants? (Authors’ 
own wording.) 
These items could be measured using a Likert scale (e.g., from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’).  
 
Qualitative data 
Willingness to challenge radical extremist views could be measured through the use of 
qualitative data. One-on-one interviews or focus groups could be conducted with community 
members to explore: 
 Attitudes regarding their willingness to challenge radical extremist views when confronted 
with them.  
 Under what circumstances and in what contexts participants would be willing to challenge 
radical extremist views. 
 In what ways participants would challenge radical extremist views and the types of 
responses they would provide.  
 Apprehensions about challenging radical extremist views in different contexts and 
perceived fears about the repercussions of doing so.  
 What resources or support participants might need to be better equip them to challenge 
radical extremist views.  
Hypothetical scenarios may be useful for exploring the circumstances and contexts in which 
people may be willing to challenge radical extremist views. 
 
Willingness to challenge radical extremist views and relevance to the CVE context 
It is generally recognised that tacit support for extremists and the grievances they promote can 
generate empathy and/or even indifference towards these groups and their underlying ideology 
(Cherney & Murphy, 2017). A willingness to challenge radical extremist views is an important 
part of tackling this empathy or indifference, with it being essential to undermining the 
legitimacy of extremist groups. It is important to recognise that willingness to challenge radical 
extremist views does refer to intentions rather than actual behaviour and may not reflect what 
occurs in real life situations. That is, people might report a willingness to challenge radical 
extremist views but whether this translates into action may not be the case. Hence, attempts to 
evaluate levels of willingness would need to adopt a range of measures (quantitative and 
qualitative) to assess readiness to challenge extremist views under certain circumstances. 
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Evaluation would need to focus on the types of resources and support necessary for people 
to feel confident about challenging extremist views and if these are helpful.  
 
Indicator: Willingness to support diversity within the community 
This is a broad indicator that may be related to a number of different factors. These could 
include attitudes toward particular minority groups, the level of community diversity and 
whether people support the notion of multiculturalism. Further, willingness to support diversity 
may also be reflected in a variety of actions and behaviours, such as acceptance of minority 
groups in day-to-day community life, support for diversity in employment and the workplace 
and provision of community services for minority groups. This indicator is relevant to Outcome 
1.3 – Awareness and understanding of violent extremism, indicators social cohesion and 
positive perception of Australia. Acceptance of diversity can be a marker of social cohesion 
and is influenced by the perceptions people have of living in Australia.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
There does not appear to be any existing published measure of willingness to support diversity 
within the community; however, there are a number of related measures that could be adapted 
or used as proxies for this indicator: 
 
Attitudes towards community diversity 
Attitudes towards community diversity are likely to be linked with willingness to support 
diversity within the community. Murphy et al. (2012) and Mazerolle et al. (2012) used four 
items to measure attitudes towards community diversity. Each item was measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’): 
 People in this community would prefer it if residents in this area were mostly Anglo-Saxon. 
 People in this community do not like having members of other ethnic groups as next door 
neighbours. 
 People in this community are comfortable with the current levels of ethnic diversity here. 
 Some people in this community have been excluded from social events because of their 
skin colour, ethnicity, race or religion. 
 
Discrimination 
Discrimination against minority groups could also be used as a proxy measure for lack of 
willingness to support diversity within the community. Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) developed 
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an 8-item scale to measure discrimination against Muslims. Each item of the scale is 
measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘never’ to ‘all of the time’). Example items include: 
 Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your religion? 
 Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment because of your cultural 
background? 
These items could be adapted to ask respondents to think specifically about incidents of 
discrimination that have occurred in their community against certain groups. 
 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data could be used to measure willingness to support diversity within the 
community. In particular, qualitative data could explore: 
 Perceived current levels of diversity within the community. (This could then be compared 
to collected data on levels of community diversity, e.g., ABS data, to examine how accurate 
these perceptions are.)  
 Attitudes towards the existence of different religious, ethnic and cultural groups within the 
community and what contribution they make to Australian society.  
 Willingness to support diversity within the community and participate in activities that 
celebrate this diversity.  
This information could be collected through one-on-one interviews or focus groups with 
community members. 
 
Willingness to support diversity within the community and relevance to the CVE context 
As stated in the indicators social cohesion, perception of community harmony, inter-communal 
tensions and positive perception of Australia, the acceptance of ethnic, religious and cultural 
diversity is relevant to tackling violent extremism because it can provide the social conditions 
that undermine and thwart support for extremist groups (Grossman et al., 2016). Extremist 
groups (e.g., far right and white supremacists) attack ethnic, religious and cultural diversity as 
a threat to the maintenance of the dominant culture or their ‘white’ identity (Ebner, 2017). 
Attacks on the notions of multiculturalism are common (Adams & Roscigno, 2005) and 
acceptance of diversity is an important factor in the rejection of the grievances that some 
extremist groups propagate. Further, minority groups who feel supported within their 
communities are less likely to feel marginalised and may be more willing to engage with 
relevant services in relation to issues of radicalisation and violent extremism. Gauging 
willingness to support diversity has to capture both attitudes (levels of acceptance) and 
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behaviour (actions to support diversity) in order to provide an accurate assessment. 
Evaluations of particular CVE programs would need to examine both in order to see how any 
changes in attitudes towards diversity translate into actual action; however, while measuring 
judgements about the acceptance of diversity may be adequate from an evaluation point of 
view, attributing levels of support for diversity to an intervention would need to be done with 
caution. Any attempt to shape and evaluate support for diversity must also take account of the 
methods through which the attempt is promoted and if it was specifically effective (e.g., see 
also Outcome 1.4 – Ideologies, indicator recall of media campaigns and indicators listed under 
Outcome 2.1 – Identification and Outcome 2.2 – Community-led support).  
 
Indicator: Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism 
Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism may encompass 
a number of different elements, including knowledge of existing programs, understanding of 
the roles of agencies in these programs and awareness of different services and interventions 
that are delivered as part of these initiatives. Assessing awareness overlaps with Outcome 1.3 
– Communities, indicator community awareness and understanding of violent extremism and 
Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator community awareness of violent extremism and related 
issues. Readers may want to refer to those relevant sections.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Quantitative data 
Currently, there does not appear to be any published quantitative measure of community 
awareness of CVE programs. One measure could be the level of demand for these initiatives. 
This could include the number of referrals that come from community sources or the number 
of enquiries made. For example, telephone counselling services or helplines to counter violent 
extremism have been implemented here in Australia (e.g., NSW Step Together helpline) and 
overseas (Koehler, 2017). The total calls made to such initiatives can be a measure of 
awareness. The number of referrals and enquiries made by non-government organisations to 
specific interventions can also be a possible measure of awareness.  
  
Survey questions could also be used to measure community awareness of government 
initiatives. This could be approached in a number of ways. Community members could be 
presented with a list of initiatives and asked to indicate those of which they are aware. Further 
questions could be asked regarding how much respondents know about specific programs using 
Likert-scale response options (e.g., from ‘am not aware of this program/have never heard of 
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this program’ to ‘very familiar with this program’). It would also be important to measure 
community support for these initiatives. Questions could be developed to measure respondents’ 
attitudes regarding: 
 General support for government CVE initiatives. 
 The usefulness or effectiveness of government CVE initiatives. 
 The perceived appropriateness of government-run initiatives for CVE, particularly in 
relation to cultural or religious issues. 
 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data, collected through one-on-one interviews or focus groups, could be used to 
measure community awareness. This could examine: 
 Awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism. 
 Support for government initiatives to counter violent extremism. 
 Perceived barriers to community support for these initiatives. 
 Opportunities for community engagement or partnership with these initiatives. 
 
 
Community awareness of government initiatives to counter violent extremism and relevance 
to the CVE context 
A key strategy of improving community support for CVE efforts involves increasing awareness 
of those initiatives and their aims and benefits. This is relevant to ensuring they are seen as 
legitimate and beneficial, which can influence the degree to which community members refer 
people to those initiatives or seek advice or assistance themselves. The same argument applies 
for community-based service providers. Awareness of government initiatives is particularly 
relevant given community members are often among the first people to suspect or become 
aware that an individual may be radicalising to violent extremism (Thomas et al., 2017). 
Assessing community awareness can comprise a range of data sources. Assessing if awareness 
of government initiatives has changed would require an extended period of assessment because 
it can take time for community members to become aware of government programs. This will 
be influenced by the methods through which the programs are promoted (see also indicator 
recall of media campaigns).   
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Outcome 2.3 – Government-led support 
Summary Table  
Outcome 2.3 – Government-led support 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following two indicators:  
 Number and coverage of services that provide diversion-related services.  
 Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to 
government-led intervention programs.   
Why measure? 
Understanding the types of diversion-related services available, where they are located and 
at which groups they are targeted is important in identifying if there are gaps in the provision 
of support for individuals or groups at risk of radicalisation. Measuring referrals provides an 
assessment of the level of demand, as well as an indicator of public awareness. Diversion-
related services may include a variety of government and non-government programs. 
Referrals/willingness to refer to government-led intervention programs encompasses 
measures of the number, source and eligibility of referrals. Referrals could come from a 
range of sources.     
Ways of measuring 
Quantitative and qualitative methods could be adopted to measure these indicators. For 
example, quantitative data could include a count of the number of agencies/groups that 
provide diversion-related services, including geographic coverage, target groups and the 
needs being addressed, or a count of referrals to government-led intervention programs using 
administrative data. Qualitative data could be gathered from community members and 
organisations through focus groups or interviews exploring awareness of government-led 
interventions, thresholds for referrals, apprehensions about referring individuals and 
expectations of such programs.   
 
Indicator: Number and coverage of services that provide diversion-related services 
Diversion-related services are those aimed at diverting vulnerable individuals who are at risk 
of radicalisation away from violent extremist pathways and engaging them in meaningful 
activities. The aim of diversion-related services is to provide vulnerable individuals with 
alternatives to prosecution, such as reintegration and rehabilitation, and can be part of broader 
government-led early intervention and prevention approaches to countering violent extremism. 
This indicator does overlap with Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists, indicator 
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number of intervention programs; however, we interpret this indicator as more focused on 
the community or pre-custody context.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Diversion-related services could encompass a number of different activities. They could 
include services provided by government-designed diversion programs, government-funded 
initiatives within the community or in schools and services provided by NGOs or volunteer 
groups. They could include counselling, mentoring and mental health support, employment 
services and sport and recreational activities. They could also encompass both CVE-specific 
initiatives and non-CVE-labelled services. In measuring the number and coverage of diversion-
related services (government or non-government), it will be necessary to identify the level of 
service delivery, which involves distinguishing between services that exist at each of the 
following levels: 
 State police. 
 Local government. 
 State government. 
 Federal government. 
 NGOs/community-based service providers. 
This will include not only quantifying the number of service providers that exist across each 
area, but also the geographical location of these services and which particular target groups 
(e.g., young people) and needs they are addressing. Data on geography, target groups and needs 
is relevant to assessing the level of coverage of diversion-related services.  
 
Number and coverage of services that provide diversion-related services and relevance to the 
CVE context 
Understanding the types of diversion-related services that are on offer, within which 
geographic location they exist, for what specific needs they provide and which groups they 
target is important in identifying if there are any gaps in the range of diversion options available 
and if they target or overlook particular at-risk individuals. Though similar to other indicators 
that are concerned with quantifying the level of service provision, such an assessment does not 
provide any insight into the quality of the services on offer, or whether they are effective. While 
a CVE strategy might lead to an increase in the availability of the number of diversion-related 
services or help to facilitate access to existing initiatives, this does not equate to an indicator 
of the effectiveness of these services. 
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Indicator: Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to 
government-led intervention programs 
Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to government-
led intervention programs encompasses measures on both the number and source of referrals 
as well as the eligibility of people subject to a referral. Referrals could come from a range of 
sources (e.g., family and friends, civil society actors, schools or government service providers). 
The number of referrals and the willingness to refer will be affected by awareness among 
community members and organisations about the existence and purpose of government-led 
intervention programs. It should be noted that the number of referrals does not necessarily 
indicate that appropriate or eligible individuals are being referred into a program. For example, 
some people may be referred who are not assessed at being at risk of violent extremism; 
however, it would still be important to include them as part of any measure of willingness to 
refer. 
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Administrative data 
A direct measure of referrals to government-led intervention programs could include 
administrative data, such as the total numbers of referrals and details of whether these referrals 
were assessed as eligible for assistance or as meeting the required risk assessment to be 
included in the program. Such data could be collected pre- and post-implementation of a 
program aimed at increasing the number and eligibility of referrals.   
 
Other quantitative measures 
A further proxy measure of willingness of community members and organisations to refer to 
government-led intervention programs is the Peer-Assistance Barometer (described under 
Outcome 2.1 – Identification, indicator willingness in community to report suspicious 
behaviour and voice concerns). This provides an assessment of an individual’s willingness to 
assist a peer who might be experiencing a personal crisis, but could also be applicable to 
willingness to seek assistance for a peer, such as referring them to a government-led 
intervention program.   
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Qualitative measures  
Qualitative measures could also be used to assess willingness of community members and 
organisations to refer to government-led intervention programs, as well as thresholds and 
barriers to referring individuals. Focus groups or interviews could be conducted with 
community members and organisations exploring:  
 Awareness and sources of information on government-led intervention programs.  
 Under what circumstances community members and agencies may be willing to refer 
individuals to government-led intervention programs. (See also Outcome 2.1 – 
Identification, indicator willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice 
concerns.) 
 Apprehensions about referring individuals to government-led intervention programs (e.g., 
exposure to risk, rejection by fellow community members and questions over the 
legitimacy of government-led CVE programs). 
 Expectations of government-led intervention programs and their outcomes for referred 
individuals.  
   
Referrals/willingness among community members and organisations to refer to government-
led intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context 
A measure of referrals provides an assessment of the level of demand for both the number and 
nature of government-led CVE intervention programs. Any increase in the number of referrals 
to an intervention program could indicate an improved awareness about such an initiative 
among community members; however, this does not necessarily translate into a greater demand 
for those services because violent extremism is becoming more prevalent.  
 
Outcome 2.4 – Government-led intervention/diversion 
Summary Table  
Outcome 2.4 – Government-led intervention/diversion 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following two indicators:  
 Commitment to participation in program 
 Service providers delivering intervention services and their 
capabilities/number of VE initiatives.   
Why measure? 
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Commitment to participate in a CVE program covers participation and completion rates as 
well as the nature of that participation (e.g., highly engaged vs passive). It can be influenced 
by a range of factors. Service providers also need to be able to deliver an appropriate level 
of service provision. Intervention services could include a range of assistance, some of which 
could be labelled as CVE-specific, while other services may be more generic and part of a 
mix of approaches. Capabilities to deliver interventions cover funding, staffing levels, 
current demands for existing services and the skills and experience of staff.  
Ways of measuring 
Quantitative and qualitative methods could be adopted to measure these indicators. Methods 
could include collecting data on the proportion of individuals who consent to attending a 
program, to those who do attend and complete a program, including the overall number of 
sessions completed using administrative data. Similar methods, as suggested in relation to 
Outcome 2.3 – Government-led support, are relevant. Service mapping could be 
undertaken. Interviews with program participants, significant others and program staff could 
be conducted.  
 
Indicator: Commitment to participation in program 
This indicator covers similar elements to those covered in the indicator willing participants of 
intervention programs (see Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists). 
Intervention/diversion programs may be voluntary or mandatory and hence this will dictate 
what is considered ‘commitment to participate’. Given there are no mandatory CVE programs 
in Australia, only commitment to participation in voluntary intervention/diversion programs 
will be covered. This constitutes participation and completion rates as well the nature of that 
participation (e.g., highly engaged or passive participation). Commitment to an 
intervention/diversion program will be influenced by a range of factors, such as the trust clients 
place in program staff and the relationships they develop with staff members, as well as the 
perceived relevance of and benefits arising from participation. Willingness to participate can 
potentially be determined by how staff promote the aims and outcomes of a program to a client 
and his or her significant others (family and friends), which can determine consent to 
participate.  
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Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
To measure this indicator, similar sources of data to those described in the indicator willing 
participants of intervention programs (see Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists), 
are relevant. These data sources include:  
 
Administrative data 
Commitment to participation in a program could be measured through the proportion of 
individuals who consent to attending a program, and those who do attend and complete a 
program. This can include the overall number of sessions completed. Such measures of 
compliance are limited as they only consider outputs. Case notes could also be used to examine 
how engaged and active a client is when attending a program, and whether there have been any 
observed behavioural changes as a result of participation.  
 
Qualitative data 
Assessment of commitment to a program could be derived from interviews with participants, 
significant others, program staff or service providers contracted to deliver interventions. Such 
interviews could capture observations of the degree of engagement in a program among 
participants and whether clients are receptive to the assistance being provided. One would 
assume that if a person were committed then the latter would be the case. Program staff or 
service providers could be asked to give a rating of commitment as it pertains to particular 
individuals who are referred to an intervention. This could include the levels of engagement in 
the program in terms of an individual’s self-reported or observed enthusiasm and motivation 
to attend and actively contribute to particular sessions. Assessing the level of engagement 
would be important in any assessment of a client’s commitment. As stated above, looking at 
outputs (number of sessions attended) will not provide a reliable assessment of commitment. 
Understanding any barriers to commitment to participate could also be gathered from similar 
sources, such as in cases where an individual may have not completed an intervention/diversion 
program, when discussions with the individual and other stakeholders (e.g., family members, 
case workers) could provide some insight into why the program was not effective in keeping 
them engaged and committed.    
 
Commitment to participation in programs and relevance to the CVE context 
The level of commitment an individual possesses towards participating in a CVE intervention 
will influence the impact it has on their pathway away from radicalisation. This commitment 
will not simply be influenced by the content of the intervention, but also their understanding 
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of its aims and benefits. Explaining the aims and benefits in the CVE context is particularly 
important given the apprehension that may arise about participating in a CVE intervention, 
what this means for how an individual is judged by others and the fact that consent to participate 
must be voluntary. While self-interest might influence commitment, this does not mean a CVE 
intervention will have no effect on ways of thinking and behaving (see also Outcome 3.1 – 
Rehabilitating violent extremists, indicator willing participants of intervention programs). 
Understanding the various dimensions of commitment to participate in an intervention or 
diversion program involves examining the issue from a range of perspectives and through 
different sources of data. It is important that any qualitative source is cross-referenced against 
another so as to guard against any bias regarding assessed levels of commitment.  
 
Indicator: Service providers delivering intervention services and their capabilities/number of 
VE initiatives 
The effective provision of CVE intervention services relates to the number of services available 
and the capabilities of providers to deliver an appropriate level of service provision. 
Intervention could include family and youth counselling, youth mentoring, mental health and 
cross-cultural mental health services, religious guidance, employment and housing assistance, 
and the provision of sport and recreational activities. Some services might be labelled as CVE-
specific. Others could involve non-government actors working in partnership with authorities 
as part of a case management approach, while others could involve community-based agencies 
operating independently of any government program, initiating their own processes to attract 
clients and provide support (Cherney et al., 2017b). Hence, there could exist formal 
intervention services and also informal assistance provided by civil society (e.g., social and 
family support provided through Mosques). The relevant service could be one among many an 
agency delivers to a wide range of target groups. Capabilities to deliver intervention services 
cover such considerations as funding and staffing levels, current demands for existing services, 
and the knowledge, skills and experience of staff. It relates to the existence of formalised 
referral and assessment processes and risk mitigation strategies. Identifying the groups and 
clients who are the targets of assistance will also be of relevance to assessing service 
capabilities.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Ways of gathering information on the number and capabilities of CVE-related service 
provision are similar to those discussed under Outcome 2.3 – Number and coverage of 
diversion-related services and Outcome 3.1 – Number of intervention programs. Numerical 
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data needs to be gathered on the number of CVE-related initiatives within a particular area 
as well as the focus of the service provision (i.e., service mapping). In order to do this, a 
distinction will need to be made between formal and informal services. Ways of assessing 
capabilities are also outlined under Outcome 4.1 – Understanding of violent extremism issues 
and strategies to address violent extremism, Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, 
governance, advice, reporting and evaluation, Outcome 4.3 – CVE information sharing and 
collaboration and Outcome 4.4 – Robust networks between government and communities. 
Additional information could be gathered from administrative data that an organisation collects 
on their service provision and demand, and supplemented by interviews with key staff. To 
accompany this type of data, there is also a need to assess if agencies regard their service 
provision as relevant to CVE, where they think they can best add value to CVE interventions, 
and if they are able to cope with any future increase in demand for their services. Interviews 
with staff would help to provide insight into these issues.  
 
Service providers delivering intervention services and their capabilities/number of VE 
initiatives and relevance to the CVE context 
Assessments of whether intervention services have the capabilities to deliver appropriate 
assistance to individuals at risk of radicalisation provides evidence of where capacity building 
should be targeted. Tackling violent extremism is not just concerned with addressing 
ideological influences, but also risk factors that create vulnerabilities to radicalisation (e.g., 
mental health, wellbeing, sense of belonging and identity, school failure and family 
functioning). These risk factors will vary across individuals (see indicators listed under 
Outcome 4 – Capability to deliver effective CVE programs is strengthened [system enabling 
outcomes]). Hence, the breadth of service providers will be relevant to addressing different 
needs. Assessing the adequacy of this service provision requires one to understand the number 
and nature of service provisions, as well as existing capabilities, so responses are appropriate 
and effective. A baseline assessment of intervention services and their capabilities can be 
undertaken prior to strategy implementation and assessed overtime to observe if it improves in 
response to any capacity building efforts, and through developing familiarity and experience 
with assisting individuals at risk.  
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Outcome 3 – Violent extremists are rehabilitated and reintegrated when possible 
Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists  
Summary Table  
Outcome 3.1 – Rehabilitating violent extremists 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following three indicators:  
 Number of intervention programs. 
 Willing participants of intervention programs. 
 Successful rehabilitation from intervention programs. 
Why measure? 
Programs targeting convicted terrorists or radicalised offenders should aim to rehabilitate 
and reintegrate this cohort. Services can be provided in custody and in the community. 
Programs may be both CVE-specific and non-CVE specific. Tallying the number of 
intervention programs must occur in consideration of these various contexts. Willing 
participation in intervention programs is essential to their success, with rehabilitation and 
reintegration encompassing a number of measures. 
Ways of measuring 
Data could be collected via a range of means and from different sources. This could include 
a count of the number of custody- and community-based intervention programs. Willing 
participation could be gauged through quantitative (e.g., a count of the number of eligible 
individuals who consent to participate in a program) and qualitative (e.g., interviews with 
program participants and staff) measures. Proposed recommendations for measuring 
rehabilitation vary, with a range of tools suggested. Some have and have not been used with 
convicted terrorists. Qualitative data could also be useful for measuring rehabilitation, such 
as program or community supervision case notes or interviews. Measures to assess 
reintegration need to encompass behavioural and attitudinal changes that can act as markers 
for reintegration. 
 
Indicator: Number of intervention programs 
Rehabilitation of violent extremists is not only about ensuring that they have moved away from 
their violent extremist beliefs, but is also about assisting them in their reintegration when 
released from prison (e.g., education, reconnecting with family, employment, mental health, 
housing). Consequently, intervention programs for violent extremists will include both CVE-
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specific initiatives as well as other related programs that address the needs of violent 
extremists, but may not be labelled as CVE-specific. This could constitute a suite of services 
provided to offenders when released from prison that are part of a service provider’s 
mainstream service delivery (e.g., employment services). It must be noted that intervention 
programs may occur in different contexts (e.g., within custody or in the community) and may 
be coordinated at different levels and by different agencies (e.g., police-led, local government, 
state government, NGOs). Tallying the number of intervention programs must occur in 
consideration of the various contexts in which intervention programs may be delivered 
(custody or community) and also the various types of services that help to rehabilitate offenders 
when in custody and assist in their reintegration once released.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
To measure the number of intervention programs for rehabilitating violent extremists, it is 
necessary to identify relevant programs occurring at a number of different levels, including: 
 Police-led programs. 
 Local government programs. 
 State government programs. 
 Programs run by NGOs/community service providers. 
As noted above, these programs may occur both within custody and in the community and may 
or may not be explicitly labelled as CVE programs. 
 
Number of intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context 
Quantifying the number of intervention programs can provide insight into the levels of 
assistance available to individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism. It can help 
identify where funding is targeted, map service provision and help identify where gaps in 
assistance may exist; however, identifying the number of intervention services can only 
quantify outputs, and it must be noted that while a CVE strategy might lead to an increase in 
the number of intervention programs or facilitate access to existing services, this does not 
equate to an indicator of effectiveness.  
 
Indicator: Willing participants of intervention programs 
For voluntary intervention programs, willing participants may refer to individuals eligible for 
a program who consent to participate. For mandatory programs, willing participants may refer 
to those individuals who actively engage in a program. Willingness to participate in an 
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intervention may be influenced by a number of factors, including the perceived relevance 
of the program to the individual and whether they think participation will have positive or 
negative consequences. This indicator overlaps with Outcome 2.4 – Government-led 
intervention/diversion, indicator commitment to participate in programs. The willingness of 
participants also relates to the perceived level of coercion that may affect decisions about 
participation.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Administrative data 
Willingness to participate in an intervention may be measured through the percentage of 
eligible individuals who: (1) consent to participate in a program, (2) attend program activities, 
and (3) complete a program. Case notes could also be used to examine how engaged and active 
a client is when attending a program, and whether any behavioural changes have been observed 
as a result of participation. One could assume willing participation is reflected in a person being 
receptive to an intervention and the assistance it provides; however, while they may turn up 
consistently, a person may not necessarily be taking on board the required behaviour changes.  
 
Qualitative data 
Interviews could be conducted with individuals eligible for a program who declined to 
participate and those who consented to examine factors related to their decisions to participate. 
Understanding potential barriers to participation may help program staff to develop strategies 
to increase participation. Interviews could also be conducted with program staff (e.g., case 
workers) to capture their observations on the degree of engagement in a program among 
participants and whether clients are receptive to the assistance being provided. 
 
Willing participants of intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context 
It is important that individuals willingly (i.e., voluntarily) participate in a CVE intervention. 
This will influence how responsive they are to any assistance being provided and their 
receptiveness to program staff. Generating willing participation may be challenging for some 
groups. For example, Muslims have suspicion towards CVE more generally, with Muslim 
extremists tending to be anti-authoritarian, often having a high distrust of government and 
institutional authorities (Koehler, 2017; Pressman & Flockton, 2012); this may influence their 
willing participation in an official intervention. Hence, assessing willing participation in an 
intervention may need to capture a range of dimensions. While quantifying rates of attendance 
and program completion is relevant, consideration also needs to be given to assessing why 
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people are, or are not, participating. This will require more qualitative measures. While 
individuals might be willingly participating in a CVE intervention through self-interest, 
thinking they will accrue some individual benefit (e.g., an extremist offender participating in a 
custody-based intervention to secure parole), this does not mean it will not trigger the required 
self-reflection to help facilitate rehabilitation. Gauging willing participation as an aim of CVE 
evaluation is important because it will ultimately affect the achievement of program outcomes.  
 
Indicator: Successful rehabilitation from intervention programs  
Most assessments of rehabilitation programs regard recidivism (i.e., reoffending) as an 
important measure of success (Craig, Gannon & Dixon, 2013). Rehabilitation is also concerned 
with reintegration, which encompasses a range of indicators such as whether an offender is 
engaged in employment, continuing their education, is drug-free and building meaningful 
relations with family and/or their spouse and disengaging from criminal associates. 
Rehabilitation is concerned with ensuring an offender has the capacity and motivation to 
engage meaningfully in mainstream society. ‘Desistance’ is another term associated with 
rehabilitation that refers to the process of an offender moving away from criminal activity and 
adopting a pro-social identity (Farrall & Calverley, 2005).  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
Attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups 
Given the ideological motivations underpinning violent extremism (Dawson, 2017), attempts 
have been made to develop measures that aim to assess the degree of affiliation with features 
of an extremist ideology. Only a handful of studies have empirically assessed ideological 
change in the context of terrorist rehabilitation programs (e.g., Webber et al., 2017b). To 
measure changing attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups, it would be necessary to 
collect matching data regarding these attitudes prior to and after completion of an intervention. 
Attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups have been measured in a number of ways. 
Some examples include:  
 
Islamic extremism 
Webber et al. (2017a) designed an 11-item scale to measure Islamic extremism. This was used 
in the context of assessing Islamic extremism among a sample of Filipino prisoners. Each item 
is measured using a 7-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). Example 
items include: 
 Suicide bombers will be rewarded for their deed by God. 
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 Armed jihad is a personal obligation of all Muslims today. 
 True Muslims should adhere strictly to the literal meaning of the Quran. 
 Islam should be practiced in the strictest way, regardless of situations or circumstance. 
 
Use of violence  
Given violence is often seen as a means to an end by extremists, attitudes towards the use of 
violence may also be applicable to rehabilitation. One example includes the violent intention 
scale developed by Doojse, Loseman and van den Bos (2013) to assess the radicalisation of 
Islamic youth in the Netherlands. This was not used in a correctional or program context. Each 
item is measured using a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally agree’). An 
example item is: ‘I am prepared to use violence against other people in order to achieve 
something I consider very important’. 
 
Support for right-wing extremism 
Degrees of support for right-wing or far right extremism have been assessed through a range 
of measures relating to attitudes towards immigration, racist beliefs, anti-Semitism and anti-
Muslim sentiment, homophobic attitudes, political affiliations, cognitive closure, willingness 
to use violence, authoritarianism, group dominance and a desire to exclude immigrants and 
ethnic groups (see Zick, Küpper & Hövermann, 2011). The authors were unable to locate a 
discreet measure of far right attitudes.  
 
Violent Extremism Risk Assessment – Version 2 (VERA-2) (Pressman & Flockton, 2012) 
VERA-2 was developed to assess convicted and suspected offenders’ overall levels of risk of 
radicalisation and/or recidivism. The tool is designed to be used by trained professionals who 
monitor and manage individuals suspected or convicted of terrorism offences (e.g., law 
enforcement staff, corrections staff, intelligence, security and military personnel). The revised 
VERA-2R consists of 67 items assessed using a Structured Professional Judgement approach 
in combination with range of data sources (e.g., intelligence and police data, criminal or mental 
health history). The tool covers the following areas:  
 Beliefs, attitudes and ideology. 
 Social context and intention. 
 History, action and capacity. 
 Commitment and motivation. 
 Protective factors. 
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 Additional indictors. 
Example indicators include: 
 Commitment to ideology justifying violence (low/moderate/high).  
 Personal contact with violent extremists (low/moderate/high). 
 Prior criminal history of violence (low/moderate/high). 
 Involvement in de-radicalisation, offence-related programs (low/moderate/high). 
 Criminal history (criminal justice data).  
VERA-2R is used in a number of countries including Australia. Pressman (2016) argues that it 
provides a tool to assess the rehabilitation of extremist offenders. 
 
Qualitative data 
To gauge successful rehabilitation, interviews can be conducted with program participants to 
gauge how their reintegration is progressing. This could include canvassing such issues as:  
 Reflecting on how a program has assisted them and any gaps in program delivery.  
 Engagement in work and education, including opportunities and barriers. 
 Changes in their mental health and outlook on life. 
 Lifestyle changes that may have occurred. 
 Their attitudes towards extremism and extremist groups. 
 Engagement with community members and leaders.  
 Their relationship with their family and partners.  
 Their experiences while on parole, including any challenges they face in regards to 
completing parole. 
 Changes in their social networks, including whether they continue to associate with known 
violent extremists. 
The evidence derived from the questions above will be subjective, and caution will need to be 
adopted in assuming a causal link between an intervention program and what an individual 
might state about how a program has benefitted them. Such interviews will provide evidence 
of how an extremist offender or person identified as at risk of radicalisation is actively 
navigating a pathway away from extremism.  
 
Successful rehabilitation from intervention programs and relevance to the CVE context  
Interventions aiming to rehabilitate known violent extremists will need to focus on a number 
of different objectives, including engaging participants in meaningful work and education, 
improvements in mental health, lifestyle changes, religious education and mentoring, changing 
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attitudes towards extremist groups, re-engaging with family, successful completion of 
parole and disassociating from known extremists. Gauging whether individuals have been 
successfully rehabilitated will therefore require measures that capture a variety of activities and 
outcomes. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that studies on pathways away from 
violent extremism look at a variety of indicators beyond ideological and religious re-
orientations. For example, Webber et al.’s (2017a, 2017b) study of terrorist rehabilitation also 
examined psychological and emotional states related to shame, humiliation and sense of 
insignificance, as well as whether individuals believed the rehabilitation program helped them 
and improved their lives (see also Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014). Given the rarity of terrorism 
compared to other types of crime, a reduction in recidivism, while important, may not be a 
useful measure to assess the success of intervention programs targeting known extremists. 
Finally, how best to measure de-radicalisation, which represents a cognitive shift away from 
an extremist ideology, is less than clear, with disengagement from violent extremism arguably 
a more realistic goal of rehabilitation programs (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The priority given 
to such outcomes will dictate the types of measures adopted to assess this indicator.  
 
Outcome 3.2 – Post-release disengagement from radicalisation, rehabilitation and 
reintegration 
Summary Table  
Outcome 3.2 – Post-release disengagement from radicalisation, rehabilitation and 
reintegration 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from the main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the indicator:   
 Re-offending and/or associations with VE groups of those released from 
corrections.   
Why measure? 
Extremist offenders released into the community can include individuals who have been 
charged for a terrorist offence, or have been identified as at risk of radicalisation due to 
certain behaviours or associates. Peers and associates can have a negative influence on their 
behaviour when released from prison, helping to reinforce personal grievances and an 
extremist ideology. Measuring and monitoring re-offending and/or associations with violent 
extremist groups is relevant to address the reintegration needs of extremist offenders when 
transitioning from prison into the community.   
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Ways of measuring 
A range of data could provide measurements for this indicator relating to monitoring the 
absence of criminal reoffending or anti-social/extremist-related behaviour, evidence of 
breaking off from previous associates, compliance to parole conditions, improvements in 
family/partner relationships, family providing pro-social support to an offender, engagement 
in work or education and monitoring of mobile devices and email accounts.  Data sources 
could include administrative data (e.g., case notes from parole officers), interviews with 
offenders, family members, service providers, police or intervention coordinators. 
 
Indicator: Re-offending and/or associations with VE groups of those released from corrections 
Radicalised offenders released into the community can encompass three groups: (1) individuals 
who have been released after serving a period of incarceration for a terrorism-related offence, 
(2) individuals who have exhibited extremist views and/or behaviours while in prison but may 
not have committed a terrorist offence, and (3) individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation 
due to an association with known extremists. Reoffending for this cohort includes both the 
commission of extremist-related offences and other criminal acts. A risk factor for mainstream 
offenders reoffending when released from prison is any interaction with previous or new 
criminal associates and individuals (e.g., partners, friends, relatives) who continue to engage 
in an antisocial and criminal lifestyle (Whited et al., 2017). For extremist offenders, this could 
include co-offenders, peers and family members who support extremist views, suspected 
extremists or leaders of extremist groups. Engagement with these associates could occur face-
to-face and online.  
 
Example questions or possible scenarios / potential existing measures 
We have taken this indicator as referring to the release of an extremist offender on a parole 
order following a period of incarceration. This provides the capacity to examine a number of 
measures relevant to reoffending and associations, including:  
 Monitoring the absence of criminal reoffending or anti-social/extremist related behaviour.  
 Evidence relating to breaking off from previous associates. 
 Compliance to parole conditions. 
 Stable and improving family and partner relationships. 
 Offender's family works to provide pro-social, economic, welfare and emotional support 
to parolee.  
 Engagement in work and/or education.  
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 Monitoring of mobile devices and email accounts.  
 
This evidence will form the content of standard case notes recorded by community corrections 
officers as part of their role. It could be collected via interviews with offenders during their 
regular supervision appointments, case planning reviews and engagement in various structured 
intervention activities. Evidence can be collected from family members during parole home 
visits and through engagement with partners or family members during supervision 
appointments. Evidence of engagement with associates would need to be sourced from police. 
If the surrender and regular searching of all personal mobile devices form part of an offender's 
parole order, this will need to be undertaken by relevant police authorities with the technical 
capacity to conduct regular checks and monitoring. If an offender has been referred to a CVE 
intervention as part of their parole conditions (e.g., police-coordinated Diversion Program), 
relevant data could also be collected from program managers or intervention coordinators 
relating to progress on an intervention plan and any known engagement with extremist 
associates. If released straight from prison without any parole conditions, correctional 
authorities and police would need to share information on past and ongoing associations, and 
monitor for any future criminal charges. Intervention coordinators or service providers could 
also be additional sources of data if an offender is referred to these bodies when released from 
prison.  
 
Re-offending and/or associations with VE groups of those released from corrections and 
relevance to the CVE context 
Existing evidence indicates that convicted terrorists have low rates of reoffending. For 
example, Silke (2014, 111) claims that ‘terrorist prisoners have very low reconviction rates’. 
Silke bases this assertion on research examining the prior criminal records of terrorists to see 
if they have a history of terrorism-related offences. Silke (2014), referring to UK data on 
prisoners convicted for terrorism between 2001 and 2008, estimates that less than five per cent 
of released terrorist prisoners will be reconvicted for another terrorist-related offence; however, 
there is evidence to show that offenders who radicalise in prison do commit future acts of 
terrorism and crime (Hamm & Spaaij, 2017; Kepel, 2017). Severing negative social ties that 
may influence such future acts should be a focus of the community supervision of extremist 
offenders relating to addressing their criminogenic needs and dynamic risk factors. For 
convicted terrorists and radicalised offenders, this can be particularly important, given that 
peers and associates have been shown to play key roles in the radicalisation process, helping 
reinforce personal grievances and the jihadist ideology, providing the intent and capability to 
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commit acts of terrorism (Harris-Hogan, 2014; Sageman, 2011). Monitoring any 
reoffending and associates is relevant to tackling the reintegration needs of extremist offenders 
when transitioning from prison into the community.  
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Outcome 4 – Capability to deliver effective CVE programs is strengthened (system 
enabling outcomes) 
This outcome is concerned with program design, delivery and implementation. It encompasses 
what could be known as ‘process evaluation’, as compared to ‘impact evaluation’. Process 
evaluation is focused on assessing the task of implementation (e.g., whether program activities 
have been completed and relevant agencies have the capacity to deliver the required 
intervention), while impact evaluation is about understanding whether a program reduced the 
problem it was aiming to influence, that being violent extremism. 
 
Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE 
Summary Table  
Outcome 4.1 – Sound understanding of VE 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following nine indicators:  
 Understanding of VE issues and strategies to address VE. 
 Understand that VE is motivated and enabled by multiple factors. 
 Understand that VE tends to be partly driven by grievances. 
 Understand that there is no standard pathway to VE. 
 Understand that physical responses and messaging are important. 
 Understand that civil society actors have an important CVE role. 
 Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of security force excesses. 
 Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of stereotyping. 
 Understand the legal framework in the relevant location. 
Why measure? 
This outcome is concerned with program design and implementation, encompassing 
organisational capacity to deliver CVE programs and gauging knowledge bases 
(understanding) on violent extremism and associated responses. How violent extremism and 
CVE are understood within an agency will have an impact upon the commitment and 
capacity to deliver initiatives. It is important that agencies understand the various drivers of 
violent extremism to ensure that their service addresses a mix of risk factors for radicalising 
to extremism. Agencies may be dealing with clients with multiple risk factors across a range 
of interventions and service providers, so agencies will need to understand how they ‘value-
add’ to an overall response or strategy. CVE programs can have the potential to be 
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stigmatising. Staff will need to understand how clients (or their families) might react to being 
part of a CVE initiative, which may impact on program participation and engagement. 
Ways of measuring 
Gauging organisational capacity and knowledge could involve the following activities: (1) 
interviews, (2) focus groups, and (3) workshops. At the beginning of a program, during 
planning or pre-implementation stage, it will be important to establish a knowledge baseline. 
For example, interviews or focus groups could be conducted with agencies to comprehend 
their understanding of CVE. During the program, workshops could be run to enhance 
knowledge deficits. Interviews and focus groups could also be undertaken to identify how 
agencies incorporate these indicator statements in their decision-making and policies. Unlike 
previous indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone or agreed upon measure 
for these indicators (i.e., a quantifiable metric).  
 
The following set of indicators constitutes a series of statements relating to knowledge bases 
surrounding the design and implementation of CVE-related initiatives. While the following set 
of statements may be experienced as an outcome of a program (i.e., there are improvements in 
knowledge bases), they may not be the primary objective as it relates to a program's target 
group. These statements relate to how programs operate, rather than to how target groups (e.g., 
clients) respond to those programs. Unlike the previous indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there 
may be no stand-alone measure for each discrete statement (i.e., a quantifiable metric). 
Assessment may need to be based on gauging perceptions, rather than on actual behavioural 
changes, which introduces the risk of bias into the data and means caution must be followed 
when making claims about causation (i.e., improvements in understanding were the direct 
result of an intervention). The following describes why each statement is important to 
understand and then outlines some generic suggestions for how these statements could be 
assessed.  
 
Indicator: Understanding of VE issues and strategies to address VE 
This indicator can encompass a range of issues. These can include staff understanding how 
clients (or their families) might react to being part of a CVE initiative, which could impact on 
program participation and engagement. For example, the Muslim community regards the term 
‘CVE’ as stigmatising and hence may react negatively to the use of this terminology (see 
Cherney, 2016; Thomas, 2012). How violent extremism and CVE are defined and understood 
within an agency will have an impact upon the commitment and capacity of that agency to 
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deliver initiatives to certain populations. For example, responses to CVE by a community-
based agency will be influenced by their service provision philosophy. This will influence how 
the agency thinks the problem should be addressed, the resources that should be allocated to it 
and if they see training for frontline staff as appropriate (Cherney et al., 2017b). It is also 
important that agencies are aware of the range of strategies that can be adopted to address 
violent extremism, as this will help them to understand what approaches they can consider 
implementing in their own programs and whether these responses are relevant to tackling 
violent extremism.  
 
Indicator: Understand that VE is motivated and enabled by multiple factors 
It is important that agencies understand the various drivers of violent extremism to ensure that 
their service addresses one or more of these risk factors and, therefore, has an impact. A greater 
understanding of the range of motivations or factors influencing violent extremism can help 
agencies identify how to adapt their programs to address more than one motivating factor, 
thereby increasing their potential effectiveness (Cherney et al., 2017b).  
 
Indicator: Understand that VE tends to be partly driven by grievances 
Compared to conventional crime, violent extremism can be strongly ideologically-motivated, 
which is arguably linked to grievances held by particular individuals and groups (Dawson, 
2017). It is important for agencies to understand the content and context of these grievances 
when they are delivering a CVE program because individuals radicalised to violent extremism 
may be quite different to their usual clients. Further, it is important they comprehend the 
content and basis of various grievances that influence violent extremism so that they 
understand how certain clients may react to a program and its staff. It may be necessary for 
some third parties to tackle these grievances in certain circumstances, particularly if they 
influence the level of program participation among client groups.  
 
Indicator: Understand that there is no standard pathway to VE   
When it comes to working with individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism, 
agencies may be dealing with people who are not part of their typical client group. For example, 
individuals who have radicalised to violent extremism present with multiple risk factors that 
need to be addressed through a range of interventions and service providers (Koehler, 2017). 
Hence, particular agencies will need to address one of many risk factors and recognise that a 
one-size-fits-all approach will not always work. In such circumstances, agencies may need to 
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understand how they ‘value-add’ to an overall response. Agencies and departments will 
need to acknowledge that they can be one partner amongst many contributing to an 
intervention, all aiming to address a range of factors that lead people to radicalise to violent 
extremism.  
 
Indicator: Understand that physical responses and messaging are important   
It is important that agencies not only focus on outputs (initiatives) but also are aware of their 
messaging surrounding their programs. As outlined in Statement 1 (indicator understanding of 
VE issues and strategies to address VE), CVE programs can have the potential to be 
stigmatising, with clients and families reacting negatively to the use of the CVE label. Thus, 
messaging surrounding the purpose and benefits of the program can be important to their 
operation because it will influence whether target groups and the broader community regard 
them as warranted (i.e., legitimate) and can influence the level of participation in a program 
(Cherney, 2016). Working on the messaging surrounding a program can be just as important 
as designing the content of the program itself. This indicator is also linked to Outcome 4.5 – 
Coordinated public CVE messaging, indicator inter-agency interactions to deliver CVE 
messaging.  
 
Indicator: Understand that civil society actors have an important CVE role   
CVE is not just a law-and-order or government-led responsibility. As noted in Outcome 2.1 – 
Identification, indicator willingness in community to report suspicious behaviour and voice 
concerns, friends, family, and community members can be the first people to become aware of 
a person radicalising to violent extremism. The same argument applies here to civil society 
actors, such as NGOs, volunteer or religious groups, mentors and leaders, who, through their 
engagement with community members, can become aware of people at risk. Likewise, agencies 
involved in the delivery of CVE programs need to recognise that civil society groups have an 
important role to play in addressing risk factors for violent extremism, and may act as a credible 
source through which to deliver a program (Cherney, 2016; Grossman et al., 2016; Koehler, 
2017). Agencies and departments involved in the delivery of a CVE initiative must recognise 
that civil society actors need to be part of a case management approach and have methods of 
outreach to ensure they can be leveraged to assist target groups.  
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Indicator: Acknowledge the potential negative effects of security force excesses  
It must be acknowledged that counter-terrorism policies and laws can have unintended 
consequences, such as generating community push-back/backlash. For example, legal 
responses that focus on the pre-emption and disruption of terrorism have shown to generate 
backlash from Muslims, with the perception being that counter-terrorism policing unfairly 
targets Muslim communities (Cherney & Murphy, 2016). The consequences of this must be 
considered when implementing programs because they could affect how clients and/or 
communities react to and willingly participate in CVE programs. The excessive use of security 
forces has also been shown to create greater sympathy for the causes violent extremist groups 
claim to defend, thus generating both active and passive support for such groups (LaFree, 
Dugan & Korte, 2009). Excessive policing can lead people to withdraw their cooperation and 
create resistance against legal authorities (Sherman, 1993).  
 
Indicator: Acknowledge the potential deleterious effects of stereotyping   
It is important that a CVE intervention does not do more harm than good. CVE programs can 
negatively label individuals and/or communities a security threat (Murphy et al., 2015), which 
can lead those individuals and communities to feel under siege from mainstream society and 
authorities. Consequentially, they may feel they are being unfairly singled out. Interventions 
aimed at assisting individuals assessed as ‘at risk’ can lead to those individuals being negatively 
labelled as potential extremists. Labelling can also reinforce broader social stereotypes against 
certain groups. Such labelling can backfire and have the opposite effect than what was 
intended, with individuals or groups acting out and confirming that label (Cherney, 2016).  
 
Indicator: Understand the legal framework in the relevant location   
Agencies will need to have a full understanding of the legalities of their work and the role they 
play within the CVE field. There will be concerns relating to legal requirements, which may 
be in direct conflict with agency goals relating to the maintenance of client relationships. For 
example, agency-client relationship building, establishing and maintaining trust, and open 
communication may be inconsistent with requirements to report potential or suspicious violent 
behaviour/attitudes to authorities. There are additional concerns relating to the provision of 
voluntary consent to participate in a program, particularly if a person is under the age of 18. 
There may be legal issues surrounding national security clearances and client privacy, which 
can have an impact on the sharing of information between agencies.  
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How to measure 
As previously mentioned, these indicators constitute a series of statements relating to the 
existence of particular knowledge bases related to the design and implementation of CVE-
related initiatives. To assess the strength of these knowledge bases and if they have been 
enhanced, the following activities could be undertaken: 
1. Interviews. 
2. Focus groups. 
3. Workshops. 
At the beginning of a program, during the planning or pre-implementation stage, it will be 
important to establish some type of baseline knowledge in relation to the above indicators. This 
baseline can be established through interviews or focus groups with agencies to gauge their 
comprehension of the indicator statements. During the duration of a program and on an ongoing 
basis, workshops could be run with agencies to address knowledge deficits relating to any one 
of the indicators above (previously identified via interviews and focus groups) and to update 
partners on new research and developments from the CVE field. Workshops can be used to 
canvass one or more issues and identify knowledge gaps; these can then be addressed with 
targeted information, and ongoing feedback provided to agencies to improve their capacity to 
deliver CVE-relevant programs. Interviews and focus groups could also be undertaken to 
identify how agencies incorporate or take account of these indicator statements in their 
decision-making, and any resulting initiatives.  
 
Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, governance, advice, reporting and 
evaluation 
Summary Table  
Outcome 4.2 – Robust policy development, governance, advice, reporting and 
evaluation 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following two indicators:  
 Number of evidence-informed CVE initiatives. 
 Number of CVE programs evaluated. 
Why measure? 
These two indicators relate to assessing the total number of CVE programs based on key 
principles of evidence-based policy and practice. This includes (1) using research evidence 
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to inform policy and practice within an organisation, (2) including stakeholder perspectives 
in decision-making, (3) understanding ‘what works’ for your service users/program target 
groups (e.g., evaluating programs/services), and (4) utilising research evidence related to the 
delivery of initiatives to similar target groups. 
Ways of measuring 
An attribute of evidence-informed practice involves ensuring that initiatives are subject to 
an evaluation of their implementation and impact. Evidence-informed CVE initiatives and 
programs should be assessed using the following principles: (1) program data is 
systematically collected, (2) personnel with skills in data and policy analysis are employed, 
(3) the capacity to provide performance-related information and policy options exists, and 
(4) evaluation and review processes are established.  Unlike previous indicators (Outcomes 
1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone or agreed upon measure for these indicators (i.e., a 
quantifiable metric). 
 
The following two indicators relate to the total number of CVE programs based on key 
principles of evidence-informed practices and the number of initiatives that have been 
evaluated. We have grouped these two indicators in Table 1, below. We have done this given 
both indicators overlap, with evaluation being a key attribute of evidence-informed practice. 
 
Indicator: Number of evidence-informed CVE initiatives   
In order to identify whether CVE initiatives are evidence-informed, a determination needs to 
be made on the degree to which their development and implementation reflect key attributes 
of evidence-informed policy and practice. This requires an assessment of the ways agencies 
operate when developing and delivering CVE initiatives. It must be acknowledged that there 
is no agreed definition of what constitutes evidence-informed policy and practice. As a term, 
it is regarded as broader than the phrase ‘evidence-based policy and practice’, recognising that 
‘evidence’ on program design and best practice can come from a range of sources and be 
informed by different levels of evidence. Attributes of evidence-informed policy and practice 
include: 
 Using research evidence to inform policy and practice within an organisation. 
 Including stakeholder perspectives in decision-making. 
 Understanding ‘what works’ for your service users/program target groups (e.g., evaluating 
programs/services). 
 Utilising research evidence related to the delivery of initiatives to similar target groups.  
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 Examining and utilising broad research evidence as part of decision-making processes.  
(Head, 2014; PART, n.d).  
 
Table 1 reflects what are regarded as standard features of evidence-informed policy and service 
delivery that can be used to assess how closely agencies reflect these attributes (Head, 2014). 
For each feature, a series of questions is posed that can be used to inform assessments of 
whether CVE initiatives are evidence-informed. These questions are general in their focus and 
are applicable to a broad range of government and non-government agencies/actors that may 
be involved in developing and implementing CVE initiatives.  
 
Indicator: Number of CVE programs evaluated   
An attribute of evidence-informed practice involves ensuring that initiatives are subject to an 
evaluation of their implementation and impact; however, it must be noted that the rigour of 
these evaluations may vary. While randomised control trials (RCTs) might be regarded as the 
gold standard in evaluation design (having treatment and control groups), it may not be possible 
to conduct RCTs for some CVE programs. This can be due to the low number of clients referred 
to or participating in a program, which is pertinent given the small number of people convicted 
for terrorism or extremist-related offences compared to conventional crime, therefore making 
it difficult to secure an adequate control group. Further, there could be security- and/or ethical-
related concerns about using RCTs in the CVE space, particularly with convicted terrorists. 
Simpler evaluations may be necessary, such as non-experimental designs that undertake a 
‘before’ and ‘after’ comparison; however, attributing any outcomes or behavioural changes to 
a program needs to be done with caution when using non-experimental designs. Although 
having a well-developed theory of change to interpret and explain outcomes helps to address 
this problem, so does tracking the program over an extended period of time. A numerical count 
of the number of CVE programs evaluated will help to assess if evaluation practices are being 
followed. It would also be worthwhile recording the type of evaluation methods that are used 
so people can make an informed judgement about the validity of the evaluation. 
 
Table 1 – Features of evidence-informed policy and service delivery 
Key Features Series of questions/indicators of strength 
Program data systematically 
collected 
 Do agencies collect program data? 
 What is the scope, coverage of the data collected? 
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 Is there any level of investment in data collection 
and management? 
 Are relevant Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs) in place relating to data collection 
requirements and sensitivities regarding data-
sharing and confidentiality issues?  
 Are there management and governance structures 
for the collection, analysis and sharing of program 
data?  
Personnel with skills in data and 
policy analysis 
 Are there staff with specialist data collection and 
analysis roles?  
 Are staff trained in research and evaluation and/or 
do they already have relevant 
experience/knowledge?  
 Do staff have policy-analytical capacities e.g., 
awareness of CVE programs & contingencies 
surrounding their implementation?  
 Is there ongoing training for staff? 
 Are there processes in place for the sharing of 
developments in research and evaluation 
methodologies/studies from relevant policy fields?  
Capacity to provide performance-
related information and policy 
options 
 Does the agency draw on a wide range of expertise 
and does it seek the perspectives of stakeholders? 
 Does an agency have a stakeholder management 
and communication plan? 
 What evidence is there to support whether the 
agency has a process for stakeholders to provide 
feedback on initiatives and programs?  
 Have benchmarks been established for targeted 
improvements in program outcomes? 
 What evidence is there to indicate that results from 
data and policy analysis inform program design and 
implementation?  
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 Are there systems in place that allow for the 
reporting and dissemination of program 
milestones?  
Evaluation and review processes  Do agencies have evaluation guidelines and are 
they updated? 
 Have ex-ante analysis and post-implementation 
reviews of programs been conducted? 
 Have programs been subject to impact evaluation? 
 Have agencies used external experts as part of their 
review/evaluation process? 
 Are evaluations from other jurisdictions used to 
inform program design and review?  
 Have agencies established protocols so evaluation 
methods are built into program design and delivery? 
 What proportion of funds has been invested in 
evaluation (at least 1%)? 
 Are there common and defensible standards of 
evidence that are used to identify ‘what works’? 
 Are evaluation results made available to other 
parties and disseminated through relevant 
networks?  
(Adapted from Head, 2014: 51 and Results For America, Federal Invest in What Works Index, 
2017.) 
 
Outcome 4.3 – CVE information sharing and collaboration 
Summary Table  
Outcome 4.3 – CVE information sharing and collaboration 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following four indicators:  
 Data-sharing and cooperation among CVE agencies within jurisdictions, and 
across jurisdictions and countries. 
 Research and evaluation findings shared among agencies. 
 Interaction between the policy and expert CVE communities. 
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 Interactions among CVE program designers to share experiences and 
knowledge. 
Why measure? 
This outcome relates to the capacity of agencies to collaborate and share information and 
knowledge. This includes ‘opportunities’ for knowledge sharing between policy-makers and 
external experts (e.g., facilitating forums, workshops, seminars, conferences) and knowledge 
infrastructure that makes research and evaluation reports available via research databases. In 
order to strengthen effective data-sharing and cooperation, MOUs should be established 
between agencies to facilitate this exchange; however, there may be legal and organisational 
sensitivities that may prohibit the sharing of data. An important assessment of impact would 
involve identifying the type of outcomes that are achieved. For instance, has the sharing of 
data led to the identification of particular individuals at risk and/or their referral to relevant 
service providers?  
Ways of measuring 
Engagement between agencies around the sharing of data, intelligence, research, knowledge 
and experience can occur at a formal level via specific forums or databases, as well as 
informally through personal networks. Any assessment would need to take account of the 
types of interactions, the mechanisms and infrastructure in place to facilitate these 
interactions, the frequency at which they occur and the content and usefulness of the 
experiences and knowledge shared. This will enable an assessment of both the frequency of 
the interactions and how beneficial they are. The collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data would be required for an assessment of these indicators. Unlike previous 
indicators (Outcomes 1 to 3), there may be no stand-alone or agreed upon measure for these 
indicators (i.e., a quantifiable metric). 
 
The following set of indicators relates to the capacity of agencies to collaborate and share 
information. These indicators are not unique to the CVE field, but are applicable to other policy 
domains. The following section describes each indicator and explains how each could be 
measured. It must be recognised there are no validated metrics by which to assess the level of 
information sharing and collaboration between agencies. Further, while one might be able to 
count the number of forums in place to facilitate information sharing (e.g., the Australian and 
New Zealand Counter-terrorism Committee), any assessment would also need to interview 
members of these forums to see if information sharing is actually occurring and what barriers 
to information sharing exist. Furthermore, engagement between agencies around the sharing of 
 123 
data, intelligence, research, knowledge and experience can occur at a formal level via 
specific forums or databases, as well as informally through personal networks. 
 
Indicator: Data-sharing and cooperation among CVE agencies within jurisdictions, and across 
jurisdictions and countries 
In order to strengthen effective data-sharing and cooperation, MOUs must be in place, as well 
as forums to facilitate this exchange. The content of these agreements needs to be assessed to 
ensure they tackle legal and organisational sensitivities that may prohibit the sharing of agency 
data. Agency representatives would need to be interviewed to identify if the MOUs are 
honoured and if forum members willingly share data and work together. The number of 
domestic and international members should be quantified and their contribution gauged. An 
important assessment of impact would involve identifying the type of outcomes that are 
achieved. For instance, has the sharing of data led to the identification of particular individuals 
at risk and/or their referral to relevant service providers? Has it led to international 
collaborations to tackle issues of mutual concern, such as returning foreign fighters?  
 
Indicator: Research and evaluation findings shared among agencies 
This indicator relates to assessing the level of knowledge exchange across agencies. This 
requires identifying and examining the existence of mechanisms to support the process of 
dissemination. Such mechanisms can include the existence of seminars, workshops and 
conferences and knowledge infrastructure that make research and evaluation reports available. 
The latter would include databases that provide access to reports. There may be dedicated or 
informal 'knowledge brokers’ that help to disseminate research and evaluation findings to 
interested parties. It must be acknowledged that there may be circumstances in which it is not 
feasible or practical to share evaluation findings due to sensitivities surrounding results, which 
can be particularly applicable to the CVE field. In the academic study of research utilisation, 
measures have been developed that aim to assess the degree to which agency personnel are 
able to access research findings. These could be used as a proxy of the extent to which research 
and evaluation findings are shared among agency staff (e.g., Cherney et al., 2015). Examples 
include:  
 I have access to research and evaluation reports that are relevant to my work (adapted from 
Head et al., 2013). 
 I participate in meetings that discuss research and evaluation relevant to my work (adapted 
from Head et al., 2013). 
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These can be measured on a 5-point Likert scale (from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). Another example question requiring a yes/no answer includes: 
 Do you have access to electronic databases from which to download, read and print research 
and evaluation reports (A following question could then ask: ‘How frequently do you 
access these databases?’ Responses could include: weekly, monthly, etc).  
It must be acknowledged that while research and evaluation findings might be shared, this does 
not mean they are being used in policy decision-making. This would require a measure of 
research impact (see Cherney et al., 2012, 2015).   
Indicator: Interaction between the policy and expert CVE communities   
Similar to the indicators above, the interaction between policy and expert CVE communities 
relates to the types of linkage and exchange mechanisms that exist to facilitate opportunities 
for knowledge sharing between policy-makers and external experts (e.g., academics, think 
tanks, civil society actors). This can include the existence of forums and workshops that bring 
these parties together. It can also include the degree to which agencies contract external experts 
to research and evaluate CVE programs. While interactions can be facilitated through formal 
mechanisms, they can also occur through informal networks (Cherney et al., 2015). A measure 
of the level of interactions would need to take account of both formal and informal 
collaborations.   
 
Some measures exist that aim to assess interactions between policy-makers and external 
experts. One example includes measures that rate opportunities for collaboration between 
policy-makers and academics (Head et al., 2013). This can include questioning policy-makers 
about opportunities to build links with external experts and the level of importance they place 
on information from these experts. For example:  
 I have few opportunities to build relationships with researchers outside my organisation. 
(Measured on 5-point Likert scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The term 
‘researcher’ could be substituted with another name of an external third party.) (Adapted 
from Cherney et al., 2017a.)  
 What level of importance do you place on the information available from each of the 
sources listed below? (Measured on 5-point Likert scale from ‘very unimportant’ to ‘very 
important’. The list could include specific reference to different CVE expert entities.) 
(Adapted from Cherney et al., 2017a.)  
 125 
Similar to the previous indicator, while interactions between policy and expert CVE 
communities might occur regularly, it does not necessarily mean they will help to inform 
policy-decision making.  
 
Indicator: Interactions among CVE program designers to share experiences and knowledge 
This indicator overlaps with the previous and relates to linkage and exchange mechanisms that 
facilitate opportunities for knowledge sharing between policy-makers. These can include 
interactions across local, state, national and international jurisdictions and can involve the 
existence of forums and workshops that bring these parties together and can include both 
formal and informal processes. Any assessment would need to take account of both the types 
of interactions that occur (formal and informal), the mechanisms and infrastructure in place to 
facilitate these interactions, the frequency at which they occur and the content and usefulness 
of the experiences and knowledge that is shared. This will enable an assessment both of the 
frequency of the interactions and how beneficial they are. The collection of both quantitative 
and qualitative data would be required for an assessment of this indicator.   
 
Outcome 4.4 – Robust networks between government and communities 
Summary Table  
Outcome 4.4 – Robust networks between government and communities 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following two indicators:  
 Number of community partnerships. 
 Range of communities with CVE related partnerships. 
Why measure? 
These outcomes relate to networks, agencies and stakeholders working together to build 
government and community capacities to deliver CVE programs. There is no agreed upon 
or tested metric to assess the robustness and quality of interactions between partners or the 
breadth and representation of the partnerships that exist. Assessments would need to consider 
whether relevant communities are included and participating as part of a CVE-relevant 
strategy, and whether they are truly representative of the communities they profess to 
represent (e.g., hard-to-reach or underrepresented groups). CVE interventions rely on 
partnership approaches because no one agency or group will be able to address the causes of 
violent extremism on their own. Hence, robust networks and partnerships are relevant to the 
capacity to tackle violent extremism. Assessing the range of communities with CVE 
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partnerships requires both a numerical count of the breadth of participation, as well as an 
assessment of the representativeness of the groups involved. 
Ways of measuring 
Undertaking a numerical count of community partnerships would require capturing a range 
of interventions or initiatives that involves different partners that may or may not be clearly 
defined as CVE-specific, as well as other related programs that may not be labelled as such, 
but could have an impact on violent extremism (e.g., social cohesion programs). Caution 
should be used when undertaking a numerical count of community partnerships, as this will 
not give any indication of the quality of the partnership, and may not capture those informal 
partnerships that contribute positively to CVE.  
 
The following two indicators are interrelated. They both relate to networks and 
agencies/stakeholders working together to build capacity between government and 
communities to deliver CVE programs. It must be recognised that, unlike other indicators, there 
is no agreed upon or tested metric to assess the robustness and quality of the interactions 
between partners. This is not the same as Social Network Analysis that looks at the connections 
across different stakeholders within a network. We have set out to specify the types of issues 
that would need to be considered in any such assessment.  
 
Indicator: Number of community partnerships  
Measuring this indicator would involve undertaking a numerical count of existing community 
partnerships. In doing so, the following issues need to be considered. Community partnerships 
can include initiatives that are clearly defined as CVE-specific, as well as other related 
programs that may not be labelled as such, but could have an impact on violent extremism 
(e.g., programs aimed at social cohesion or media campaigns promoting the positive attributes 
of multiculturalism). Undertaking a numerical count of community partnerships would require 
capturing a range of interventions or initiatives involving different partners. This could include 
police-led intervention programs that partner with community-based service providers or 
Mosques, local government programs targeting social cohesion that engage volunteer groups 
or NGOs, state government programs that draw on civil society actors, initiatives by NGOs 
that work together to provide services to youth at risk, and civil society actors partnering with 
religious leaders to address, for example, youth alienation and identity. It must be recognised 
that any attempt to tally the number of community partnerships will need to consider the 
varying contexts in which programs operate and the various types of partnerships that exist 
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(whether officially defined as CVE-specific or informally operating with CVE-related 
benefits). Further, while quantifying the number of partnerships may provide insight into levels 
of activities, it does not give any indication of the quality of the partnership (e.g., highlighting 
the difference between active and passive partners) and may not capture those informal 
partnerships that contribute positively to CVE. A simple count of these programs will not take 
account of what they may or may not be achieving. 
 
Indicator: Range of communities with CVE-related partnerships   
This indicator differs from the above indicator (number of community partnerships) in that it 
is concerned with assessing the breadth and representation of the existing partnerships. Breadth 
relates to assessing if relevant communities are included and participating as part of a CVE-
relevant strategy. Further, partners should be representative of the communities they profess to 
represent. While certain partners may claim to be community leaders, it is important that 
membership among any hard-to-reach or underrepresented groups is included as part of any 
assessment (e.g., young people or women). Identifying whether a partnership is poorly 
constituted can help identify gaps in participation that must be addressed. In acknowledging 
that there is no standard pathway into violent extremism (see Outcome 4.1 – Sound 
understanding of VE), it is important a CVE intervention relies on partnership approaches 
because no one agency or group will be able to address the causes of violent extremism on their 
own. Robust networks and partnerships are relevant to the capacity to tackle violent extremism. 
Assessing the range of communities with CVE partnerships requires both a numerical count of 
the breadth of participation, as well as an assessment of the representativeness of the groups 
involved; however, as for the previous indicator, this will not assess how well these 
partnerships are working.  
 
Outcome 4.5 – Coordinated public CVE messaging 
Summary Table  
Outcome 4.5 – Coordinated public CVE messaging 
Do not read or use this content in isolation from main CVE Evaluation Indicator Document. 
This outcome includes the following three indicators:  
 Inter-agency interactions to deliver CVE messaging. 
 Range of media forms through which CVE messaging is delivered. 
 Reach of CVE messaging across communities. 
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Why measure? 
These indicators are relevant to the capacity of agencies to deliver a clear and consistent 
message around CVE policy. Agencies working in partnership to counter violent extremism 
need to communicate a clear and consistent message about their programmatic responses. In 
order to reach the greatest number of people, agencies should deliver their messages across 
a range of platforms. For CVE messaging to have an influence, the mode of message delivery 
must be relevant both in language and content to the target audience.  
Ways of measuring 
It is recommended that participating agencies establish standards for CVE messaging, which 
can then be used to assess its coherency and delivery. Standards can be measured by 
assessing the level of compliance. Additionally, a numerical count could be conducted of the 
media platforms being used; however, it would be important to ensure that this is matched 
by an assessment of whether these platforms are appropriate to the program's target group. 
 
These indicators are relevant to the capacity of agencies to deliver a clear and consistent 
message around CVE policy. Validated metrics to evaluate the level of coordination relating 
to public messaging surrounding particular social policy problems do not exist. As in the 
previous sections, we have explained the relevance of each of the indicators. Broad ways of 
measuring each indicator are then proposed.  
 
Indicator: Inter-agency interactions to deliver CVE messaging   
Agencies working in partnership to counter violent extremism must communicate a clear and 
consistent message about their programmatic responses. This is important so that the 
messaging of one agency does not conflict or undermine the messaging or work of another. To 
ensure that a coordinated multi-agency message is communicated to key stakeholders, it is 
recommended that agencies participating in a program/initiative establish standards for CVE 
messaging. These can then be used to assess its coherency and delivery.  
 
How to measure 
All relevant stakeholders must agree to standards regarding CVE messaging. Standards can be 
measured by assessing the level of compliance. Table 2 outlines some basis standards for CVE 
messaging and then presents questions that can be used to assess compliance. 
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Table 2 – Standards for CVE messaging 
Standard  Ways of measuring 
Consistent 
messaging for all 
communication 
 
 Has a consistent and coherent CVE message been agreed upon? 
 Does all communication follow the agreed format and content? 
 Is CVE messaging approved (signed-off) by personnel with the 
appropriate authority, who ensures all protocols have been 
followed?   
Message content   Have clear definitions and rules around appropriate and 
inappropriate language and terms been established?  
 Is the content of the message accessible to the target population 
and/or general population?  
 Does all messaging make clear statements around agency 
responsibilities?  
 Does the content of the messaging avoid complicating key 
information (inaccessible to the target population) and being too 
simplistic (thus reinforcing stereotypes)? 
Authority to speak  Who has the authorisation to communicate the CVE message? 
 Who is the head/primary spokesperson? 
 Do key spokespeople have the authority/legitimacy to speak on 
behalf of their respective agencies?  
 Are key spokespeople aware of the community sensitivities 
surrounding CVE messaging?  
Appropriateness of 
platform 
 Have agencies agreed as to which platforms are appropriate to use 
for CVE messaging?   
Risk Management   Have the individual agencies and the inter-agency working 
groups established a Risk Management/Mitigation Plan to 
address the following? 
o Protocols for messaging when a violent extremist or 
terrorism-related incident occurs. 
o Messaging to address community backlash against 
perceived/actual targeting of community by the media 
and security agencies.  
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o Messaging around key responsibilities relating to 
responding to violent extremism.  
o Protocols for messaging around system deficits (real or 
imagined) that failed to detect a violent extremist or 
prevent an act of violent extremism. 
o Messaging around the actions or inactions of 
agencies/community service providers and/or groups 
who have responsibilities in CVE.  
 
Indicator: Range of media forms through which CVE messaging is delivered  
In order to reach the greatest number of people, agencies should ensure that they have not 
invested all their CVE messaging in one type of communication method (e.g., social media). 
Agencies should deliver their messages across a range of platforms, while acknowledging some 
communities may not have access to certain media platforms.  
 
How to measure 
A range of media forms through which CVE messaging may be delivered can be measured 
through a numerical count of the media platforms used. These include, for example, traditional 
media forms such as newspapers, television and radio, and non-traditional media forms such 
as Twitter and Facebook. It would be prudent to ensure that this count is matched by an 
assessment of whether these platforms are appropriate to the program's target group and their 
usage patterns when it comes to engaging certain communication platforms (i.e., the reach of 
certain communication platforms; see below). Any measurement of the range of media forms 
would need to include an assessment of the number utilised and their appropriateness.  
 
Indicator: Reach of CVE messaging across communities   
This indicator overlaps with the above indicator; however, the difference is that the reach of 
messaging is not about the number of media platforms delivering key messages, but is focused 
on knowing if campaigns are being delivered to their target audience. (See also Outcome 1.4 – 
Ideologies, indicator recall of CVE-related media campaigns, for relevant material.) For CVE 
messaging to have an influence, the mode of delivery of that message must be relevant both in 
language and content to the target audience. Further, as indicated above, the mode of delivery 
must match the media and communication platforms used by target groups.  
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How to measure 
Table 3 outlines some proposed standards that could be used to assess how target groups engage 
with certain CVE messaging, thus giving insight into its reach. The table covers CVE 
messaging in forums and discussions, specific CVE communication campaigns, responses to 
(and requests for) communication from target groups and risk management protocols to address 
CVE miscommunication.    
 
Table 3 – Reach of CVE Messaging 
Forums and discussion 
boards 
 Number of members of a group or forum.  
 Number of subscribers to a newsletter or other 
communication forum. 
 Number of ‘likes’, ‘retweets’, ‘referrals’ or ‘followers’. 
 Duration of time spent at site, length of engagement with 
site or online resource. 
Communication campaigns   Number of reviews, comments or length of reviews or 
feedback. 
 Number of references to reviews on other sites. 
 Number of references to a specific project or initiative in 
other media forums (e.g., newspapers). 
 Duration of time spent at site, length of engagement with 
site or online resource. 
Communication requests  Number of responses to surveys, polls or requests for 
information or feedback. 
Risk Management  Monitoring use of language.  
 Monitoring comments made in response to CVE 
messaging.  
 Be prepared to react when problems occur. 
 Have a clear message prepared to address community 
concerns and any false or misleading posts. 
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Appendix A – Identification and Review of Existing Guides, Toolkits 
and Metrics  
Overview of CVE Guides and Toolkits 
The nine guides and toolkits identified herein were published between 2010 and 2017 in a 
range of formats (e.g., journal articles, policy reports, technical reports, interactive website) 
and covered a variety of information regarding CVE program evaluation. A brief overview of 
the guides and toolkits is listed in Table 1, below, with further information provided on the 
content covered in each guide and toolkit. 
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Table 1. Overview of guides and toolkits 
Guide/Toolkit Year 
Published 
Format Evaluation methods and 
associated tools/approaches 
discussed 
Source 
Rehabilitating the 
terrorists?: 
Challenges in 
assessing the 
effectiveness of de-
radicalization 
programs 
2010 Journal 
article 
 Multi Attribute Utility 
Technology (MAUT) 
Horgan, J., & Braddock, K. (2010). Rehabilitating the 
terrorists?: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness 
of de-radicalization programs. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 22, 267-291. 
From input to 
impact: Evaluating 
terrorism 
prevention 
programs 
2012 Policy report  Content analysis 
 Evaluability assessment 
 Focus groups 
 Formative evaluations 
 Horizontal evaluations 
 Interviews 
 Logic model 
 Multidimensional evaluations 
 Summative evaluations 
 Surveys 
 Theory of Change 
 Vertical evaluations 
Romaniuk, P., & Fink, N. C. (2012). From input to 
impact: Evaluating terrorism prevention programs. 
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. 
Evaluating 
countering violent 
extremism: Practice 
and progress 
2013 Policy report  Horizontal evaluations 
 Multidimensional evaluations 
 Vertical evaluations 
Fink, N. C., Romaniuk, P., & Barakat, R. (2013). 
Evaluating countering violent extremism 
programming: Practice and progress. Center on 
Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. 
A utilisation-
focused guide for 
conducting 
terrorism risk 
2014 Journal 
article 
 Logic model 
 Quasi-experimental designs 
 Randomised experimental 
methods 
Williams, M. J., & Kleinman, S. M. (2014). A 
utilization-focused guide for conducting terrorism risk 
reduction program evaluations. Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression, 6(2), 102-146. 
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reduction program 
evaluations 
 Theory of Change 
 Utilisation-focused evaluation 
perspective 
 
 
 
Guide/Toolkit Year 
Published 
Format Evaluation methods and 
associated tools/approaches 
discussed 
Source 
Learning and 
adapting: The use 
of monitoring and 
evaluation in 
countering violent 
extremism: A 
handbook for 
practitioners 
2014 Handbook  Contribution analysis 
 Cost-benefit analysis 
 Delphi survey 
 Formative evaluations 
 Horizontal evaluations 
 Logic model 
 Multidimensional evaluations 
 Online surveys 
 Peer-group review 
 Process-mapping 
 Summative evaluations 
 SWOT analysis 
 Theory of Change 
 Vertical evaluations 
Dawson, L., Edwards, C., & Jeffray, C. (2014). 
Learning and adapting: The use of monitoring and 
evaluation in countering violent extremism: A 
handbook for practitioners. Great Britain: Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security 
Studies (RUSI). 
Countering violent 
extremism and Risk 
reduction: A guide 
to programme 
design and 
evaluation 
2016 Guide  Focus group discussions 
 Key informant interviews 
 Observations 
 Quantitative surveys 
 Quasi-experimental methods 
 Randomised control trials 
 Results framework 
 Theory of Change 
Khalil, J., & Zeuthen, M. (2016). Countering violent 
extremism and risk reduction: A guide to programme 
design and evaluation. United Kingdom: Royal 
United Services Institute for Defence and Security 
Studies (RUSI). 
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Evaluation of a 
multi-faceted, US 
community-based, 
Muslim-led CVE 
program 
2016 Technical 
report 
 Focus groups 
 Grounded theory approach 
 Multi-method evaluation 
design 
 Surveys 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. G., & Evans, W. P. 
(2016). Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE program. US Department of 
Justice. 
 
Guide/Toolkit Year 
Published 
Format Evaluation methods and 
associated tools/approaches 
discussed 
Source 
RAND Program 
Evaluation Toolkit 
for Countering 
Violent Extremism 
2017 Electronic/ 
paper copy 
toolkit 
 Interrupted time-series 
analysis 
 Logic model 
 Outcome evaluation 
 Retrospective pre-post-
intervention evaluation 
 Pre-/post-intervention 
evaluation 
 Pre-/post-intervention 
evaluation with a comparison 
group 
 Pre-/post-intervention 
evaluation with a control 
group 
 Process evaluation 
 Surveys 
Helmus, T., Matthews, M., Ramchand, R., Beaghley, 
S., Stebbins, D., Kadlec, A., Brown, M. A., Kofner, 
A., & Acosta, J. (2017). RAND Program Evaluation 
Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Impact Europe 
Interactive Online 
Evaluation Guide 
2017 Interactive 
website 
 Contribution analysis 
 Cost-benefit analysis 
 Cost-effectiveness analysis 
 Cross-sectional data analysis 
 Data mining 
 Economic evaluation 
 Focus groups 
Impact Europe. (n.d.). Impact Europe Evaluation 
Guide. Retrieved from http://www.impact.itti.com.pl/ 
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 Impact evaluation 
 Interviews 
 Logic model 
 Mechanism evaluation 
 Network analysis 
 Objective and options 
analysis 
 Observation 
techniques/ethnography 
 Policy scientific approach 
 Process evaluation 
 Qualitative data analysis 
 Quasi-experimental designs 
 Realist evaluation 
 Randomised control trials 
 Stakeholder analysis 
 Surveys 
 Theory of Change 
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Rehabilitating the terrorists?: Challenges in assessing the effectiveness of de-radicalization 
programs 
Horgan and Braddock’s (2010) article proposes Multi Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT), 
also known as Multi-Attribute Evaluation (ME), as a strategy for both guiding the development 
of de-radicalisation programs and evaluating these initiatives. MAUT is used to (a) facilitate 
the identification and relative weighting of key stakeholders’ goals and objectives, and (b) 
assess the effectiveness of a program in meeting those goals and objectives, and is best used 
for comparative assessment of programs (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). There are six 
fundamental, underlying assumptions: 
1. Evaluations are most effective when they are used to assess and compare common 
elements across a range of programs. 
2. Any given program will have a range of stakeholders who have a vested interest in the 
development of the program. 
3. Any given program will have a number of different objectives, which likely are of 
differing importance/significance. 
4. Program evaluations must make judgements. 
5. Judgements made during program evaluations (e.g., which methodology to use) should 
be evidence-based. 
6. Program evaluations should be directly relevant to policy decisions. 
 
The article proposes that the MAUT evaluation method allows the user to ‘draw general 
conclusions regarding (a) which goals are important, (b) the relative difficulty in achieving 
certain goals, (c) where efforts should be focused to develop a successful de-radicalization 
initiative, and (d) the differences in the priorities of the initiatives’ (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). 
This article presents relatively little information as to how a MAUT evaluation is conducted. 
Further, this approach does not tackle some of the key barriers to evaluating CVE programs 
outlined by Horgan and Braddock (2010), including the lack of explicit criteria for evaluating 
success. 
 
From input to impact: Evaluating terrorism prevention programs 
This policy report discusses the evaluation of terrorism prevention programs, drawing on a 
range of resources, including discussions with academics, policy-makers and practitioners 
during the Colloquium on Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism Programming, held in 
Ottawa, Canada in 2012 (Romaniuk & Fink, 2012). The report outlines a number of key steps 
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for designing an evaluation, including: establishing the purpose or objective of an evaluation, 
selecting an appropriate type of evaluation, defining the scope of an evaluation, determining 
the most appropriate method of data collection, identifying an evaluator, and identifying 
available resources for the evaluation. The report focuses on three types of evaluations 
commonly used with CVE programs: 
 Multidimensional evaluations: Evaluations based on a framework that considers 
multiple levels of evaluation, sometimes in a hierarchical manner. Well suited to 
evaluations assessing a wide variety of programs. 
 Vertical evaluations: Evaluations used to assess a specific program from its inception 
through to the final outcome. 
 Horizontal evaluations: Evaluations used to assess initiatives or programs undertaken 
by a range of agencies, bodies or organisations that fall under a particular action plan 
or strategy. 
Lastly, the report also highlights two key considerations for CVE program evaluations: (1) the 
timing of data collection (e.g., will baseline data be collected prior to the implementation of 
the initiative to allow for before-and-after comparisons?), and (2) how much involvement 
stakeholders will have in the evaluation process. 
 
Evaluating countering violent extremism: Practice and progress 
This report was developed out of the international symposium of the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism, which focused on measuring the 
effectiveness of CVE programming and which was held in Ottawa, Canada in 2013 (Fink et 
al., 2013). This symposium built on the 2012 colloquium, which was the basis for the report 
by Romaniuk and Fink (2012), discussed above. The report provides an overview of the key 
steps of an evaluation (i.e., establishing a clear understanding of the purpose or objectives of 
the evaluation in order to determine an appropriate methodology; establishing whether the 
evaluation is vertical, horizontal, or multidimensional; identifying an appropriate evaluator; 
confirming that the program being evaluated qualifies as CVE; and developing 
indicators/measures of success). The report also provides an overview of experiences of CVE 
evaluation from attendees of the symposium. Specifically, four cases studies are provided, 
detailing CVE evaluations conducted in Canada, Denmark, East Africa and Germany, and the 
lessons learnt from these case studies are discussed. 
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A utilisation-focused guide for conducting terrorism risk reduction program evaluations 
In this article, Williams and Kleinman (2014) present a utilisation-focused evaluation 
perspective as a method for conducting impact evaluations of terrorism risk reduction 
initiatives. Utilisation-focused evaluations are based on the principle that evaluations should 
be assessed on the basis of their usefulness to their intended users (Williams & Kleinman, 
2014). Key stakeholders play a crucial role in utilisation-focused evaluations, including in 
determining how the success of the program should be measured. To guide the reader through 
the process of undertaking a utilisation-focused impact evaluation, the authors outline a number 
of key steps, and also provide a process checklist for an impact analysis of terrorism risk 
reduction initiatives. A self-assessment for evaluations of terrorism risk reduction initiatives 
are appendices to the article. 
 
Learning and adapting: The use of monitoring and evaluation in countering violent 
extremism: A handbook for practitioners 
In this handbook, Dawson et al. (2014) aim to support policy-makers and practitioners in 
implementing the monitoring and evaluation of CVE initiatives. The handbook covers a range 
of information, including: (1) an overview of violent extremism (including radicalisation and 
CVE), (2) a brief overview of the basic tenets of evaluation, (3) an outline of key evaluation 
types, tools and technologies, (4) an overview of previous lessons drawn from evaluations in 
the fields of crime prevention, gang prevention, overseas development and peace-building 
projects, and (5) an overview of a number of CVE initiatives implemented in different 
countries. Chapter 3 describes a range of types of evaluations, data collection tools and 
technologies. 
 
Countering violent extremism and risk reduction: A guide to programme design and 
evaluation 
This report by Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) aims to provide guidance to policy-makers and 
practitioners implementing CVE programs focusing on risk reduction (also referred to as de-
radicalisation). The report focuses on key concepts (e.g., violent extremism, CVE, risk 
reduction), the variety of actors involved in violent extremism (e.g., perpetrators, supporters, 
and advocates), drivers of violent extremism, issues of causality, conducting research in 
challenging environments, designing CVE and risk reduction programs, and evaluation 
considerations. While the report touches on CVE program evaluation, a relatively narrow focus 
is taken; however, useful information is provided regarding key questions that should be 
 153 
considered by evaluators and practitioners, as well as impact and outcome indicators for CVE 
initiatives. 
 
Evaluation of a multi-faceted, US community-based, Muslim-led CVE program 
This technical report by Williams et al. (2016) overviews an evaluation of a portfolio of 
programs run by the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), 
a community-based, Muslim-led organisation in the USA that provides CVE initiatives. This 
technical report is a useful example of an evaluation of a CVE initiative. This report is 
particularly useful for the suite of 12 freely licensed measures developed and compiled by the 
authors for the assessment of CVE programs. These measures examine a range of social 
circumstances, psychological processes, motivations and states, including: resiliency and 
coping; historical loss; emotional stability; racism; grievance, activism and radicalism; 
religiosity; social support; program commitment; volunteer program outcomes; peer-
assistance; and trust in police. These scales do not explicitly measure violent extremism, but 
were selected by Williams et al. (2016) on the basis of theoretical and empirical evidence 
regarding predictors or correlates of violent extremism. As noted by Williams et al. (2016), 
these variables are likely most useful as statistical control variables, though they may also be 
suitable for use as dependent/outcome variables in some cases. 
 
RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism 
The RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism aims to help 
community-based organisations implementing CVE initiatives to design an evaluation based 
on the type of program and available resources and expertise (Helmus et al., 2017). The toolkit 
is adapted from the RAND Suicide Prevention Program Evaluation Toolkit. Four core phases 
of evaluation are covered by the toolkit: (1) identifying the core components of a program and 
creating a logic model, (2) designing the evaluation, (3) selecting evaluations measures, and 
(4) using evaluation data to improve the program. Throughout these sections, the toolkit utilises 
a number of worksheets, templates and checklists for the user to complete in order to help them 
move through the process. Additionally, the toolkit also includes three appendices that focus 
on how to create a survey, how to use social media metrics in evaluations and a basic 
introduction to analysing evaluation data. 
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Impact Europe Interactive Online Evaluation Guide 
Impact Europe’s Evaluation Guide is an interactive online guide for designing and conducting 
CVE evaluations (Impact Europe, n.d.). The guide comprises two main sections, which focus 
on (1) how to plan an evaluation, and (2) how to conduct an evaluation. Broadly, information 
covered by the toolkit includes: 
 Ethical considerations. 
 Characteristics and pragmatic considerations of the intervention (e.g., goals, 
mechanisms, beneficiaries, activities, coverage, timing, costs). 
 The purpose of the evaluation (and how this affects the evaluation approach). 
 Evaluation questions (specifically relating to relevance, coherence, effectiveness, 
impact, efficiency and sustainability). 
 The type of evidence and information needed (based on the purpose of the evaluation). 
 Data (e.g., types of data [quantitative, qualitative, primary, secondary, etc.], data 
management, data protection, bias in CVE evaluation, sampling). 
 Project management and data collection (e.g., documentation, resources, project team, 
quality standards, quality assurance). 
 Data analysis (e.g., preliminary information regarding analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data). 
 Writing up and presenting evaluation findings. 
 Potential follow-up activities after completion of an evaluation (e.g., preparing an 
action plan). 
 
The toolkit is designed for individuals to use at various stages of the evaluation process (e.g., 
those planning an evaluation, conducting an evaluation and who have completed an 
evaluation). The ‘get started’ section of the toolkit helps the user to identify what evaluation 
phase they are in and provides them with information regarding how they may best use the 
toolkit. Users can then navigate through the toolkit using the main menus or the links on each 
page. Where available, links are also provided for useful tools (e.g., logic models) and relevant 
existing CVE interventions and evaluations.  
 
In addition to the toolkit, Impact Europe has also developed an interventions database and a 
‘lessons learned’ section. The interventions database provides details regarding a range of CVE 
interventions. The database can be searched using a variety of filters, including by intervention 
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type, radicalisation factor and evaluation characteristics. The ‘lessons learned’ section 
documents lessons learned through evaluations of CVE initiatives. In this section, users can 
review a collection of evaluated CVE interventions, with information provided regarding what 
worked, including how and why it worked, and experiences of implementing and evaluating 
CVE initiatives at different stages of the evaluation process. Additionally, users can also upload 
their own evidence and experiences to the ‘lessons learned’ section. 
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Summary of metrics/instruments tested in the CVE field 
Introduction 
This appendix provides a brief overview of key metrics and instruments that have been tested 
in the CVE field. Due to the wide variety of CVE programs and initiatives, from de-
radicalisation programs involving convicted violent extremists to prevention programs 
targeting the wider community, objectives and outcomes of CVE initiatives vary. This is 
reflected in the range of outcome measures identified in the literature. It is important to note 
that there are relatively few published evaluations of CVE programs, and most of these 
predominantly only provide descriptive results of the program (e.g., number of attendees or 
participants in the program) (Mastroe & Szmania, 2016; Scarcella, Page & Furtado, 2016).  
 
Overview of metrics and instruments tested in the CVE field 
A brief overview of key metrics and instruments that have been tested in the CVE field is 
provided in Table 2, below.  
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Table 2 – Brief overview of key metrics and instruments tested in the CVE field 
Metric/Instrument Description of measure Number of items and 
examples 
Validity and 
reliability 
Source(s) 
Acculturation 
scale 
This scale was developed to 
measure acculturation, 
specifically respondents’ own 
feelings about their cultural 
customs and values in 
relation to integration, 
assimilation, separation and 
marginalisation. 
The number of items and 
measurement/response options 
for each item are not reported. 
Example items: 
 I wish to maintain my 
heritage culture values 
and also adopt key 
features of American 
values. 
 I wish to give up my 
heritage culture values for 
the sake of adopting 
American values. 
 I wish to maintain my 
heritage culture customs 
rather than adopt American 
customs. 
 I do not wish to maintain 
my heritage culture values 
or adopt American values 
as I feel uncomfortable 
with both types of values. 
Information not 
reported. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, 
M. J., Mirahmadi, H., 
Farooq, M., & van Egmond, 
M. (2015). Belonging 
nowhere: Marginalization 
and radicalization risk 
among Muslim immigrants. 
Behavioral Science & 
Policy, 1(2), 1-12. 
Adapted 
Collectivism Scale 
This scale, designed to 
measure collectivism, was 
adapted from Triandis and 
Gelfand’s (1998) Culture 
Orientation Scale. 
Four items measured using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Items: 
Scale has been shown 
to have very good 
reliability (alpha = .93) 
(see Kruglanski et al., 
2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
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 If a member of my group 
succeeded, I would feel 
proud. 
 The wellbeing of my co-
workers is important to 
me/The wellbeing of my 
fellow group members is 
important to me. 
 It is my duty to take care 
of my family, even when I 
have to sacrifice what I 
want./It is my duty to take 
care of my fellow group 
members, even when I 
have to sacrifice what I 
want. 
 It is important to me that I 
respect the decisions made 
by my groups. 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
 
Triandis, H., & Gelfand, M. 
(1998). Converging 
measurement of horizontal 
and vertical individualism 
and collectivism. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(1), 118-128. 
Adapted 
Grievance, 
Activism, and 
Radicalism Scale 
This measure was designed 
to assess an individual’s level 
of political grievance, 
activism, and radicalism. 
Eight items measured using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
‘very unconcerned’ to ‘very 
concerned’). 
Example items: 
In the future, how concerned 
would you be if your best 
friend engaged in the activities 
described below?: 
 Join an organisation that 
fights for their group’s 
political and legal rights. 
 Participate in a public 
protest against oppression 
The Adapted 
Grievance, Activism, 
and Radicalism Scale 
has been shown to have 
good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.74–0.93) (see 
Williams et al., 2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
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of their group if they 
thought the protest might 
turn violent. 
 Attack police or security 
forces if they saw them 
beating members of their 
group. 
Adapted 
Individualism 
Scale 
This scale, designed to 
measure individualism, was 
adapted from Triandis and 
Gelfand’s (1998) Culture 
Orientation Scale. 
Three items measured using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Items: 
 I’d rather depend on 
myself than others. 
 I rely on myself most of 
the time; I rarely rely on 
others. 
 It is important that I do my 
job better than others. 
 
Scale has been shown 
to have very good 
reliability (alpha = .90) 
(see Kruglanski et al., 
2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
 
Triandis, H., & Gelfand, M. 
(1998). Converging 
measurement of horizontal 
and vertical individualism 
and collectivism. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(1), 118-128. 
Adapted 
Investment Model 
of Program 
Commitment 
Scale 
This measure was designed 
to assess an individual’s level 
of engagement with, and 
commitment to, a particular 
organisation. 
16 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
‘completely disagree’ to 
‘completely agree’). Items are 
split across four areas: 
satisfaction level, quality of 
alternatives, investment size, 
and commitment level. 
Example items: 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(see Williams et al., 
2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
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 Volunteering, or 
participating in 
multicultural events, 
at/with [organisation] 
makes me feel satisfied. 
 I have put a great deal into 
volunteering, or 
participating in 
multicultural events, 
specifically with the 
[organisation], that I would 
lose if I was to stop doing 
that with them. 
Adapted Modern 
Racism Scale 
This scale was designed to 
assess an individual’s racial 
bias towards minority groups. 
Six items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 Over the past few years, 
minorities have gotten 
more economically than 
they deserve. 
 Minorities are getting too 
demanding in their push 
for equal rights. 
Scale has been shown 
to have very good 
reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.93) (see 
Williams et al., 2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Adapted Need for 
Cognitive Closure 
Scale 
This scale, developed to 
measure need for cognitive 
closure, was adapted from 
Webster and Kruglanski’s 
(1994) Need for Cognitive 
Close Scale. 
14 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 I prefer to be with people 
who have the same ideas 
and tastes as me. 
Scale has been shown 
to have high reliability 
(alpha = .87) (see 
Kruglanski et al., 
2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
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 After having found a 
solution to a problem I 
believe that it is a useless 
waste of time to take into 
account diverse possible 
solutions. 
 I get very upset when 
things around me aren’t in 
their place. 
 Generally, I avoid 
participating in discussions 
on ambiguous and 
controversial problems. 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
 
Webster, D., & Kruglanski, 
A. (1994). Individual 
differences in need for 
cognitive closure. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67(6), 1049-
1062. 
Adapted 
Religiosity Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure religious activity, 
dedication and belief. 
Seven items (see Williams et 
al. (2016) for response 
categories). 
Example items: 
 How close do you feel to 
God most of the time? 
 Do you believe in life after 
death? 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(see Williams et al., 
2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Adapted 
Significance Loss 
Scale 
This scale, adapted from the 
Need Threat Scale (Williams, 
2009), was developed to 
measure significance loss. 
21 items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (categories 
not reported). 
Example items: 
 I feel ashamed. 
 I feel humiliated. 
 I feel meaningless. 
 I feel like an outsider. 
 I feel disconnected from 
other people. 
Information not 
reported. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, 
M. J., Mirahmadi, H., 
Farooq, M., & van Egmond, 
M. (2015). Belonging 
nowhere: Marginalization 
and radicalization risk 
among Muslim immigrants. 
Behavioral Science & 
Policy, 1(2), 1-12. 
 
Lyons, S. L. (2015). The 
psychological foundations of 
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 I feel welcome in most 
non-Muslim American 
social situations. 
 There are times when I feel 
I don’t belong to any 
culture. 
homegrown radicalization: 
An immigrant accultural 
perspective. Doctorate of 
Philosophy, University of 
Maryland, Maryland, US. 
 
Williams, K. D. (2009). 
Ostracism: A temporal need-
threat model. Advances in 
Experimental Social 
Psychology, 41, 275-314. 
Adapted Social 
Dominance 
Orientation Scale 
This scale, developed to 
measure social dominance 
orientation, was adapted from 
Pratto et al.’s (1994) Social 
Dominance Orientation 
Scale. 
15 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (‘strongly 
disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). 
Example items: 
 It’s probably a good thing 
that certain groups are at 
the top and other groups 
are at the bottom. 
 Some groups of people are 
simply inferior to other 
groups. 
 To get ahead in life, it is 
sometimes necessary to 
step on other groups. 
 We would have fewer 
problems if we treated 
people more equally 
(reverse coded). 
Scale has been shown 
to have very good 
reliability (alpha = .90) 
(see Kruglanski et al. 
2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., 
Stallworth, L., & Malle, B. 
(1994). Social dominance 
orientation: A personality 
variable predicting social 
and political attitudes. 
Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67(4), 
741-763. 
Attitudes towards 
de-radicalisation 
scale – version 1 
This scale was designed to 
measure the extent to which 
prisoners felt that the 
Four items measured using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
Scale has been shown 
to have adequate 
reliability (Cronbach’s 
Webber, D., Chernikova, 
M., Kruglanski, A. W., 
Gelfand, M. J., 
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rehabilitation program had 
been beneficial to them. 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 The rehabilitation program 
has helped me. 
 My situation has improved 
since the rehabilitation 
program began. 
alpha = 0.59-.066) (see 
Webber et al., 2017b). 
Hettiarachchi, M., 
Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, 
J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing 
detained terrorists. Political 
Psychology. 
doi:10.1111/pops.12428 
Attitudes towards 
de-radicalisation 
scale – version 2 
This scale was designed to 
measure attitudes towards de-
radicalisation, relating 
specifically to the time when 
respondents were detained. 
Six items measured using a 6-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 The rehabilitation program 
helped prepare me to be 
successful post-release. 
 When I look back to my 
time in rehabilitation, I feel 
like I was treated with 
respect. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.85) (see Webber et 
al., 2017b). 
Webber, D., Chernikova, 
M., Kruglanski, A. W., 
Gelfand, M. J., 
Hettiarachchi, M., 
Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, 
J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing 
detained terrorists. Political 
Psychology. 
doi:10.1111/pops.12428 
Australian 
identity scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure how strongly 
respondents identified as 
Australian. 
Four items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Items: 
 I am proud to be 
Australian. 
 I identify strongly with 
being Australian. 
 Being an Australian is 
important to the way I 
think of myself as a 
person. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = .81) (see 
Cherney & Murphy, 
2017). 
Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. 
(2017). Support for 
terrorism: The role of beliefs 
in jihad and institutional 
responses to terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political 
Violence. doi: 
10.1080/095 
46553. 2017.1313735 
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 I see myself as an 
Australian first and 
Muslim second. 
Brief Resiliency 
and Coping Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure an individual’s 
tendency to cope with stress 
in a highly adaptive manner. 
Four items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘does not describe me at all’ to 
‘describes me very well’). 
Example items: 
 Regardless of what 
happens to me, I believe I 
can control my reaction to 
it. 
 I actively look for ways to 
replace the losses I 
encounter in life. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(see Williams et al., 
2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Beck Scale of 
Suicidal Ideation 
(BSI) 
The scale was measured to 
assess suicidal ideation. 
19 items measured using a 3-
point Likert scale. 
 
Example items unavailable. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = .83) (see 
Bélanger et al., 2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
 
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. 
(1991). Manual for the Beck 
Scale for Suicide Ideation. 
San Antonio, TX: 
Psychological Corporation. 
Brief Volunteer 
Program Outcome 
Assessment 
This measure was designed 
to assess the strength of key 
14 items measures using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
Information not 
available. 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
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outcomes of volunteer 
programs. 
‘completely disagree’ to 
‘completely agree’). 
Example items: 
Thinking of when you 
volunteer, please rate your 
level of agreement with the 
following items: 
 I feel welcome. 
 I feel a part of something 
bigger than myself. 
 I learn about cultures other 
than my own. 
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Collective relative 
deprivation scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure collective relative 
deprivation. 
Six items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from 
‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally 
agree’). 
Example item: 
 I think Muslims are less 
well off than other groups 
in the Netherlands. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = .82) (see 
(Doosje et al., 2013). 
Doojse, B., Loseman, A., & 
van den Bos, K. (2013). 
Determinants of 
radicalization of Islamic 
youth in the Netherlands: 
Personal uncertainty, 
perceived injustice, and 
perceived group threat. 
Journal of Social Issues, 
69(3), 586-604. 
Discrimination 
scale 
This scale was developed to 
measure discrimination 
against Muslims. 
Eight items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘never’ to ‘all of the time’). 
Example items: 
 Have you ever experienced 
hostility or unfair 
treatment because of your 
religion? 
 Have you ever experienced 
hostility or unfair 
Information not 
reported. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, 
M. J., Mirahmadi, H., 
Farooq, M., & van Egmond, 
M. (2015). Belonging 
nowhere: Marginalization 
and radicalization risk 
among Muslim immigrants. 
Behavioral Science & 
Policy, 1(2), 1-12. 
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treatment because of your 
cultural background? 
 
Embeddedness 
scale 
This scale was developed to 
measure the extent to which 
individuals and their families 
were integrated within the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) social 
structure.  
17 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 I was very active in the 
armed group. 
 I was very central in the 
armed group. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.88-0.89) (see Webber 
et al., 2017b). 
Webber, D., Chernikova, 
M., Kruglanski, A. W., 
Gelfand, M. J., 
Hettiarachchi, M., 
Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, 
J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing 
detained terrorists. Political 
Psychology. 
doi:10.1111/pops.12428 
Emotional 
Stability Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure emotional stability. 
Seven items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘very much’). 
Example items: 
These questions ask you about 
how often you have the 
following thoughts or 
emotions: 
 Feeling others are to blame 
for most of your problems. 
 Thoughts of ending your 
life. 
 Urges to injure or harm 
someone else. 
Scale has been shown 
to have very high 
reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.96) (see 
Williams et al., 2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Emotional 
Uncertainty Scale 
This subscale of the 
Uncertainty Response Scale 
(URS) was developed to 
measure emotional 
uncertainty. 
15 items (measurement scale 
not described). 
Example items: 
 I feel anxious when things 
are changing. 
Scale has been shown 
to have high reliability 
(alpha = .89) (see 
(Doosje et al., 2013). 
Greco, V., & Roger, D. 
(2001). Coping with 
uncertainty: The 
construction and validation 
of a new measure. 
Personality and Individual 
Differences, 31, 519-534. 
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 When uncertain about 
what to do next, I tend to 
feel lost. 
 Thinking about uncertainty 
makes me feel depressed. 
 When I’m not certain 
about someone’s intentions 
towards me, I often 
become upset or angry. 
 
Doojse, B., Loseman, A., & 
van den Bos, K. (2013). 
Determinants of 
radicalization of Islamic 
youth in the Netherlands: 
Personal uncertainty, 
perceived injustice, and 
perceived group threat. 
Journal of Social Issues, 
69(3), 586-604. 
Historical Loss 
Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure an individual’s sense 
of loss, based on their sense 
of their cultural heritage. 
12 items measured using a 6-
point Likert scale (from 
‘never’ to ‘several times a 
day’). 
Example items: 
 Loss of our language. 
 Loss of our people through 
wars or armed conflicts. 
 Loss of respect by our 
children for traditional 
ways. 
Scale has been shown 
to have very high 
reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.96) (see 
Williams et al., 2016). 
Whitbeck, L. B., Adams, G. 
W., Hoyt, D. R., & Chen, X. 
(2004). Conceptualizing and 
measuring historical trauma 
among American Indian 
people. American Journal of 
Community Psychology, 
33(3-4), 119-130. 
 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Identifying 
Vulnerable People 
(IVP) Guidance 
This screening tool was 
developed to provide a 
checklist of key behaviours 
that may assist frontline 
workers (e.g., school 
teachers, health care 
professionals, police officers) 
16 items scored using a 4-
point rating system (where 0 – 
no record/not known, 1 – low 
evidence, 2 – medium 
evidence, 3 – good evidence). 
Example items: 
The screening tool has 
been shown to be 
reliable when using 
open source 
intelligence sources as 
the basis for 
information to score 
Egan, V., Cole, J., Cole, B., 
Alison, L., Alison, E., 
Waring, S., & Elntib, S. 
(2016). Can you identify 
violent extremists using a 
screening checklist and 
open-source intelligence 
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to identify individuals at risk 
of becoming involved with 
violent extremism. 
 Cultural and religious 
isolation. 
 Political activism. 
 Sudden change in religious 
practice. 
the items (see Egan et 
al., 2016). 
alone? Journal of Threat 
Assessment and 
Management, 3(1), 21-36. 
Individual 
Relative 
Deprivation Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure individual relative 
deprivation. 
Six items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from 
‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally 
agree’). 
Example item: 
 I don’t think I get as many 
chances as others in the 
Netherlands. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = 0.82) (see 
(Doosje et al., 2013). 
Doojse, B., Loseman, A., & 
van den Bos, K. (2013). 
Determinants of 
radicalization of Islamic 
youth in the Netherlands: 
Personal uncertainty, 
perceived injustice, and 
perceived group threat. 
Journal of Social Issues, 
69(3), 586-604. 
Loss of 
Significance Scale 
(Webber et al., 
2017a) 
This scale was designed to 
measure the frequency with 
which respondents 
experienced feelings of 
humiliation, shame, and 
‘people laughing at them’ in 
their daily life. 
Three items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘rarely or never’ to ‘very 
often’). 
Example items not available. 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory 
reliability (alpha = .73) 
(see Webber et al., 
2017a). 
Webber, D., Babush, M., 
Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-
Nieuwenhuis, A., 
Hettiarachchi, M., Belanger, 
J. J., … Gelfand, M. J. 
(2017). The road to 
extremism: Field and 
experimental evidence that 
significance loss-induced 
need for closure fosters 
radicalization. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology. 
Loss of 
Significance Scale 
– Version 1 
(Webber et al., 
2017b) 
This scale was designed to 
measure feelings of 
insignificance. 
11 items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from ‘rarely 
or never’ to ‘very often). 
Example items: 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory 
reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.77-0.78) (see 
Webber et al., 2017b). 
Webber, D., Chernikova, 
M., Kruglanski, A. W., 
Gelfand, M. J., 
Hettiarachchi, M., 
Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, 
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 I feel humiliated in my 
daily life. 
 I feel like hiding from the 
world in my daily life. 
 I feel worthless in my daily 
life. 
J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing 
detained terrorists. Political 
Psychology. 
Loss of 
Significance Scale 
– Version 2 
(Webber et al., 
2017b) 
This scale was designed to 
measure feelings of 
insignificance, particularly 
targeted at respondents re-
integrating back into a 
community. 
Seven items measured using a 
6-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 I feel ashamed of myself. 
 Because I am a Tamil 
person, I have been 
victimized/discriminated. 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory 
reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.71) (see 
Webber et al., 2017b). 
Webber, D., Chernikova, 
M., Kruglanski, A. W., 
Gelfand, M. J., 
Hettiarachchi, M., 
Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, 
J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing 
detained terrorists. Political 
Psychology. 
Islamic 
Extremism Scale 
(Kruglanski et al., 
2016) 
This scale was designed to 
measure Islamic extremism. 
11 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 Islam is the only true 
religion. 
 I think it is important to 
establish an Islamic state in 
my country. 
 The goal of jihad is to 
restore justice for Muslims 
worldwide. 
Scale has been shown 
to have relatively weak 
reliability (alpha = .45-
.47) (see Kruglanski et 
al., 2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
Islamic 
Extremism Scale 
(Webber et al., 
2017a) 
This scale was designed to 
measure Islamic extremism. 
11 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory 
reliability (alpha = .70) 
(see Webber et al., 
2017a). 
Webber, D., Babush, M., 
Schori-Eyal, N., Vazeou-
Nieuwenhuis, A., 
Hettiarachchi, M., Bélanger, 
J. J., … Gelfand, M. J. 
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 Suicide bombers will be 
rewarded for their deed by 
God. 
 Armed jihad is a personal 
obligation of all Muslims 
today. 
 True Muslims should 
adhere strictly to the literal 
meaning of the Quran. 
 All countries that are not 
ruled by Muslims and do 
not observe shariyah 
(Islamic law) should be 
considered darul harb 
(abode of war). 
(2017). The road to 
extremism: Field and 
experimental evidence that 
significance loss-induced 
need for closure fosters 
radicalization. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 114(2), 270-
295. 
Legitimacy of 
Counterterrorism 
Laws 
This scale was designed to 
measure respondents’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy 
of counterterrorism laws. 
Four items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Items: 
 I question the fairness of 
some of Australia’s 
counterterrorism laws 
(reverse coded). 
 I have confidence in 
Australia’s 
counterterrorism laws. 
 I question the legitimacy of 
Australia’s 
counterterrorism laws 
(reverse coded). 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = .80) (see 
Cherney & Murphy, 
2017). 
Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. 
(2017). Support for 
terrorism: The role of beliefs 
in Jihad and institutional 
responses to terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political 
Violence. doi: 
10.1080/095 
46553. 2017.1313735 
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 Counterterrorism laws 
unfairly target Muslims 
(reverse coded). 
Levenson Self-
Report 
Psychopathy Scale 
(LSRP) 
This scale was designed to 
assess two types of 
psychopathy: primary 
psychopathy and secondary 
psychopathy. 
26 items across primary 
psychopathy (16 items) and 
secondary psychopathy (10 
items). Each item is measured 
using a 5-point Likert scale 
(from ‘strongly disagree’ to 
‘strongly agree’). 
Example items: 
 For me, what’s right is 
whatever I can get away 
with. 
 Most of my problems are 
due to the fact that other 
people just don’t 
understand me. 
The subscales of the 
LSRP have been 
shown to have 
satisfactory to good 
reliability (primary 
psychopathy: alpha = 
.87; secondary 
psychopathy: alpha = 
.68) (see Bélanger et 
al., 2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
 
Levenson, M. R., Kiehl, K. 
A., & Fitzpatrick, C. M. 
(1995). Assessing 
psychopathic attributes in a 
noninstitutionalized 
population. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68, 151-158. 
Meaning in Life 
Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was 
designed to measure the 
presence of meaning in life. 
Five items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from 
‘absolutely untrue’ to 
‘absolutely true’). 
 
Example item: 
 I have a good sense of 
what makes my life 
meaningful. 
Scale has been shown 
to have very high 
reliability (alpha = .93) 
(see Bélanger et al., 
2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
 
Steger, M. F., Frazier, P., 
Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. 
(2006) The Meaning in Life 
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Questionnaire: Assessing 
the presence of and search 
for meaning in life. Journal 
of Counseling Psychology, 
53, 80-93. 
Muslim Identity 
Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure how strongly 
respondents identified as 
Muslim. 
Four items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Items: 
 I am proud to be Muslim 
 What Islam stands for is 
important to me 
 Being a Muslim is 
important to the way I 
think of myself as a person 
 I see myself as a Muslim 
first and an Australian 
second 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = .84) (see 
Cherney & Murphy, 
2017). 
Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. 
(2017). Support for 
terrorism: The role of beliefs 
in Jihad and institutional 
responses to terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political 
Violence. doi: 
10.1080/095 
46553. 2017.1313735 
Negative Attitudes 
Toward the West 
This scale was designed to 
assess respondents’ 
perceptions of Western 
nations as immoral and 
threatening. 
Four items measured using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’. 
Example items: 
 The aggression of Western 
countries must be stopped 
by any means possible. 
 Western nations are 
generally immoral. 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory to 
high reliability (alpha = 
.62-.81) (see 
Kruglanski et al., 
2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
Normative Beliefs 
about Anti-
Semitic 
Aggression 
This scale was designed to 
measure normative beliefs 
about anti-Semitic aggression 
in Pakistan. 
Six items measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from 
‘absolutely the right thing to 
do’ to ‘completely wrong’). 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 
Amjad, N., & Wood, A. M. 
(2009). Identifying and 
changing the normative 
beliefs about aggression 
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Example items: 
 Cursing Jews in prayers 
and praying for God’s 
wrath against Jewish 
people is… 
 Forwarding anti-Semitic 
emails or written material 
is… 
 Making threats against 
Jewish people is… 
0.80) (see Amjad and 
Wood, 2009). 
which lead young Muslims 
adults to join extremist anti-
Semitic groups in Pakistan. 
Aggressive Behavior, 35, 
514-519. 
Nostalgia for 
Involvement in 
Extremist Group 
This scale was developed to 
measure the extent to which 
former members of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) missed their 
involvement in the group. 
Five items measured using a 6-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 I currently find myself 
yearning for the sense of 
discipline that I had when I 
was a member of the 
LTTE. 
 When I think back to the 
time when I was with the 
LTTE, I felt that being a 
member gave my life 
purpose. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.80) (see Webber et 
al., 2017b). 
Webber, D., Chernikova, 
M., Kruglanski, A. W., 
Gelfand, M. J., 
Hettiarachchi, M., 
Gunaratna, R., … Bélanger, 
J. J. (2017). Deradicalizing 
detained terrorists. Political 
Psychology. 
Own Violent 
Intentions 
This scale was designed to 
measure respondents’ violent 
intenstons. 
Three items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 I am prepared to use 
violence against other 
people in order to achieve 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory 
reliability (alpha = .76) 
(see Doosje et al., 
2013). 
Doojse, B., Loseman, A., & 
van den Bos, K. (2013). 
Determinants of 
radicalization of Islamic 
youth in the Netherlands: 
Personal uncertainty, 
perceived injustice, and 
perceived group threat. 
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something I consider very 
important. 
 I am prepared to disturb 
the orderliness in order to 
achieve something I 
consider very important. 
Journal of Social Issues, 
69(3), 586-604. 
Passion Scale This scale was designed to 
measure respondents’ passion 
regarding a particular cause. 
12 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from ‘not 
agree at all’ to ‘very strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 My cause is in harmony 
with the other activities in 
my life. 
 I have almost an obsessive 
feeling for my cause. 
The two subscales of 
the Passion Scale have 
been shown to have 
good reliability 
(harmonious passion 
subscale: alpha = .87; 
obsessive passion 
subscale: alpha = .88) 
(see Bélanger et al., 
2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
 
Vallerand, R. J., Blanchard, 
C. M., Mageau, G. A., 
Koestner, R., Ratelle, C., 
Léonard, M., … Marsolais, 
J. (2003). Les passions de 
l’âme: On obsessive and 
harmonious passion. Journal 
of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85, 756-767. 
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Peer-Assistance 
Barometer 
This instrument was designed 
to measure willingness to 
engage with/assist peers who 
might be experiencing a 
personal crisis. 
Eight items separated into two 
sections (see Williams et al. 
(2016) for full wording of 
instrument). 
Example items: 
Thinking now about your 
friends, imagine one of them 
started to say or do things that 
made you think they were 
thinking about committing 
violence against someone else. 
What (if anything) do you 
think you would say or do in 
response to that friend? 
 I would talk to another 
friend or family member 
about what to do. 
 I would contact the police. 
 I would try to get my 
friend to talk to a 
counsellor. 
Information not 
available. 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Perceived Group 
Threat 
This instrument was designed 
to measure three types of 
perceived group threat: 
symbolic threat, realistic 
threat and interpersonal 
anxiety. 
29 items across three sub-
scales: symbolic threat (12 
items), realistic threat (three 
items), and interpersonal 
anxiety (14 items). 
Example items: 
 Islamic and non-Islamic 
people in the Netherlands 
have different family 
values. 
 Non-Islamic Dutch people 
have too many positions of 
The subscales have 
been shown to have 
satisfactory to good 
reliability (alpha = .70-
.88) (see Doosje et al., 
2013). 
Doojse, B., Loseman, A., & 
van den Bos, K. (2013). 
Determinants of 
radicalization of Islamic 
youth in the Netherlands: 
Personal uncertainty, 
perceived injustice, and 
perceived group threat. 
Journal of Social Issues, 
69(3), 586-604. 
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power and responsibility in 
this country. 
Perceived in-
group superiority 
This scale was designed to 
measure perceived in-group 
superiority. 
Four items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘totally disagree’ to ‘totally 
agree’). 
Example item: 
 I believe that Muslims are 
better people than people 
who endorse another 
religion. 
Scale has been shown 
to have satisfactory 
reliability (alpha = .71) 
(see (Doosje et al., 
2013). 
Doojse, B., Loseman, A., & 
van den Bos, K. (2013). 
Determinants of 
radicalization of Islamic 
youth in the Netherlands: 
Personal uncertainty, 
perceived injustice, and 
perceived group threat. 
Journal of Social Issues, 
69(3), 586-604. 
Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale 
Short Form (SRP-
SF) 
This scale was designed to 
measure self-report 
psychopathy. 
29 items across four 
dimensions of psychopathy: 
interpersonal manipulation 
(seven items), callous affect 
(seven items), erratic lifestyle 
(seven items) and antisocial 
behaviours (eight items). Each 
item is measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (‘strongly 
disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’). 
 
Example items not available 
The subscales have 
been shown to have 
satisfactory to good 
reliability (alpha = .67-
.83) (see Bélanger et 
al., 2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
 
Paulhus, D. L., Neumann, C. 
S., & Hare, R. D. (in press). 
Manual for the Hare Self-
Report Psychopathy Scale. 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada: 
Multi-Health Systems. 
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Self-Sacrifice 
Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure an individual’s 
readiness to self-sacrifice. 
10 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (from ‘do 
not agree at all’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 I would be prepared to 
endure intense suffering if 
it meant defending an 
important cause. 
 I would be ready to give up 
all my personal wealth for 
a highly important cause. 
 I would defend a cause to 
which I am truly 
committed even if my 
loved ones rejected me. 
Scale has been shown 
to have high reliability 
(alpha = .90) (see 
Bélanger et al., 2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
Short Patient 
Health 
Questionnaire 
(PHQ-9) 
The Short Patient Health 
Questionnaire was designed 
to measure respondents’ 
tendency to feel depressed. 
Nine items measured using a 
4-point Likert scale (from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘nearly every day’). 
Example items: 
 Little interest or pleasure 
in doing things. 
 Feeling down, depressed or 
hopeless. 
Scale has been shown 
to have good reliability 
(alpha = .89) (see 
Bélanger et al., 2014). 
Bélanger, J. J., Caoette, J., 
Sharvit, K., & Dugas, M. 
(2014). The psychology of 
martyrdom: Making the 
ultimate sacrifice in the 
name of a cause. Journal of 
Personality and Social 
Psychology, 107(3), 494-
515. 
 
Kroenke, K., Spitzer, R. L., 
& Williams, J. B. (2001). 
The PHQ-9: Validity of a 
brief depression severity 
measure. Journal of General 
Internal Medicine, 16, 606-
613. 
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Support for 
Fundamentalist 
Groups 
This scale was developed to 
measure support for 
fundamentalist groups, using 
respondents’ perception of 
the extent to which most 
people they knew would be 
interested in the group as a 
proxy for their own attitudes 
and opinions. 
12 items measured using 7-
point Likert scales (from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘very much’ and 
‘very unlikely’ to ‘very 
likely’). 
Items: 
 To what extent do you 
think most people you 
know would… 
o Want to join the 
group. 
o Identify with the 
group. 
o Like the group’s 
members and the 
group as a whole. 
o Perceive personal 
similarity to the 
group and its 
members. 
 How likely do you think 
most people you know 
would participate in the 
following activities for the 
group? 
o Attend monthly 
meetings. 
o Lobby, petition, 
and letter-write on 
behalf of the group. 
o Participate in 
demonstrations, sit-
ins, and blockades 
Information not 
reported. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, 
M. J., Mirahmadi, H., 
Farooq, M., & van Egmond, 
M. (2015). Belonging 
nowhere: Marginalization 
and radicalization risk 
among Muslim immigrants. 
Behavioral Science & 
Policy. 
 
Lyons, S. L. (2015). The 
psychological foundations of 
homegrown radicalization: 
An immigrant accultural 
perspective. Doctorate of 
Philosophy, University of 
Maryland, Maryland, US. 
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on behalf of the 
group. 
o Act as a 
representative of 
the group. 
 To what extent do you 
think most people you 
know would understand if 
this group participated in 
the following behaviours? 
o Participating in an 
illegal 
demonstration. 
o Participating in a 
violent 
demonstration. 
o Writing a political 
slogan on a public 
wall. 
o Damaging other 
people’s property. 
 
Support for a 
Radical 
Interpretation of 
Islam Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure respondents’ support 
for a radical interpretation of 
Islam. 
10 items (response options not 
reported). 
Example items: 
 Muslims in America 
should help their oppressed 
brothers and sisters in 
other parts of the world by 
participating in combative 
jihad. 
 It is important to give to 
Islamic charities, even if 
Information not 
reported. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, 
M. J., Mirahmadi, H., 
Farooq, M., & van Egmond, 
M. (2015). Belonging 
nowhere: Marginalization 
and radicalization risk 
among Muslim immigrants. 
Behavioral Science & 
Policy, 1(2), 1-12. 
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their ideological beliefs 
may be extreme at times. 
 Combative jihad is the 
only way to conduct jihad. 
Support for 
Violence 
This scale was designed to 
measure respondents’ support 
for violence. 
Three items measuring using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 If violence does not solve 
problems, it is because 
there was not enough of it. 
 The only way to teach a 
lesson to our enemies is to 
threaten their lives and 
make them suffer. 
Scale has been shown 
to have adequate 
reliability (alpha = .50-
.72) (see Kruglanski et 
al., 2016). 
Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, 
M. J., Sheveland, A., 
Babush, M., Hetiarachchi, 
M., Bonto, M. N., & 
Gunaratna, R. (2016). What 
a difference two years make: 
Patterns of radicalization in 
a Philippine jail. Dynamics 
of Asymmetric Conflict, 9(1-
3), 13-36. 
SyfoR This scale was designed to 
measure an individual’s 
vulnerability to violent 
radicalisation/sympathies for 
violent extremism. 
16 items measured using a 7-
point Likert scale (categories 
not reported). 
Example items: 
 Take part in non-violent 
protests. 
 Organise radical terrorist 
groups without personally 
taking part. 
 Violence to protect family. 
Information not 
available. 
Bhui, K., Warfa, N., & 
Jones, E. (2014). Is violent 
radicalisation associated 
with poverty, migration, 
poor self-reported health and 
common mental disorders? 
PLOS One, 9. 
Terrorists have 
Valid Grievances 
This single item was 
developed to measure 
respondents’ beliefs as to 
whether terrorists have valid 
grievances. 
Single item measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Item: 
 Terrorists have valid 
grievances. 
Not applicable. Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. 
(2017). Support for 
terrorism: The role of beliefs 
in Jihad and institutional 
responses to terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political 
Violence. doi: 
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46553. 2017.1313735 
Trust in Police 
Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure trust in police. 
Eight items measured using a 
7-point Likert scale (from 
‘very unlikely’ to ‘very 
likely’). 
Example items: 
Imagine that you wanted to 
talk to the police, just to ask 
them for advice about what to 
do about a friend of yours, 
whom you believe might be 
considering doing something 
illegal that could end up 
injuring other people. How 
likely do you think the 
following would be to happen? 
The police would: 
 Overreact. 
 Try to monitor me or my 
friend. 
 Cause more harm than 
good. 
Scale has been shown 
to have high reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.87) (see Williams et 
al., 2016). 
Williams, M. J., Horgan, J. 
G., & Evans, W. P. (2016). 
Evaluation of a multi-
faceted, US community-
based, Muslim-led CVE 
program. US Department of 
Justice. 
Trust in Police to 
Combat 
Terrorism Scale 
This scale was designed to 
measure trust in police to 
combat terrorism. 
Seven items measured using a 
5-point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Example items: 
 You trust police to make 
decisions that are good for 
everyone when they are 
investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism. 
Scale has been shown 
to have very good 
reliability (alpha = .91) 
(see Cherney & 
Murphy, 2017). 
Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. 
(2017). Support for 
terrorism: The role of beliefs 
in Jihad and institutional 
responses to terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political 
Violence.  doi: 
10.1080/095 
46553. 2017.1313735 
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 People’s rights are 
generally well protected by 
police when they are 
investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism. 
 You have confidence in 
police to effectively deal 
with terrorism. 
 You have confidence in 
police when they 
investigate and prosecute 
terrorism. 
 When the police fight 
terrorism they gain respect. 
Views of Jihad 
Items 
These items were developed 
to measure attitudes towards 
the meaning of jihad. 
Three single-item statements 
(not a summed scale). Each 
item is measured using a 5-
point Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly 
agree’). 
Items: 
 The concept of jihad in 
Islam supports the use of 
violence as a means to an 
end. 
 Jihad is solely a personal 
struggle for righteousness. 
 Jihad is a militarised 
struggle that can be 
conducted by individuals. 
Not applicable. Cherney, A., & Murphy, K. 
(2017). Support for 
terrorism: The role of beliefs 
in Jihad and institutional 
responses to terrorism. 
Terrorism and Political 
Violence. doi: 
10.1080/095 
46553. 2017.1313735 
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